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ABSTRACT
Since 1940 Newfoundland has witnessed a considerable
change to its cultural landscape. One of the major contributors to
these changes has been the military, especially during thp. years
1940 to 1945. Although the military has been a significant factor in
the development of the landscape, the literature- on this aspect 01
our historical geography is almost non-existent. This thesis is an
effort to fill this lacuna and provide an understanding of the
military geography of Newfoundland and Labrador during the Second
World War and its enduring impact on the landscape.
During the inter war years, there was no permanent military
presence in Newfoundland. This was to change in 1940 when the
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom made decisions for
their own strategic and national interests, with little or no input
from Newfoundland. The resultant military buildup extensively
modifIed the Newfoundland landscape. The benefits. mainly in the
form of social capital. are still evident throughout Newfot,Jndland
today.
This thesis is structured in three parts. In part one the
geopolitical reasons why the military forces of three foreign
countries came to Newfoundland are documented. In part two the
military geography of Newfoundland is reconstructed by documenting
the spatial and temporal patterns of military activity on the
landscape. The third and final part documents the significant and
enduring impact of the military on the landscape of the province.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis has three getals: to reconstruct the geopolitical
reasons why the military forces of three foreign countries came to
Newfoundland; to reconstruct the military geography that evolved
by documenting the spatial and temporal patterns of military
activity on the landscape; and to discuss the post-war impacts of
the military developments on the tands8ape. Once these goals have
been achieved, it will be possible to answer the question of whether
the military developments during the years 1940-1945 had any
significant long-term impacts on the cultural landscape.
The spatial and temporal aspects of military activity have
not been as extensively studied as many of the- other fields of human
geography. Traditionally, military geography has concerned itself
with the tactical problems associated with the offensive and
defensive movement of military forces in relationship to topography.
The standard work by Cole (1950) is a physical, economic and human
geography of the British Empire written from a military perspective.
Its primary emphasis is on the effects of topography on the spatial
movement of military forces. Later works by Peltier and Pearcy
(19&6), and O'Sullivan and Miller (1983) continue the study of the
military implications and considerations imposed on strategi-:: and
tactical decisions by topography. A more recent work
(McManners (1987)) providel> a micro-scale reconstruction of thE'!
effects vf topography on the 1982 British ground campaign to
recapture the Falkland Islands.
Within the last decade however, there has been a change in
the wal in which military geography is perceived. Contemporary
geographers have expanded the theme of military geography Qy using
research techniques from human geography to study th8 lI"pacts of
military activity on the physical, social, or economic landscape
(Lotcin (1984), Pepper a.nd Jenkins (1985), Ashworth (1989)). Most
of this literature has been concerned with modern activity and
focuses on the local or regional economic impacts of the defense
industries (Bateman and Riely 1987), the implications of nuclear
war, (Mieczkowski 1985, Openshaw 1982 &1983) or strategy and
geopolitics (Cohen (1973), House (19~4), Farington (1986 &1989)).
The documentation of past military activity has been left
almost exclusively to historians. A ,'eview of the literature
indicates that there has been little research by geographers into the
historical reconstruction of the impacts of the military on the
landscape. The study of military activity by historical geographers
has been almost nonexistent. The study of agriculture, migration
and settlement has consumed most of the research, Alan William's
(1987) work Father BaudQin's War which reconstructs the French
Raids in Newfoundland during the winter of 1696 -1697, is one of
the few examples in historical geography of the reconstruction of a
military campaign. It also appears to be the only one that concerns
Newfoundland.
Historians have produced a considerable literature
pertaining to the general history of the North West Atlantic during
the Second World War. By their very nature these works are of a
narrative nature and do not include any substantial coverage of the
military establishments in Newfoundland. The official military
histories focus on the units and men who were involved. Works by
Cr::..... en and Cate (1964) for the United States Army Air Force,
Morison (1964) for the United States Navy, Douglas (1986) for the
Royal Canadian Air Force, Stacey (1948) for the Canadian Army, and
Tucker (1952) and Schull (1961) for the Royal Canadian Navy, are all
examples of official histories that document the operational history
of a particular service. In addition to the official histories there
are numerous personal narratives written by military personnel that
served in the North West Atlantic during the Second World War.
Work~ ~y West (1976), Lamb (1979), and McVicar (1981) are just a
few of the numerous personal narratives that touch on
N~'lJfoundland. Unfortunately none of these official histories or
campaign narratives provide a concise geographic portrayal of the
domestic defense geography of Newfoundland during World War Two.
The Second World War and its impacts on Newfoundland and
labrador have not been the subject of much detailed research by
historians or geographers. Works specifically about the geography
of defense are rare. Two recent works by historians have
highlighted the lacuna in the published literature pertaining to this
period. In the preface to his book Newfoundland in the North
Atlantic World 1929-1949 Neary (1988) writes that the period from
1934 to 1949 has not been the subject of much detailed
investigation and has been a neglected part of Newfoundland's
history. Narrowing in on the military aspects of this period,
Macleod (1986) notes that his essay is .. ." a more extensive
treatment of the Newfoundland scene and situation than has
previously appeared in print.. .". He also calls for more detailed
research into the various aspects of the military presence during
World War Two, specifically the spatial distribution of the bases
and stations. To date this monograph represents the only attempt to
address the impact of the military in Newfoundland during World
War Two. Macleod incfudes no reference to any research on the
spatial and temporal distribution of military installations on the
landscape and has discussed with the author the great difficUlty he
encountered in obtaining con.~istent, complete and reliable data on
the spatial distribution of military installations.
During the interwar years there was no permanent military
presence in Newfoundland. However, since 1940 there has been a
continuous presence by the armed forces of several nations. The
nationality, strength, cumposition and mandate have varied spatially
and temporally depending on advances in technology and the changing
geopolitics of the North Atlantic. This recent era of military tenure
began with an in\ense period of development and operations during
the Second World War. Geography and politics were the two factors
that combined to make Newfoundland and Labrador strategica{]y
important to the military planners of the major North Atlantic
nations during World War Two.
Cohen (1973) defines Geopolitics as "having to do with the
world that matters": that is, what is important in the geography of
power relations between the major powers of a period. After the
fall of France in the spring of 1940, the major powers of the North
Atlantic world were the United Kingdom and Germany in Europe and
the United States in North America. Although the United States
maintained a position of neutrality in the war between the British
Empire and Germany until the end of 1941, her sympathies lay with
the United Kingdom and she maintained a vested interest in
sustaining the United Kingdom as an independent nation. The United
States viewed Germany as her primary military threat and the
United Kingdom as the front line of American defense. If the United
Kingdom had fallen. the United States would in all probability have
been forced to confront Germany and possibly Japan alone. In the
North Atlantic this combination of political factors, combined with
Newfoundland's geographic position astride the Great Circle Route
between American and the United Kingdom's core areas, placed
Newfoundland in c< militarily strategic position because geography
had placed her within the world that mattered (Map 1). Jamieson
(1989:30) states that •...in some respects Newfoundland's greatest
contribution to the war effort lay simply in being there." It was the
consideration of geographic location that led American, Canadian and
to a lesser degree British military planners to focus on
Newfoundland and Labrador in their military plans for the North
West Atlantic. These considerations resL'!ted in the enormously
expensive decisions to establish military bases and stations
throughout Newfoundland and Lab'ador. The subsequent military
d~'ielopments were so exMnsive and '..':idespread that they had a
considerable impact or: the economic, social, cultural and physical
landscape of the country.
rMitary histories and other sources use a variety of names
to describe the same installation. The terms 'base', 'station',
"installation' or 'facility' may be used. For the purpose of this
study only the terms 'base' and 'station" have been used. A base is
defined as a major facility with greater than 100 personnel and an
area more than 100 acres. Tenure of the bases was freehold,
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acquired either by formal treaty or lease. The us.,)r had unrestricted
access rights to use, and freedom to operate. Examples of bases
acquired by treaty were the American installations at Ft. Pepperrel1
near St. John's. Harmon Air Force Base near Stephenville, and the
Argentia Naval Air. Station and Fort McAndrew in Placentia Bay. The
Canadian Air Bases at Gander, Goose Bay and Botwood were acquired
through leases with Newfoundland.
A station is defined as a secondary or tertiary site of less
than 100 acres and with under 100 personnel. "':'hese were
predominantly single function sites that in the majority 01
instances were temporary in nature, and designed to provide
operational support to one or more of the bases. Tenure
arrangements were not as formal as in the case of the bases and was
generally carried out simply by a formal agreement rather than a
tre'3.ty or lease. Examples were the American radar stations at
Elliston, Allen's Island and Fogo, the Canadian Naval repair facility
at Bay Bulls, and the United States Coast Guard LORAN stations at
Port aux Basques and Bonavista.
The methodology for this thesis is primarily one of
chronological reconstruction. However it has sometimes been
necessary to use a thematic approach in order to provide a clearer
understandina of issues such as national strategy, individual base
development and operations. For this reason the chronology of some
of the chapters overlap. This is particularly true in the chapters
which describe the construction of the bases and stations, It is
important to stress that this thesis does not attempt to provide a
narrative of the operations of military units based in Newfoundland.
Operations will only be discussed when they serve to illustrate the
technical limitations that necessitated specific ir,stallations or
impacted on strategy.
The majority of the data was collected through archival
research, personal interviews, and field-orientated work which
included studying air photos and the remaining relict features,
Information from all sources has been combined to reconstruct as
accurately as possible the military landscape which evolved during
the Second World War,
The military developments during the period from 1939 to
1945 had a substantial impact on the cultural landscape of
Newfoundland and resulted in extensive modifications to selected
areas of the province. The cultural landscape is the artificial
landscape created by culture! groups as they live on the natural
landscape. It includes all modifications to the landscape created by
man's activities, The noted French geographer. Paul Vidal de. la
Blache stated 'that one can read the landsc~p~ as we do a book. The
cultural landscape" reflects our tastes, values aspirations and
fears· (JorrJan & Rowntree, 1986: 24·25), The military landscape of
Newfoundland and Labrador was a reflection of both the values and
'0
tears of the major English speaking ~ations of the North Atlantic
during the Second World War. The values were to defend the
democratic societies while the fears were manifested in the
defense infrastructure put in place throughout Newfoundland and
Labrador to defend against a possible attack by the Germans. This
military activity was the result o! American, Canadian and British
decisions based on a consideration of their own national security
and strategic interests. Newfoundland had no control (Wer these
decisions, most if not all of which were a function of
Newfoundland's geographic location in the North Atlantic. The
cultural landscape of the <::ountry was extensively modified as a
result of these decisions. In addition Newfoundland was the
beneficiary of a substantial investment of social capital which
continues to greatly benefit the province to this day.
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CHAPTER I
PRELUDE TO WAR: 1935-1939
NEINFOUNDlAND
In the lale 1930's Newfoundland was a dominion of the
Crown in abeyance. A Commission of Government consisting of a
Governor and six commissioners all appointed by the United Kingdom,
three of whom were Newfoundlanders, had replaced nannal
democratic government. This form of government was to remain in
effect until Newfoundland became the tenth province of Canada in
1949. Geographically, Newfoundland shared the western North
Atlantic with Canada, the United States and the French islands of St.
Pierre and Miquelon off the southern coast of Newfoundland. The
country was located off the east coast of North America and
consisted of the island of Newfoundland which was 43,359 square
miles and the mainland territory of Labrador, 100,000 square miles
(Minister of Supply and Services, 1979). The island of Newfoundland
is separated from Nova Scotia by the 90 mile wide Cabot Strait, and
Labrador from Newfoundland by the 11 mile wide Strait of Belle Isle.
Like her neighbours, Newfoundland was adversely affected
by the prolonged economic depression that had begun in 1929. The
depression was more severe l!"l Newfoundland 'Jecause of the almost
12
total dependence upon the export of raw materials and the
importation of manufactured goods and food. The backbone of the
economy was the fishery and it was particularly hard hit. Exports of
fish were severely reduced because the market countries were also
affected by the depression. This contributed to economic
devastation which had a profound effect on the financial affairs of
the country. By 1933 the national debt was approaching 100 million
dollars and the country was on the verge of bankruptcy (Neary.
1986:12). In 1934 the fiscal crisis resulted in the replacement of
the elected government with a commission of government. Like
much of the Western World the country remained in the grasp of the
depression and by 1939. 50,000 residents were receiving welfare
(MacKenzie,1986:30).
The population of 289,588 was found predominantly along
the coast. The main spatial characteristic of settlement was its
distribution in more than one thousand small villages nestled in the
sheltered coves and harbours along the shores of the country's
numerous bays. This pattern was a reflection of the importance of
the fishery as the backbone of the economy. The few settlements
that existed in the interior were involved with mining or forestry.
The Avalon Peninsula, which contained the capital city of St. John's,
was the most heavily populated region of the country with 148,190
or 47 percent of the population. With a population of 39,886 in
13
1935. St. John's was the only large urban center in the country (All
figures from the 1935 Census of Newfoundland).
The ocean provided the main means of transportation.
Besides common fishing boats there were numerous small freight
boats, schooners and steamers that plied the coastal waters. These
vessels provided Ihe main linkage between many of the scattered
villages and the larger towns that served as regional service
centers. Internationally, steamships ran from St. John's to the
United Kingdom and between St. John's, Halifax, Boston and New York.
Regular scheduled steamship service between Port aux Basques and
North Sydney, Nova Scotia, was the main link with Canada and served
to connect the North American railway network with the
Newfoundland railroad which was the second most important mode
of transportation. The railway ran from Port aux Basques on the
southwest coast, northeastward through Corner Brook, Grand Falls,
Gander, and Clarenvillp. to its eastern terminus in S1. John's. Spur
lines in central Newfoundh:•.~r: ran to Buchans in the interior and to
Botwood and ~ewisporte in Notre Dame Bay. East coast spur lines
ran to Bonavista on the Bonavista Peninsula and to Argentia and
Carbonear on the Avalon Peninsula.
Tha existing roads formed a tertiary system that was
poorly developed, constructed and maintained. There was no
country-wide network, only a haphazard system of small roads and
roads extensions at the end of railway lines that had developed
14
independently of each other. The most extensive development was in
and around St. John's, from which roads ran north, south, and west.
The most highly developed system extended from $1. John's around
the bottom and up the west side of Conception Bay. Other roads ran
north through Logy Bay, Torbay and Pouch Cove to Cape S1. Francis on
the north of the Avalon Peninsula and south along the southern shore
of the Avalon 10 Trepassey.
Other unlinked road networks ex:sted at many localized
points throughout the country, most of which served to connect the
populated areas to the railway. The most important of these were
those running from Corner Brook to Deer Lake, Buchans to
Millertown, Grand Falls to Bishops Falls and Botwood; and those in
the general vicinity of Lewisporte, Clarenville and Bonavist<'l.
Port facilities were available at many locations throughout
the country but were limited by dock size, space and related
services available, as well as the volume of cargo that could be
handled. The major ports, all of which were served by the railway,
were located at St. John's, Argentia, Harbour Grace, Bonavista,
Botwood, Lewisporte, Comer Brook and Port aux Basques.
From a military perspective Newfoundland's civilian,
indusirial and transportation infrastructure was poorly placed and
inadequately developed to support modern North American or
European mechanized military operations. The existing civilian
15
water and sewer, roads, electricity and communications
infrastructures would require extensive upgrading before they could
support a military infrastructure. Any military presence, beyond the
most rudimentary naval, air or land operations, would initially
require base and support infrastructure construction and then an
extensive maintenance program once the infrastructure was in place.
MILITARY PLANS AND STRATEGY
During the period from the end of I.he First World War in
1918 to the mid 1930's defense and its associated military activity
did nol have a high priority in the countries of the North West
Atlantic. This was to change with the re·emergence of Germany as a
military power in Europe. Defense now became a priority and
concern about German rearmament became the main factor that
governed the defense plans of the countries of the Northwest
Atlantic. Newfoundland, along with the other countries of the
Western Atlantic, viewed the re-emergence of German military
power with great concern and with good reason. Her location in the
North West Atlantic left her exposed to German naval forces and for
the first time to the newly developing threat of airpower. The
spatial separation provided by the Atlantic no longer provided a
guarantee of isolation from European conflicts. (Dzcuban,1959:2).
16
Newfoundland and the United Kingdom
Until the mid 1930's defense had not been of great concern
to Newfoundland because she enjoyed the collective security
afforded by membership in the British Empire. The country's lack of
a military establishment was not unusual given that she enjoyed
good relations with all of her neighbours with which she shared
common cultural, economic and political ties. There was no military
threat in the immediate area and none was anticipated. The
Atlantic, controlled by the Royal Navy, effectively isolated and
distanced Newfoundland from any potential enemies in Europe.
Predominantly because of her geographic location, Newfoundland had
not hOsted Imperial troops since 1870, when the last British
Garrison had been withdrawn (Stacey,1936:148-158). Because of
the stable relations between the United States and the British
Empire there was no military threat to Newfoundland. Since the
withdrawal of Empire troops, Newfoundland's contribution to the
Empire's security had been men for the armed forces of the mother
country. During the Great War of 1914 -1918 a regiment of infantry
had been recruited and served in France as a unit of the British Army
(Nicholson, 1969). When the war ended, the Royal Newfoundland
Regiment was demobilized and its men retumed home along with the
individual Newfoundlanders who had served in the various branches
of the Empire's forces. Newfoundland did not maintain any active or
17
reserve military units and no military forces from any other country
were stationed on her soil. The only vestiges of military activity
were the periodic goodwill visits by units of the Royal Navy when
they were in the North Western Atlantic.
The country's police forces, which consisted of 255
Newfoundland Constabulary members and 50 Newfoundland Rangers.
were the only organizations that had even rudimentary military
training. For the most part this was small arms and parade ground
drill, hardly suitable for combat !'Against the forces of an
industrialized nation. Compounding the absence of trained personnel
was the fact that Newfoundland was devoid of even the most basic
military equipment. In 1934 at the insistence of the United
Kingdom's Overseas Defense Committee the Commission of
Government had commenced a study to determine the defen3e
requirements of the country. Because of a lack of funds resulting
from the economic depression and the low priority given to defense
related matters in general, two years passed before the report was
produced. This report, entitled The Newfoundland Defense Scheme
1..9..3..Q. focused not on the defense of the population centers but on the
infrastructure that would be a target in the event of a European war
(Germany) involving tl1e British Empire (NLPA GN1/3 320/35)(Map 2).
This is indicative of the Governm8nt's opinion of the strategic value
of Newfoundland and the overriding concept of fostering the
18
NEWFOUNDLAND DEFENSE SCHEME
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deve:opment of the Empire at the cost of ignoring local concerns.
Major targets in the event of hostilities wefe considered to be the
transatlantic cable installations at Hearts Content, Bay Roberts,
Harbour Grace, St. John's. Arnold's Cove, Placentia, and Port aux
Basques; fuel storage sites, St. John's harbour, the Bell Island iron
mines, and the pulp and paper mills at Grand Falls and Corner Brook.
The study concluded thai an enemy in possession of NewfOi..l~dland
could threaten Canada and the surrounding sealanes. The only major
reference to population was a concern for the vulnerability of the
inhabited portions of the country because of their openness to
observation and attack from the sea. The report concluded that "the
island is entirely undefended and vulnerable to attack from vessels
armed with modern guns," Despite this conclusion the report
remained silent on recommendations to provide .: course of action to
address these deficiencies in defense,
The report was shelved and for another 1"""0 years no further
action was taken, However, given the deteriorating situation in
Europe, the question of defense was rais~J in 1938 by Newfoundland
in discussions with the Office of the United Kingdoi:"1's
Undersecretary of State for Dominion Affairs (NLPA GN1I3
320/35) 1. While both parties agreed that Newfoundland was
defenseless, there was disagreement on how to address the defense
needs of the countf)'. The United Kingdom's Ministf)' of Defense was
'Various telegrams between the Governor of Newfoundland and the Dominions
Secretary. September to Nuvember 1938.
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of the opinion that the expense of stationing a garrison in
Newfoundland was not warranted given the more urgent defense
needs of the Britisf: Isles and other countries of the Empire that
were much closer to the source of hostile threats. Considering the
absence of a local threat, the United Kingdom felt that the Royal
Navy's continued command of the Atlantic Ocean would adequately
serve the defense needs of Newfoundland (Bridie. 19,4:18:27-213).
Historically the Royal Navy had always been Newfoundland's
first line of defense and guarantee of sovereignty. For the first
three decades of the twentieth century the only military threat to
Newioundland had originated in Europe, and for the foreseeable
future this was not expected to change. The Royal Navy's
unchallenged control ot the vast Atlantic Ocean and the proximity to
powerful neighbours in the United States and to a lesser extent
Canada served to insulate Newfoundland from Europe and made the
probability of war in the Western Atlantic appear highly unlikely.
The Royal Navy's principal Atlantic strategy centered on the
protection of the United Kingdom. To accomplish this the navy's
strategy was to interdict and defeat any European naval threat in
European coastal waters before they could break out into the open
waters of the mid·Atiantic (Roskill,1956). This strategy was based
on the principle that it is easier to locate and engage an enemy in
the narrow coastal waters of Europe than in the open ~tlantic where
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there was greater freedom tv maneuver. By concentrating the main
strength of the fleet in home waters instead of dispersing it thinly
throughout the Atlantic, both the United Kingdom and Atlantic
shipping lanes could be protectsd :rom German capital ships.
Another factor which contributed to the United Kingdom's
decision not to maintain defense forces in Newfoundland was the
existence of the American Monroe Doctrine. This 19th century
doctrine held that tile United States would not tolerate interference
by another European Power in the affairs of any of the European
p;;c~essions in the Western Hemisphere (Perkins.1942; Wilcox,
1942). Geography and the Monroe Doctrine thus afforded
Newfoundland and Canada the protection of the United States. This
protectio:l, which was provided without consideration or
consultation, effectively guaranteed that the United States would
not allow foreign occupation of Newfoundland since this would
constitute a serious threat to the United States and be an
unacceptable alteration of the balance of power in the Western
Atlantic. The knowledgr.r that the United States would defend the
Northwest Atlantic perlnitted the Royal Navy to concentrate in the
Eastern Atlantic and other more threatened theatres of operation.
As the situation in Europe continued to deteriorate in the
spring of 1939, Newfoundland and the United Kingdom moved toward
concrete action for Newfoundland's defense. In Maya request was
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made to the Dominions Secretary to arm and train a light infantry
force of 189 men for local defense (NLPA GN1/3 ::;~·O/35)2. On
June 26 the Dominions Secretary agreed to Ihe establishment and
arming of three companies of light infantry and on August 30th
advised that the necessary small arms along with three regular army
personnel to act as instructors, would be departing for
Newfoundland on September 5, 1939. The Dominions Secretary
further advised th ..! the main points of defense should be the Bell
Island iron mines and the City of $1. John's, and that any
detachments to guard the airport at Gander and the cable stations
should be kept at a minimum (NLPA GN1/3 320/35)3, The United
Kingdom continued to believe that Newfoundland would not be
subject to a large scale attack and that only a token force would be
necessary for the defense of Newfoundland.
Canada's Atlantic defense concerns and needs were similar
to those of Newfoundland. She had no enemies on her borders and
was isolated from any European enemy by formidable barriers of
distance, ocean spaces and the power of friendly nations (Stacey,
1970:3). While this isolation had been an important factor
2Telegram from Governor of Newfoundland to Dominions Secretary, May 22, 1939.
3Telegram from Dominions Secretary to Governor of Newfoundland, June 26, 1939
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underlying Canadian defense plans in the inter-war years, technology
was slowly reducing the traditional benefits bestowed by distance.
New developments in naval and particularly air technology had
significantly reduced the spatial benefits provided by the Atlantic
Ocean and made Canada and Newfoundland less isolated trom Europe
than ever before.
By the late 1930's there was growing apprehension in
Canada, spurred on by the Munich crisis, about the rising military
power of Germany (Stacey,1970:38). Canadian military planners
responded by reassessing their defense plans and initiated further
study of the defense of the Atlantic coast (Stacey,1970:29). The
task of preparing plans for the Atlantic coast was complicated by
the presence of Newfoundland, an island over which Canada obviously
had no jurisdiction. However, because the island commanded both
entrances to the Gulf of S1. Lawrence and was in close proximity to
the Maritime Provinces, the defense of Newfoundland was the key to
the defense of Atlantic Canada from an overseas invader (Bridle,
1974: 19;19-20). Simply put, Canada's maritime security could not
be guaranteed unless Newfoundland remained secure. This
inescapable fact bound the defense of both countries together
(Bridle, 1974:3;12-13, Stacey, 1970:92-93). Therefore, Canada had
serious reservations about the presence of an undefended island off
her Atlantic coast. Her paramount concern was that an enemy might
secure a lodgement in Newfoundland to attack Canaaa and her
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co:-<:;tal shipping using air, naval and submarine raiders. A secondary
concern was the possibility of the disruption of shipments from the
Bell Island iron mines to the Sydney steel plant. The latter produced
a third of Canada's steel and was totally dependent upon Bell Island
for her supply of iron ore (Bridle, 1974:14;24-25). Finally,
Newfoundland was the home of important trans-Atlantic cable relay
stations which were critical to communications between ; :orth
America and the United Kingdom.
To ~repare for the defenses of both countries, Canada's
military planners initiated plans to integrate and co-ordinate
Canada's Atlantic defense with the United Kingdom's defense of
Newfoundland (Bridle, 1974;3;12-13). This proved to be no simple
matter for at the Imperial Conference of 1937, Canada was to learn
at that in the event of war the United Kingdom had only limited plans
for the defense of Newfoundland and the Western Atlantic
(Stacey,1970:92-93). The United Kingdom's principal concern would
be the strategic defense of the North Atlantic using naval power. In
an exchange of memos between the spring of 1938 and December of
the same year, Canada was further advised that no British military
units were designated for posting to Newfcwndland in the event of
hostilities, and no defense plans existed other than those required
for the defense of 51. John's harbour. When conditions pennitted it a
squadron of six minesweepers would be sent to the country.
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Anti-submarine units would augment the minesweepers, but only
when they became available (Bridle, 1974:18;27-28). Essentially
Newfoundland was left defenseless.
There VJere never any formal negotiations between the
United Kingdom and Canada concerning the defense of Newfoundland,
although both sides realized that Newfoundland was geographically
important for Canada's Atlantic defense plans and for the
maintenance of the United Kingdom's trans-Atlantic
communications. Other than periodic exchanges of information the
United Kingdom had little direct contact with Canada on this matter
and in fact encouraged Canada and Newfoundland to consult with
each other on m.'Uers of mutual defense (NLPA GN 1/3 320/35). To
this end in 1938 and 1939 representatives of both countries met
several times and exchanged various memos on mutual defense
matters (Bridle, 1974:12;22-23). At one meeting in April 1938
Captain C.M.A. Schwerdt, secretary to the Governor, met with
Canadian officials to discuss matters of common defense (Bridle,
1974:12:22-23). At this meeting Canada was advised that the
responsibility for the defense of Newfoundland rested solely with
the Royal Navy (Bridle, 1974:14;24-25). Although both Canada and
Newfoundland realized that Newfoundland was in a vulnerable
position, and although neither considered the resources provided by
the United Kingdom's Royal Navy sufficient to defend the North West
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Atlantic, neither country initiated any concrete action to address
the situation; Newfoundland because she did not have the resources
and Canada because of her policy of noncommilment (MacKenzie,
1986:26-27). As e result of these attitudes. the North West
Atlan'ic defense plans of all three countries, when war broke out in
September of 1939, existed only on paper. Other than the Royal
Navy's presence in the Atlantic, there was no military equipment in
place to defend Newfoundland. The reality of the situation was that
Canada and the United Kingdom were willing to defend Newfoundlar;·j
only to the extent that it was beneficial to their own security
(Mc...'~Kenzie,1986:35).'
U oited States of Amerjca
After the Treaty of Versailles officially ended the First
World War, the United States moved toward a policy of isolation and
non-involvement in European affairs (Langer and Gleason, 1952:13).
American military strategy for the North Western Atiantic continued
to be based on the the Monroe Doctrine which was one of the oldest
principles of American foreign policy. Its origins lay in a message
to Congress on December 2, 1823, by then Presidep' James Monroe.
His speech outlined the basic principle that the United States would
not tolerate the acquisition of territory in the Western Hemisphere
by European Powers (Perkins,1942:253-254). The doctrine was
initially developed to preVetlt Spain's meddling in the affairs of the
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newly independent Latin American republics which were her former
colonies, but it later became firmly established as a fundamental
component of American foreign policy. It was applicable to all
European powers with or without New World possessions. In the
ensuing years it was invoked at various times in response to
European involvement and perceived involvement in the affairs of
the Western Hemisphere. By the late 1930's the United States was
again promoting the doctrine as a reminder to the European Powers
that 'hey were expected to maintain their distance from the Western
Hemisphere (Wilcox, 1942).
Until the mid-1930's the United States had not placed great
emphasis on the defense needs of either the Atlantic Coast or the
North West Atlantic. The country had no Atlantic enemies and the
major threat to American interests was perceived to come from
Japan in the Western Pacific. The only potential Atlantic threat was
Germany but given the double layer of protection provided first by
the large French army and secondly by the combined strength of the
British, American and French fleets in the Atlantic it was not felt
that this threat was serious. Given this situation the United States
placed her trust in the strength of the European fleets and moved the
main strength of her fleet to the Hawaiian Islands to counter the
growing threat of Japan in the Pacific (Langer and Gleason,
1952:104).
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By the late 1930's the rearmament of Germany and her re-
emergence as an European power became the cause of considerable
concern. The increased international tensions and more particularly
the Munich settlement between the United Kingdom and Germany in
1938 raised fears in the United States that she would be drawn
inevitably into another European war, or that the involvement of the
Axis powers in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere would lead to
military confrontation.
These already ominous developments were campau'nded by
the rapid improvements in the range and payload of military aircralt
which added a new threat to the Western Hemisphere (Conn, et
al.,1964:4). The advances in aircraft des!!]" had already been
demonstrated by the large flying boats that began rn;;l.!:.ing regular
scheduled flights between the United States and the United Kingdom
in 1937 (Air Ministry, 1946). They had reduced the time of the
Atlantic crossing even with refuelling stops in Ireland and
Newfoundland, from approximately four days (by sea) to less than 24
hours. A more ominous development was the non-stop flight from
Berlin to New York on August 10, 1938, of a Focke-Wolf Condor
(Beaty,1976:134·135)4. Although these were civilian flights the
potential military implications were not lost on the military or
political leaders.
4This four engine land plane never became a threat as a heavy bomber because
underpowered engines limited its payload. However it was to play an important
reconnaissance and strike role in the convoy battles in the Eastern Atlantic.
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In response to these rapidly emerging developments,
American war planning began to lake into account the resurgence of
Germany. Existing defense plans were di:·:carded in May 1939 and
five new models were prepared to address new potential world
conflict scenarios, with Germany as the major threat (Matlott and
5nell,1953:4). By early 1940 the resulling ;>Ians, code-named
Rainbow, had become the basis of American contingency planning.
They had as their primary objective the defense of the United States
and the Western Hemisphere, which had now become inseparably
linked for defense purposes (Mallott and 5nell,1953:12-13). They
differed on the extent of the protection to be accorded the Western
Hemisphere and/or the Pacific territories or potential allies in the
event of war and the overseas deployment of American troops.
Defense of the entire Western Hemisphere and not only the
continental United States was seen as the best protection for the
United States and her economic and political interests. The Western
Hemisphere was defined as the continents of North and South
America west to the Hawaiian Islands, Wake Island and American
Samoa in the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean to the 30th meridian
(Conn et aI, 1964:9).
Earlier American studies had concluded that there was no
serious military threat to the United States in the Atlantic and one
would only develop if France ano' Great Britain fell or were not
involved in the war for one reason or another (Conn et ai, 1964:27).
But when German' rearmament progressed to the point of becoming a
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potential threat 10 the United States and her interests throughout
the Western Hemisphere, the United States adopted a mOTe
aggressive defense policy based on the concept of forward defense,
that would extend from the frontiers of the continental United
States to provide protection to the entire Western Hemisphere
(Watson,1950:8B). Milltary plann€;~ concluded that the continental
United States could not be threatened seriously by either air or
surface attack unless a hostile power first obtained a lodgement
within the Western Hemisphere. To prevent this the United States
adopted a policy of hemispheric defense (Conn et al,1964:3) (Map 3).
Instead of meeting an adversary on the borders of the United States
or in the coastal waters, the United States now planned to intercept
and join battle with the enemy at sea before it came within striking
distance of the United States or established itself in the Western
Hemisphere.
In espousing this policy President Franklin D. Roosevelt
declared that "the United States must be prepared to resist attack
on the W~stem Hemisphere from the North Pole to the South Pole,
including all of North America" (Dzcuban,1&59:3). The concept of
hemispheric defense, although not the ori i:nal inten of the Monroe
Doctrine, represented a logical extension given the determination of
the United States to protect both her territory and her economic
interests (Conn et al,1964:3; Wilson, 1942:442).
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MAP 3
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The strategy of forward defense was primarily influenced
by ine vulnerability of the heavily populated Atlantic Seaboard. In a
message to Congress on January 28, 1938 President Roosevelt
defined this strategy when he stated ·We must keep any potential
enemy many hundreds of miles away from our continental limits·
(Dzcuban,1959:4). In the Pacific this strategy was already in place,:
since the early 1920'5. The naval and air bases at Dutch Harbour in
Alaska, Oahu in the Hawaiian Islands and the Panama Canal Zone
provided a triangle. of outposts to protect the Pacific coast
(Map 3). The concept was to be applied to the Atlantic where until
now it hau not been necessary, given the overwhelming presence of
the British and French fleets in relation to the small German navy.
As this strategy became fUlly developed it was destined to have
considerable implica:lons for Newfoundland, which was now placed
in the forefront of American plans for the Northwesi Atlantic, not
by choice, but by circumstances created by geography and the
politics of other nations. Technical limitations of naval and air
power required the acquisition of bases outside the United States to
achieve this new forward strategy. These bases would permit
American military power to extend its effective range into the mid-
Atlantic. Newfoundland was ideally suited for such bases.
On August 18, 1938, the President emphasized American
determination to defend all of North America and not just the United
States. In an address at Queens University in Kingston, Ontario, he
stated that "the people of the United States would not stand idly by
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if the Dominion of Canada's soil is threatened by any other empire"
(Wilson, 1942:442). While this reference specifically identified
Canada, the previous statements of the President combined with the
basic tenets of the Monroe Doctrine, along with American Foreign
Policy and Defense Plans made it clear that in the event of an attack
by a foreign power, Newfoundland could count on the same level and
type of American support.
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CHAPTER II
THE OUTBREAK OF WAR: EARLY PLANS AND OPERATIONS,
SEPTEMBER 1939-AUGUST 1940.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
On September 3, 1939. after diplomatic efforts had failed
to halt the two-day-old German invasion of Pol~nd. the United
Kingdom and France honored their treaty obligations to Poland and
declared war on Germany. For the countries of the North West
Atlantic, the outbreak of war in Europe had an immediate impact.
Defense, which had until now been a secondary concern, became the
primary focus of all of the countries.
For Newfoundland participation in the war was automatic
with the United Kingdom'S declaration. Canada soon followed suit
and entered the war on September 10. 1939. The United States
remained neutral but was concemed that the war might spill into
the Western Hemisphere and lead to American involvement. This
was a real possibility given the active participation of
Newfoundland and Canada and the existence of European possessions
in the Western :-iemisphere.
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Historians have named the period from September 1939 to
May 1, 1940 the ·Phoney War." This phase of the war was
characterized both in Western Europe and the North Atlantic more by
posturing than by any significant activity between the combatants.
The enemy did not make any substantial attempt to challenge the
Royal Navy in the Atlantic and although it was generally recognized
that Germany was a greater threat now than in the First World War,
local defense plans proceeded with little urgency. France and the
United Kingdom remained strong so the direct threat to northeastern
North America was considered to be remote. In Canada and
Newfoundland there was little ugency in the discussio!'1~ about
military readiness for home defense. Much of the military activity
that did take place was directed towards preparing to support
Britain in a European war.
In the first nine months of the war there was only a
marginal increase in military activity in Newfoundland.
Nevertheless, Newfoundland was the subject of extensive
deliberations and planning by the defense departments of the United
States and Canada. Both countries were in the process of rethinking
their Atlantic defenses and Newfoundland figured prominently in
their plans for the Northwest Atlantic. Canadian, the United
Kingdom and particularly American military planners regarded the
security of Newfoundland as central to the command and control of
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the Atlantic. Newfoundland on the other hand was more concerned
with its own defense. Military planners knc-w full well the military
strength and capabilities of Germany and more importantly. the
implications of recent advances in naval and air technologies. At
the time Germany was in no position to threaten a full scale
invasion of North America. However, it is obvious that with the
resources available at her disposal she could do considerable damage
to trans-Atlantic and coastal shipping and the eaastul littoral of
North America especially with naval and air power based in
Newfoundland.
Conversely, the Dominion would serve as a valuable location
from which to station forces tasked to protect the north east
approach to North America and to protect the air and sealanes
between North America and the United Kingdom. While the United
States and Canada both recognized the military potential of
Newfoundland, only the United States possessed the military power
to integrate Newfoundland into the defense of North America. Even
with the outbreak of war there had been no official collaboration
between Canada and the United States on joint defense strategy.
Both countries were still proceeding with plans independent of one
another and. in the American case, without the knowledge or consent
of Newfoundland. Considering the potential threat posed by
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Germany, it is doubtful that Newfoundland would have rejected
protection from friendly neighbours, even if it meant occupation by
friendly forces.
Canadian Atlantjc Defe~
From the beginning of the war Canada acknowledged the
strategic importance of Newfoundland to her Atlantic defense. On
September 3, 1939 following the United Kingdom's declaration of
war on Germany. Prime Minister King in a speech to parliament
stated that the defense of Newfoundland and Labrador was essential
10 the defens~ of Canada (Bridle, 1974:41 ;43). While King was only
reiterating the strategic realities:. of Canada's Atlantic coast, the
fact remained thaI Canada had neither formulated plans nor
developed the personnel and equipment to defend Newfoundland.
With no heavy naval units and only light air and ground forces,
Canada was dependent on the United Kingdom and the United States
for the defense of the ocean approaches to North America. While the
United States considered the broader issue of the defense of the
North Atlantic, Canada concentrated its attention on the defense of
her Atlantic coastline within the strict confines imposed by her
limited military resources. Local defenses were strengthened
around the strategic ports of Halifax, Sydney and Saint John, and
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coastal reconnaissance was increased by both naval and air units as
far east as the west and southwestern coasl 01 Newfou.ldland
(Stacey, 1948).
Newfoundland Defense Preparations
During the so called Phoney War Newfoundland prepared for
war in much the same manner as in 1914. Recruits were accepted
for the Empire's armed fcrces and the local economy prepared 10
support the overseas Weir. There was no immediate threat of attack
and from all appearances the conflict was expected to remain
confined to Europe. Although the usual wartime anxiety existed, it
was expected that the Allies would prevail as they had in the past.
Newfoundland's main concerns centered around her own defense,
influenced by Newfoundland's long standing reliance on the
protection afforded by the Royal Navy combined with her inability to
provide for her own defense.
Since the end of the last war in 1918, advances in naval and
air technology had reduced the spatial and temporal defense
advantages provided by the Atlantic. Recognizing the importance of
Gander Airport and the Botwood flying boat base in the emerging
world of trans-Atlantic aviation, Newfoundland was concerned about
her inability to defend these air assets. if an enemy controlled
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these assets they could be used to control the country and
surrounding sealanes as well as provide a base to attack North
America. To address these concerns, on September 15 the
Newfoundland government suggested to the United Kingdom that
Canada be permitted to take over Gander and Botwood for the
duration of the war (NLPA GN1/3 39/1-17)5. On November 6th the
Dominions Office Secretary finally replied that while there were no
objections to Canada having full use of the facilities for the
duration of the war, control should not pass to Canada because it
could provide Canada an unfair advantage in post-war trans-Atlantic
civilian air travel (NlPA S-5-5-2)6, Clearly the United Kingdom,
confident about the outcome of the war, was more concerned with
losing control over trans-Atlantic air travel than increasing
Newfoundland's defense. For Newfoundland the attempt to transfer
the air bases to Canada was motivated by two considerations. In
addition to a desire to contribute to the allied war effort in one of
c~ few ways possible, one can assume a secondary and not
unimportant benefit of Canada assuming control of the air bases was
that the ground and air units, that would be stationed at the bases,
would provide the country with a greater degree of protection than
Newfoundland could afford on her own. It appears that lacking the
5lener 110m Goyernor 01 NawloundJand 10 Dominions Secrelary, September 15, 1939
6Teltgrlm Irom the Dominionl SlICfltary to the Governor 01 Newfoundllnd, November 6,
11139.
40
resources to provide for her own defense Newfoundland was
attempting to provide for her defense by forging a link with Canada.
This was not the only way that Newfoundland attempted to
provide for her owrl defer,se. In an attempt to solicit emergency
supplies of arms and ammunition, L.E. Emerson, the Secretary of
Justice, travelled to Canada and on September 17th met with senior
military and government officials (NLPA 8-4-1-1)7, The outcome
of these meetings was that Car,lda pledged to loan sufficient
quantities of small arms and ammunition to equip the Newfoundland
militia then being formed for local defense.
On the home front the first concrete move toward defense
was the placement of an anti-submarine net across the entrance to
St. John's harbour on September 19th (NLPA 8-4-1-1)8. Within
two months of the outbreak of war, the Newfoundland Government
had in place legislation pertaining to customs, trading with the
enemy, and foreign exchange. The Newfoundland Militia Act of
October 31, 1939 provided for the establishment of a volunteer
auxiliary militia for home defense (Acts of the Honorable
Commission of Government, 1939;245-347). This was followed on
November 18, 1939 with the Forestry Unit Act to provide a corps of
forestry workers for service in the United Kingdom. Because of the
7MIlmorandum by Sacfatary for Justica to tha Commission 01 Government, September 30,
1939
8Telegram from Governor of Nawfoulldiand to Commander in Chief American and West Indies
Squadron RN, October, 19,1939
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high casualties suffered by the Royal Newfoundland Regiment in the
First World War, it was decided that an artillery regiment would be
the primary combat unit raised for overseas service
(Nicholson,1969). This decision was based on the logic that an
artillery unit would not normally be subject to the same risks as an
infantry unit. In addition to the two units for overseas service,
volunteers were also accepted for the Royal Navy and the Royal Air
Force. For home service patriotic associations were formed to
support the fighting forces overseas. Their main efforts were
directed towards collecting money and material for the troops along
with items for the war economy such as scrap metal and clothing for
shipment to the United Kingdom.
AlthOugh there was considerable legislative, social and
economic activity related to the outbreak of war, from September
1939 until May of 1940, there was only a marginal increase in
military activity in Newfoundland. The first Canadian military units
to arrive came in October 1939 when RCAF observation aircraft
landed at Gander Airport (Gander Airport Departure Logs). At the
request of the Royal N&vy, and with the agreement of the
Newfoundland Government, the RCAF used Gander as a base from
which to conduct a reconnaissance of the Newfoundland coastline.
(Bridle, 1974:39;43) Not long after vessels of the Royal Navy and
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the Royal Canadian Navy, now on a war footing in the North Atlantic,
began using $1. John's for refuelling and provisions.
In February and March 1940, L E. Emerson, the
Commissioner for Justice, once again travelled to Canada, this time
not to solicit arms but to ascertain Canada's plans for
Newfoundland's defense. He was especially concerned about the
vulnerability of the Bell Island iron mines but also wanted to
determine whether Canada intended to construct an airport near St.
John's as a station for long range patrol bombers (NLPA S-4~1-1)9.
The outcome was a disappointment for Emerson and dampened
Newfoundland's hopes for large-scale military assistance from
Canada. Canada was only prepared to provide a general
reconnaissance of those parts of Newfoundland's southwest and
west coast that directly affected Canada's sea lanes
(NLPA 5-4-1-1)'0. and to provide ordnance for the defense of Bell
Island. The latter of course was critical for the Nova Scotia steel
industry. Two 4.7 inch coastal defense guns and mounts and two
searchlights along with three army personnel to train the
Newfoundland militia would be provided a3 soon as possible (Bridle,
1974:66;66-67). Given Canada's own limited military resources and
9Memorandum Irom the Commissioner of Justice 10 the Commission 01 Government. March
231940.
1oMemorandum from the Commisslonsf for Justice & Defanse to Commission 01 Government,
March 16, 1940.
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weakened strategic situation, no other assistance could be spared at
the present lime.
Upon learning that Canada had no immediate plans to defend
Newfoundland, the Governor of Newfoundland on April 8, 1940 wrote
the Dominions Secretary expressing his concerns about the lack of
defenses in Newfoundland. The British Government at this time was
preoccupied with other matters. Churchill had replaced Chamberlain
and the Phoney War was nealing an end (Churchill, 1949)~ The
Imperial Government's by now standard reply was that the Royal
Navy was Newfoundland's first line of defense. "At the present time
the naval authorities consider the fisk of an attack upon
Newfoundland, either by naval based raider or by submarine to be
remote and in view of the other urgent requirements it would not be
practical for them to provide special naval or air forces for patrol
purposes... For the same reasons it is felt that provision of guns for
the defense of St. John's or placing of mines could not I~e justified."
The letter concluded that if Canada were to offer to defend
Newfoundland then the offer should be accepted (NLPA GN1/3
320/35).
Newfoundland now found herself in the difficult situation of
not only being unable to defend herself but also having no
appreciable offer of assistance from either the United Kingdom or
Canada for the foreseeable future. Against the background of the
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collapse of Western Europe and the growing military strength 01
Germany, she now found herself defenseless and exposed 10 the
possibility of a combined German naval and air attack.
American Defense Plans
The outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 compelled
the United States to reassess her security which spurred a review of
potential threats to the continental United States. According to war
model exercises carried out by the War Plans Division, the outbreak
of war in Europe would not be a serious threat to the continental
United States unless both the United Kingdom and France were
defeated (Conn et al.,1964:27). While this was felt to be an unlikely
event, it was within the realm of possibility and therefore had to be
taken into consideration. The United Kingdom and France were
considered as the first line of defense between North America and
Germany. It was therefore in America's best interest that these
nations remain strong because their continued existence and control
01 the Atlantic eliminated the possibility of a direct German attack,
in force, on North America.
The United States' first response to the outbreak of war
was the establishment on September 5th of the Neutrality Patrol,
which was a picket line of destroyers that patrolled 300 I.liles
seaward of the American Continent (Langer and Gleason, 1952:208).
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The main purpose of the patrol was to emphasize to the belligerents,
especially Germany, that the United States was determined to
defend the Western Hemisphere. On October 2 the Neutrality Patrol
was strengthened by the Act of Panama which reiterated the
determination of the republics of North and South America to keep
the war from the Western Hemisphere. The hemisphere was
demarcated by a line along the 60 degree west meridian. Because
the other republics did not possess the military resources, the
United States Navy's Neutrality Patrol became the main instrument
to enforce the neutrality zone. By the end of October the United
States Navy had established a continuous patrol from Newfoundland
10 Trinidad (Morison, 1964:16).
The Collapse of Western Europe June 1940
The :;;ense of security that prevailed during the Phoney War
was abruptly ended by the German blitzkrieg which overran and
conquered Western Europe during May and early June of 1940. The
strategic considerations for the North Atlantic were now dictated
by the quickly unfolding events in Europe. By June 17,1940 the
United Kingdom stood alone in Western Europe against Germany. The
British Expeditionary Force, which contained the bulk of the army
and almost all of its tanks and artillery had been forced to retreat
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from France without its heavy equipment. In a period of eight
months, the military balance in Europe had been completely
redefined in favor of the Axis Powers led by Germany. France.
Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Denmark and Norway had all been
conquered. Only the English Channel, patrolled by the Royal Navy and
the Royal Air Force, stood between Britain and the victorious
GeTTn2ns.
In the Atlantic the Royal Navy remained in control while the
French fleet was no longer a cohesive fighting force and had
withdrawn to bases in North and West Africa and the Caribbean
(Churchill, 1949; Roskill, 1956). The future of both fleets was
unsettled and the possibility remained that they could be neutralized
through a peace treaty or pass to German control through conquest.
Canada and the United Slates were equally concerned as to how much
longer the United Kingdom could continue to fight. Control of the
Atlantic was paramount to the defense of both the United Kingdom
and North America. Against this background Of dt::feat and retreat in
Europe the United States, Canada and Ne\!iI1oundland ioclised on their
own defense plans for the Northwest Atlantic.
As the only nation with the strength to influence the
balance of naval power in the Atlantic, the United States began to
prepare for the worse possible scenario. France had surrendered and
the final disposition of the French fleet was far from certain. If the
French fleet passed to German control, contingency plans were
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drafted to move the bulk of the United States fleet from the Pacific
10 the Atlantic (Watson,1950:110-111). This would be necessary
because on April 15, 1939 the United States, depending on the United
Kingdom's and France's control of the Atlantic had moved the bulk of
the fleet to the Pacific as a counter to the growing naval strength of
Japan (Langer and Gleason, 1952:104). As long as the United States
maintained the bulk of its fleet in the Pacific Japan could not secure
a lodgement in the Western Hemisphere. Conversely as long as the
Royal Navy was in being and based in the United Kingdom then the
Atlantic was secure (Conn,at aI., 1964:9). Because of her dependence
on friendly capital ships to control the Atlantic the United States
had only maintained the minimum strength in the Atlantic to carry
out the Neutrality Patrol (Conn and Fairchild, 1960:30). Aside from
the final disposition of the French fleet the United States was
equally concerned with the very survival of the United Kingdom. War
Department estimates concluded that the United Kingdom could hold
out against Germany for at least six months. It was also estimated
that in the event the United Kingdom capitulated and surrendered the
main portion of her fleet, it would take an additional six months for
Germany to integrate the vessels into her own fleet (Conn et al.,
1964:65). Therefore the United States had at least a year to prepare
for any attack in force. Germany, Italy and possibly Japan, bolstered
by components of the British and French fleels would then be
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stronger than the combined strength of the American Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets (Conn and Fairchild, 1960:35). Under these
circumstances, the United States Navy would be heavily outnumbered
and the Westem Hemisphere would no longer be immune from attack.
It was conceivable that by mid 1941 the hemisphere ':~ould be
subject to invasion, with the most probable route cf attack coming
from the north east via Newfoundland (Conn et aI., 1964:9). While
this was obviously the worst case scenario i1 was a contingency for
which the Defense Departments of both the United States and Canada
had to plan. Events of the past nine months had proven that the old
concepts of warfare were no longer valid and that worst-case
scenarios unthinkable only a year previously were now a distinct
possibility.
To address this possibility a new joint Army-Navy plan was
adopted in May which aimed at preventing Germany from acquiring a
foothold in the Western Hemisphere (Watson, 1950). Given such an
ominous reality, American strategy was developed around the
concept of forward defense which has been discussed in Chapter I.
Following a successful model established by Rome during the days of
Imperial power, it entailed defending the hemisphere as far forward
as possible. To implement this strategy additional bases outside of
the continental United States in British, French, Danish and Dutch
possessions from Greenland to the coast of South America would be
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required. In the event of an emergency the protective seizure of
these Atlantic outposts was given active consideration. The trigger
for such unilateral action would be the loss of the British fleet
(Conn and Fairchild, 1960:66). These bases would serve the dual
function of providing a line of outposts along the Atlantic frontier,
similar to thai which already existed in the Pacific, and deny
Germany European overseas possessions for use as an Axis
lodgement (Conn and Fairchild,1960:43). In addition to acquiring
bases on the offshore islands, protecting the Panama Canal and its
approaches was critical to American defense strategy because the
canal permitled the rapid movement of the navy's capital ships
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
Before the blitzkrieg in Europe had altered the balance of
power, a study by the War Department in March 1940 identified
Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Virgin Islands, Trinidad, the Cocos
Islands and the Galapagos Islands as the only European possessions
in the Western Hemisphere with any real military value (Conn and
Fairchild, 1960:43). This was to change in May with the collapse of
the western front. The United States was now galvanised into
action with the realization that she could not depend on other
nations to guarantee her security. By May 24, 1940 plans had been
hastily prepared for the protective occupation of European
possessions in the Western Hemisphere should this became
necessary (Watson, 1950:477). Three days later, spurred on by the
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rapidly deteriorating situation in Europe, the Army asked the State
Department to make the necessary diplomatic arrangements with the
British Government so that if necessary, American forces could
quickly deploy to all British possessions in the hemisphere (Conn and
Fairchild, 1960:47). On the diplomatic front, the State Department
informed Germany and Italy on June 17th that the United States
would not recognize the transfer of Western Hemisphere possessions
such as the French and Dutch possessions in the North Atlantic,
Caribbean and South America, from one European power to another
(Wilcox, 1942:439). The foundation was now established both
diplomatically and militarily for American expansion outward into
the Atlantic to defend the Hemisphere.
The consultations that commenced between the United
Kingdom, the United Stales and Canada during the spring of 1940
would provide thi) United "States with access to offshore islands
without the need for unilateral action. This was important for two
reasons: first and foremost by working with the local governments
the United States would not be perceived in the world at large as an
aggressor. Secondly by securing the bases under lease there was no
need to take over the total control of these countries which would
be difficult both diplomatically and administratively.
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DEFENSE ACCOR~
The tempo of diplC:l11atic and military activity in the North
West Atlantic quickened with the collapse of Western Europe in May
and June of 1940. The stunning German victory shocked the
Governments of Canada and the United States to move quickly to
strengthen their defenses in the North West Atlantic, in the process
the importance of Newfoundland was now greatly magnified (Stacey,
1970:154). The fall of Western Europe forced the United Kingdom
into a defensive posture based in the the British Isles, with Germany
recognized as the dominant power in Europe. For the United States
and Canada the two primary military concerns were protecting North
America and preventing the United Kingdom from being defeated.
The reaction of the United States and Canada to the events in Europe
now placed Newfoundland, because of her geography, 'in the world
that mattered" for the major powers of the North Atlantic and
quickly became a focus of attention for military planners in the
United States, Canada and the United Kingdom (Map 1).
Between early June and mid-September three major defense
agreements wel'-' concluded: one between Newfoundland and Canada
on June 16th, the second between Canada and the United States on
August 18th, and the third between the United States and the United
Kingdom on September 2nd. These agreements would have profound
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implications for Newfoundland and Labrador both in the short and
long term. They formed the basis for the military developments thaI
occurred during the remainder of the Second World War and ir, some
instc.:mces continue until the present.
The Canada-Newfoundland Ememencv Defense Agreement
With the fall of Western Europe and the subsequent
isolation of the United Kingdom, Newfoundland and Canada were
faced with the realization that the United Kingdom. fighting for her
very survival and facing possible conquest by Germany, could no
longer defend Canada and Newfoundland and the approach to the
Western Atlantic. Faced with this reality the two countries drew
closer to address matters of mut...al defense.
Canada realized the importance of Newfoundland's
geographical position in relationship to her own Atlantic defense
and the strategic value of the Gander and Botwood air bases in
particular. To protect these valuable assets Canada uffered on June
14, 1940 to move ground troops and aircraft to Gander to secure
these facilities (Bridle, 1974:106;116). With Newfoundland's
agreement two days later the RCAP" dispatched a flight of five Digby
patrol bombers to Gander for general reconnaissance and naval
operations. These aircraft were the most modern aircraft in the
RCAF and had only been recently acquired from the United States.
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The first maritime reconnaissance mission was carried out on the
day the aircraft arrived in Gander (Kostenuk and Griffin, 1977:31).
On June 17th the 900 men of the Black Watch Regiment sailed from
Quebec City, arriving in Botwood on June 22 (Nea!)', 1986:131).
To follow up the June agreement which dealt only with the
two central Newfoundland air faci!ities, further talks were held in
St. John's during August to address the question of Newfoundland's
defense. The outcome of these discussions was that, by mutual
agreement, Canada assumed the responsibility for the defense of
Newfoundland including the command of the newly formed
Newfoundland militia. There was no formal defense treaty between
the countries, but throughout the course of the remainder of the war
issues were addressed as they occurred. Newfoundland for her part
was to provide the land and rights of way for defense installations
along with transportaticr: and temporary accommodations for
defense forces whenever possible. To give effect to the new defense
agreement, the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act was
passed on October 15 (Acts of the Honourable Commission of
Government, 1940:106).
Shortly after the August bilateral talks in St. John's, Canada
again requested control of the Gander and Botwood airbases for the
duration of the war. Newfoundland and the United Kingdom agreed
and negotiations were initiated to work out the details. To address
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the changing mutual defense matters that resulted from Canada's
expanded role in Newfoundland a series of conferences was held
during August and November-December 1940 and again in April 1941.
As the pace of military development quickened in 1941, Canada
moved to expedite defense mat1ers by appointing a High
Commissioner in St. John's empowered to negotiate future issues on
C~nada's behalf. This eliminated the need for formalized bilateral
meetings and allowed issues to be addressed promptly as they arose.
The defense agreement with Canada was the pivotal point
that turned Newfoundland away from the United Kingdom for her
defense needs to a common defense bond with North America. In
doing so she went from being a ward of the Royal Navy to becoming a
contributor to North American defense (Bridle, 1974:XXV).
The United States-Canada permanent Joint Board of pefense
At the same time that Canada and Newfoundland were
moving toward a mutual agreement under which Canada wC.Jld
assume the responsibility for the defense of Newfoundland. two
other sets of negotiations were in their primary stage. Unbeknownst
to Newfoundland. the United Kingdom and the United States and the
United States and Canada were in the preliminary stages of
discussions on bilateral defense matters tha! would eventually lead
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to official agreements that would have extensive implications for
outside mititalY involvement in Newfoundland. The first of these
agreements to be concluded was between Canada and the United
States.
Prior to the outbreak of war in September of 1939, Canada
and the United States had formulated defense plans for the North
West Atlantic in isolation from one another. Since the outbreak of
war senior military officers of both countries had held Informal
discussions on matters of mutual concern although there was no
formal procedure for consultation. Spurred on by the deterioration
of the military situatlor. in Europe, senior Canadian and American
military planners met on July i i to discuss defense plans for the
Northwest Atlantic (Bridle, 1974:86;85). The United States was
primarily interested in the facilities available in Newfoundland
along with Canada's defense plans for the country. Of particular
concern were the facilities that would be available within a year.
American interest in this specific time frame relates to their
strategic studies which postulated a worst possible scenario of the
United Kingdom being defeated and the United States being forced to
contront Germany and Italy bolstered by components of the BritiSh
and French Fleets. If such a battle should occur it would be no
earlier than the summer of 1941 and the United States wanted to
ensure that air facilities were available to support the air units in
such an evt'1I1tuality.
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Following the meetings of their senior Military Staffs.
Roosevelt and King met on August 17th at Ogdensburg, New York. At
the meeting Roosevelt proposed the formation of a joint United
States"Canada board to plan for the defense of the northern half of
the Western Hemisphere with emphasis on defending against an
attack frof" the North East (Langer and Gleason,1952:704).
Agreement was promptly reached and the board, to be known as the
Permanent Joint Board of Defense, was quickly appointed. The fact
that the first meeting took place on August 26 in Ottawa, less than
10 days after the board's appointment, gives an indication of 'ihe
urgency with which the defense of the Westem Hemisphere was
viewed by both countries.
The formation of the Board had immediate consequences for
Newfoundland. Fully half of the recommendations it made during the
first year of operation pertained to the defense of Newfoundland.
The first recommendation of the board was a general statement of
aims, while the second recommendation, the first of an operational
nature, concerned the defense of Newfoundland (Dzcuban, t959:347-
348). The Board recognized the strategic position of Newfoundland
for North American defence and the need to provide adequate
protection to ensure the United States and Canada were not
endangered. The United States, because of concerns about the north
eastern approaches to North America and the possibility of a German
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attack from this direction, wanted to ensure that Newfoundland was
adequately defended (Dzcuban, 1959:347). Because Canada had
already assumed responsibility for Newfoundland's defense she was
assigned the task of strengthening her land and air forces in the
country and preparing the existing air facilities at Gander and
Botwood for a large influx of United States aircraft jf the need
should arise in the future. In addition Canada was to install as soon
as practical and not later than the spring of 1941, the appropriate
defenses for $1. John'S, Botwood and other points as required
(Stacey, 1948:154).
Until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor drew the United
States into the war as an active combatant, the primary focus of
American - Canada military cooperation was centered on
Newfoundland (Dzcuban. 1959:162).
The United States.United Kingdom Leased Bases Agreement and
The third and arguably most important agreement was that
concluded between the United Kingdom and the United States. Its
basis was the United Kingdom'S need for destroyers and munitions
and the American desire for advance bases in the United Kingdom'S
possessions along the Atlantic coast of North America to enhance
the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Since the outbreak of war
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the United States and the United Kingdom had held talks on matters
of common interest, particularly the United Kingdom's need for
munitions, supplies, food, and raw materials. The United Kingdom
was particularly short of destroyers for convoy protection and to
defend against possible invasion. Heavy losses and damage to this
class of vessel in the Channel and in the Norwegian campaign had
severely depleted the available fleet of destroyers. To compound the
problem, the new building program and repair yard output would not
significantly increase this number for at least a year (Roskill,
1956). In the interim at least 50 destroyers were critically needed,
particularly for convoy escort operations and to defend against
invasion. The only possible supply of these vessels was the United
States naval reserve fleet. Churchill first raised the matter of
acquiring surplus American destroyers in mid May, shortly after
becoming Prime Minister (Churchill. 1949). Roosevelt was in favour
of transferring the destroyers but was limited by American
neutrality legislation and the United States Congress which did not
want to become drawn into a European war (Conn and Fairchild,
1960:61).
The United States Army and Navy had been pressing since
1939 for bases in the Atlantic outside the continental United States,
to enhance hemispherical defense. On August 13th, Roosevelt linked
the two ideas by proposing to exchange 50 surplus destroyers from
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the naval reserve fleet, along with other munitions that were
surplus to American needs, for bases in the United Kingdom's
possessions in the Western Hemisphere (Langer and Gleason, 1952).
0; lIe marriage of the two ideas posed a solution to the difficult
problem presented by the differing public opinions in the United
Stales and the United Kingdom. In the United States, the agreeme~t
had to appear to strengthen the country's defenses while not pulling
the United Slates into the war. In the United Kingdom the main
concern was that it not appear that its representatives had been
out-traded by the Americans (Langer and Gleason, 1952:318). With
both countries satisfied that the agreement would pass pUb!!c
scrutiny on both sides of the Atlantic, agreement in principle on the
exchange of destroyers and other munitions for bases In British
possessions in the Western Hemisphere was reached on September 2,
1940 (Langer and Gleason, 1952:769).
The immediate American consideration was to bolster the
naval strength of the United Kingdom against the threat of
immediate invasion rather than the immediate military need for the
bases involved (Conn and Fairchild, 1960:51). While the United
States military was rapidly expanding it had not yet reached the
size in both manpower and material where it could effectively
garrison these possessions. For the United Kingdom, the destroyers
and munitions would be of immediate impact, and just as important
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the agreement would link the United States and the United Kingdom
together in the face of German aggression.
In exchange for the 50 destroyers and other munitions, the
United Kingdom agreed to lease to the United States bases and
related facilities at sites in the West Indies and in British Guiana in
South America. Th:?- bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda were given
"freety and without consideration as a gift of the British people" to
assist the United States in defending tile Western Hemisphere. The
leases were for a term of 99 years and the United States was
granted "all rights, power and authority within the bases leased and
within the limits of territorial waters and airspace adjacent or in
the vicinity of such bases to provide access to and defense of such
bases and appropriate provision for their control- (Neary, 1986:135).
The actual sites for the bases would be selected by the mutual
agreement of both countries. Another provision of the final
agreement was that the United States had emergency powers to take
whatever action it deemed necessary anywhere in Newfoundland in
the event of war. While this was a very broad and powerful
authority in the event of an actual attack on the country, the
inhabitants would have been grateful for the defense supplied by the
United States.
The final negotiations for the Leased Bases Agreement got
underway in London on January 28, 1941, almost four months after
the agreement in principle had been reached. In the interim an
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American survey party had visited Newfoundland in mid-September
and selected a site for an army base at St. John's, a naval and air
base at Argentia and an air base at Stephenville. The London talks,
which Newfoundland and Canada attended as observers, were
extremely one*sided, with the American delegation, who were
dealing from a position of strength, prevailing on all points on their
agenda (Neary, 1986:145-147). When the agreement was signed on
March 27,1941 it contained 31 articles and an attached Anglo-
American-Canadian protocol. The protocol recognized Canada's role
in the defense of Newfoundland and provided that Canada's interests
would be respected. It further provided that Newfoundland and
Canada would be consulted in all future discussions between the
United Kingdom and the United States on matters pertaining to
Newfoundland that were covered by the Leased Bases Agreement.
For Newfoundland, the three Agreements resulted in an
immediate upswing in military activity which directly strengthened
Newfoundland's defenses and resulted in extensive military
development, as the the country served first as a bastion of North
American defense, then as a base from which to control the North
Atlantic shipping lanes and as a stepping stone on the air route from
North America to the United Kingdom.
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THE DEFENSE OF THE AIR BASES
BotWOQd and Gander
"Thanks to her geography and the air travel aspirations of
other countries. Newfoundland had acquired some first class air
facilities· by 1939 (Neary, 1986:113). The bases at Gander and
Botwood had their origins in a 1935 agreement between the United
Kingdom, Canada and Ireland to develop a trans-Atlantic air service.
Because of her geographic position on the great circle route between
the United Kingdom and North America Newfoundland was designated
the western terminus for the long westward overwater flight and as
the point of departure for eastward Uights (Map 1). The United
Kingdom's Air Ministry decided to construct two airports in
Nev..foundland to meet their commitments. Under the agreement
Botwood was to be a base for flying boats and Gander was to be a
traditional land airport with runways for the large aircraft that
were being designerl and expected to be operational within the next
two years (Private Communication: Wm. Chafe).
Botwood was selected for the flying boat base because it is
generally fog-free and the surrounding topography was relatively
low allowing for a long approach and departure. The sheltered
63
harbour was unaffected by ocean swells and was free from ice from
June to November (Neary. 1986:110).
A large flat plateau on the north side of Gander Lake, 35
miles south east of Botwood was selected as the site of the land
airport. The airport was originally known as HaWes Camp after the
woodcutters' shanties along the rail line. It soon became known as
the Newfoundland Airport. and remained so until 1941 when the
name was changed to Gander, by the RCAF, after the nearby lake. The
name change was necessary to avoid confusion with the other
airports being constructed in Newfoundland (Private Communication:
Wm. Chafe). [For the sake of continuity the name Gander will be used
through out the text, even during the period 1936-1940 when the
official name was Newfoundland Airport.] Construction commenced
on both air bases in the spring of 1936 (Private Communication:
Lester Shea).
When construction started emphasis was placed on the
development of the flying boat base at Botwood because the large
American and British multi-engine flying boats then being
constructed were expected to be ready for service shortly. By the
spring of 1937 Botwood was ready for the arrival of the first
aircraft, and the first experimental flights landed in June (Botwood
Departure Logs, 1936). Because thli!se aircraft took off and landed in
the bay, tl,e on shore support infrastructure was less expensive and
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time consuming to construct than the land airport at Gander where
aircraft hangars ar,d long runways were necessary.
Administrative offices, maintenance shops. fuel storage,
passenger lounge, cafet6ria and accommodations were constructed
at Botwood. To support the long over-water flights, meteorological
facilities and directional beacons along with medium and high
fr~quency radio transmitters and receiver antennae for navigation
and communications had to be installed. The first commercial flight
landed on July 5, 1937 when a Pan-American Clipper from the United
States departed Botwood for Ireland. The next day an Imperial
Airways flying boat, the Caledonia, arrived after a flight from
Ireland (Air Ministry, 1946). Regular commercial flights continued
for the next three years during the ice free flying season from May
until late October. With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 the
fly;ng boat service continued but the aircraft were now under
military and government charter.
Development of Gander paralleled the development of
Botwood with initial construction commencing in the spring of 1936.
The airport was literally carved out of an unbroken boreal forest of
black spruce interspersed with small fens and wetlands (Private
Communication: Lester Shea). In addition to the runways and
hangars, the entire support infrastructure had to be constructed.
Construction progress was slower than at Botwood for two reasons:
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Firstly, BotwGod as a flying boat base required less expensive
physical site developments and secondly, trans-Atlantic range flying
boats were in the testing stage while commercially viable trans-
Atlantic land based aircraft was still in the design stage. In the
absence of aircraft to use the facility. construction could progress
at a more leisurely pace than was the case at Botwood. Work was
undertaken during the construction seasons of 1936, 1937 and 1938,
with upwards of 900 men employed at peak periods (Private
Communications: Lester Shea, Jack James), Construction would halt
in December and commence again the following April. By the end of
1938, Gander's runways were paved and the maintenance hangar,
administration building, and power plant, constructed, and
navigational aids and communications equipment installed
(Private Communication: Jack Jdmes).
The Albatross, a long range passenger transpon being
developed in the United Kingdom for trans Atlantic service, was
designed specifically to use Gander. In fact the hangar at Gander had
actually been designed to accommodate it. Unfortunately, the
development of this aircraft was behind schedule uecause of
technical difficulties and in 1938 was cancelled with no
replacement on the hOrizon (Beaty, 1976:134·135). Thus, as late as
1940 the airport was not used for its original intended purpose. The
closest it came was in 1939 when Handley Page Harrow air tankers
provided inflight refuelling for Imperial Airways flying boats
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departing Botwood (Taylor. 1975:68-69).
With the outbreak of war it was clear that Botwood and
Gander could become either liabilities or assets in the defense of
North East North America. Were they to fail into the hands of
Germany they would serve as a base for aircraft which would make
allied control of Newfoundland untenable. These aircraft could
interdict coastal and trans Atlantic sea ?'ld air traffic, disrupt or
cut cable communications as well as attack Canada and the United
States. Under allied control these bases eculd be used fo, aerial
reconnaissance flights some 450 miles further into the Atlantic
than was possible from the nearest Canadian air bases at Dartmouth
and Sydney.
The emergency defense agreement between Canada and
Newfoundland in early June resulted in the immediate dispatch of
army and air units to Gander and army units to the flying boat base
at Botwood. These units wen.~ stationed in Newfoundland primarily
to enhance the defense of Atlantic Canada by securing the air
facilities.
By the early summer of 1940 the RCAF was well
aware of the potential of Gander as a base for
thei .. aircraft. In a report dated May 29th the
Commander of Eastern Air Command, following <l
visit to Gander, described the facilities as; one
of the largest airports in the world. It has 4
hard surfaced [paved] runways 3 of which are
4500 feet long by 600 feet wide and the
remaining runway is 4800 feet long by 1200
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feet wide. In addition there is one large hangar
120 feet by 150 feet, very complete wrr
[wireless transmitter], OfF [direction finding],
and meteorological equipment, 7 very
comfortable residences for married officials,
and a staff house having 50 single bedrooms,
central dining room, washroomS,and control
tower for the civilian operational staff.
Approximately 400 gallons of 8' octane and
6000 gallons of 100 octane gasoline are kept on
hand- (Bridle, 1974:74;77-79).
The 5 Digby aircraft of RCAF 10 Bomber Reconnaissance
(r-R) Squadron which landed at Gander on June 17th heralded the
formal arrival of a foreign milita~' unit for permanent service in
Newfoundland. The move to Gander was a simple matter of flying
from Dartmouth to Gander, but this routine flight was of great
political significance in the development of a military relationship
between Canada and Newfoundland. The RCAF aircraft cemented the
new level of military co-operation between the two countries.
Maintenance personnel and parts for minor repairs arrived
with this initial flight. Using the existing facilities, the officers
and men were accommodated in the airports staff house and
administration building. These arrangements were sufficient for the
small number of men required to operate the detachment of five
aircraft.
The RCAF's mission in Newfoundland was three fold. The
first priority was to patrol as far east into the Atlantic as the range
of their aircraft permitt~d to provide an early warning in the event
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of a German Naval move into the Western Atlantic. The second was
to defend Newfoundland in the event of an attack. Thirdly, the
aircraft were to serve as the local air defense of Botwood and
Gander (NLPA GN 1/3 320/35).
The aircraft stationed at Gander was the Douglas Digby, a
twin engined patrol bomber purchased from the United States. The
Digby was the air force's second modern maritime patrol aircraft
(the first having been the Hudson) and the first that could be
considered long range. The first aircraft were taken on strength in
December 1939 and in April 1940, 10 SR Squadron at Dartmouth was
the first unit to become operational. The Digby provided the RCAF
with a marked improvement in range and endurance over its other
modem maritime patrol aircraft, the Lockheed Hudson. The Digby
had a speed of 230 knots, an operational radius of 350 miles and an
endurance of 12 hours. The Hudson had a similar range but could
remain airborne for only seven hours (Douglas, 1986). However both
aircraft were marked improvements over the Stranraer patrol
aircraft with which the RCAF started the war. This obsolete British
designed biplane had a speed of only 130 knots, a range of 250 miles
and an endurance of five and a half hours.
The principal determinant of an aircraft's value was its
operatior,al capability. One of the key factors determining the
effectiveness of a maritime patrol bomber was its range or
operational radius. In the case of aircraft on convoy protection
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missions in the North Atlantic, Gander provided a base that
effectively doubled an aircraft's range in space and time over what
could be accomplished by aircraft flying from bases in Canada.
Operational radius could change from day to day because it was
jnfllJenced by many factors. Douglas (1986: 378-379) states;
The term operational radius- also referred to
as patrol range or effective range- requires
some explanation because of its fundamental
importance to maritime air operations. It
was the distance from base at which an
aircraft could linger for a useful amount of
time to escort shipping or search for enemy
vessels with enough fuel remaining for the
return trip. Allowing a safety margin for
headwinds and the possibility that
deteriorating weather at base would force
diversion of the returning aircraft to another
station, the effective range was roughly a
thirdwfrequently much lessw of the total
distance the aircraft could fly without
refuelling. ..,The weight of armament and
equipment and number of crew members
significantly altered aircraft performance,
while the difficult weather conditions on the
Canadian coasts often greatly reduced
operational ranges.
Weather conditions around Newfoundland and Labrador and over the
North Atlantic were worse than elsewhere in Atlantic Canada.
Considering that in 1940 aircraft flying from Gander had as their
nearest alternate Dartmouth, 450 miles further west, aircrew had to
be cautious about venturing too far from base in bad weather.
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Throughout the summer the RCAF consolidated its position
at Gander. The Digbys of 10 SR Squadron remained the only aircraft
stationed at the airport and continued reconnaissance patrols over
the North Atlantic in search of German surface vessels and
submarines that might threaten North America or the trans Atlantic
convoys. Patrols as far east as 450 miles and in duration of up to
twelve hours long were common (RCAF 10 SR Squadron Diary, 1940).
As operations continued it soon became apparent that if the
air force was to continue to operate at the present level or expand
operations additional facilities would be required to bring the
airport up to the operational level of a military air base. To address
this issue Canada on August 5, 1940, requested permission to
construct additional facilities to upgrade the airport's
infrastructure. The cost of this project was estimated at $1.3
million (Canadian) (Bridle, 1974:177;167-172). The following day
Newfoundland promptly agreed to the Canadian request with a
commitment to provide the land and right of ways free of charge
(Neary, 1986:131). The Canadian Government immediately
contracted with the Atlas Construction Company of Montreal to
commence construction of the base.
On the same day that the RCAF arrived at Gander, the
Canadian Army's Royal Highland Regiment of Canada (Black WatCh)
infantry regiment departed Quebec City for Botwood on the
55 An!Qnl.a.. The Regiment, consisting of 852 men, disembarked at
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Botwood on June 22 and was subdivided into garrisons for Gander
and Botwood (Neary. 1986:131). Their mission was to provide for
the security and defense of both facilities. Being an infantry
regiment they lacked heavy anti·aircraft or heavy coastal defense
weapons of any kind. With only light infantry weapons, they were
limited to perimeter defense against infantry raids or small scale
low level air attacks which were the threats that Canada felt to be
the most probable.
At Gander, with the air force already on site and occupying
all of the available buildings, the army's first task was to establish
defensive positions and set up tents for accommodations. To
alleviate the shortage of barracks, military engineers and civilian
contractors renovated vacant construction barracks into which the
regiment moved in July (Private Communication: Jack James).
The RCAF did not immediately assign any aircraft or
personnel to Botwood. The only military personnel assigned to
Botwood were the Army garrison whose mission was to protect the
base to ensure its continued operation. This necessitated stationing
troops around the perimeter of the bases to optimize the available
manpower and provide the greatest concentration of fire power with
the ',~·:e~pons available. The Army was temporarily housed in tents
and existing buildings while more permanent accommodations were
under construction. Throughout the summer and fall of 1940, the
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major military activity at Botwood was the establishment of army
defensive positions and barracks to accommodate the defense
troops. Operations at the base remained under the civilian authority
although the flying boats that used the Base were on military or
government contract flights transporting V.I.Ps and priority cargos
between North America and the United Kingdom (Air Ministry, 1946).
Aircraft Detection C:lrps
To enhance the efficiency of air operations and the general
defense of the country the RCAF, with the permission and support of
the Newfoundland Government, in the summer 01 1940, initiated the
formation of the Aircraft Detection Corps (NLPA GN 38 S1-1). The
Aircraft Detection Corps was a volunteer civilian organization under
the auspices of the RCAF, spread throughout Newfoundland (Map 4).
Their role was to act as the eyes and ears of the air force. Initially
the concept was to provide an early warning system to warn of a
possible enemy attack but the organization also served to track
aircraft flying in the region. In 1940, there was no radar, few
navigational aids and limited naval and air units to patrol the coast.
The Aircraft Detection Corps Wi;l.S set up to report all aircraft
activity to a central tracking and plotting office in Gander.
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The organization consisted of civilian members living in the
outlying coastal areas away from the major military bases. In the
absence of constant naval and air patrols or radar, the civilian
watchers monitored the air and sea and reported all activity to local
communications centers, usually the local telegraph office, Ranoer
or in the more remote communities the short wave operator who in
turn relayed the information to the nearest military base or
mporting center. All reports were then plotted which allowed the
military to tfack aircraft and log suspicious naval activity. In
addition to tl18 obvious role of an early warning of an attack or
enemy activity the observers reports were invaluable especially in
the first three years of the war before radar and the proliferation of
electronic navigational aids, in monitoring allied air traffic in
particular lost or missing aircraft.
By late 1942 there were approximately 1500 volunteers in
the organization (NLPA J&D Box 34, file 9). The organization
functioned until it was disbanded in November 1944 (Douglas,
1986:398). By then the observer's role had been superceded by the
elimination of the threat of air attack and the chain of radar
stations and the combined effects of enhanced naval and air patrols
along with the large military presence throughout the country at
many small stations. After the organization was disbanded it was
found that the Aircraft Detection Corps provided many services
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which the military coul1 not replace by radar and enhanced patrols,
Buch as tracking low flying aircraft and reporting suspicious
activity. These were two of the functions that the military could
not duplicate. The organization was therefore reinstated and served
to the end of the war 10 supplement the radar and patrols along with
the general intelligence gathering by the military.
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CHAPTER III
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BASES:
SEPTEMBER 1940 - DECEMBER 1942.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
The major strategic consideration in the Western North
Atlantic from September 1940 to December 1941 when the
Americans entered the war was the continuing German threat to the
United Kingdom and the Western North Atlantic. For the United
States and Canada this necessitated a strategy of preparing for the
defense of North America while reinforcing and supplying the United
Kingdom, in reality the first line of defense of North America (Conn
and Fairchild, 1964: 67). An attack on North America was considered
to be a very real possibility that would be even greater should
Germany capture Newfoundland's air bases. Both Canada and the
United States viewed the main threat to North America by Germany
to be bombardment by surface vessels, small scale raiding parties,
or aircraft attacks launched from the aircraft carrier then under
constructiun for the Gt:.:'man Navy. At this early stage of the war the
operational status of this vessel was unknown to the Allies and
there was no way of knowing it would never become operational.
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Until May 1941 the predominant threat to shipping was from
surface vessels in mid·Atlantic and submarines in the coastal
approaches to the United Kingdom. Germany attempted to isolate the
United Kingdom by destroying as much of her merchent shipping as
possible. However, naval and especially unrestricted submarine
warfare had not yet reached the Western Atlantic. The reasons for
this were primarily political however there were secondary military
and technological considerations that limited Germany's ability to
operate in the Western Atlantic without, new bases in France and
long range submarines. The over riding raa30n was Hitler's political
decision to avoid confrontation with the United States (Stacey,
1948:160).
Under the convoy escort system in use until the spring of
1941, a naval base in Newfoundland was not considered necessary
either by the United Kingdom or Canada. Since German capital ships
and raiders operating in the central Atlantic were the principal
threat, convoy escorts for the voyage from Halifax to the United
Kingdom consisted of battleships, cruisers or armed merchant
cruisers. The escort base remained in Halifax because no other
support facility was necessary since these large capital ships
possessed sufficient range to accompany the convoys for the total
passage. Only during the first 200 miles of the passage from Halifax
and as the convoy approached the United Kingdom would it bfJ }~Iet by
78
anti-submarine warfare ships (corvettes, destroyers and after 1943
frigates) and aircraft to provide additional defense against
submarines.
The threat posed by the large German naval units was
significant. In February 1941 German battleships sank five ships
only 500 miles east of Newfoundland. In March they sank or captured
16 more, some as close as 350 miles SA-st of f\i~wloundland
(Stacey, 1948:161; Raskill, 1956:373-378). ACAF patrol bombers
from Gander, operating at the extreme limit of theiT range,
unsuccessfully participated in the search for these raiders (RCAF
Gander Daily Diary, 1941). Survivors from some of these convoy
battles were landed al St. John's. thus bringing home to
Newfoundland the proximity of the war. In late May, RCAF aircraft
from Gander and United States Navy aircraf! from Argentia were
once again unsuccessful in their search for German naval units, the
banleship~ and cruiser Prince Eugen (Douglas, 1986:384-
385).
The possibility of a German attack on Newfoundland was
still considered to be a real threat, although it was reduced
significantly in June 1941 after the German invasion of Russia. The
redeployment to Eastem Europe of substantial numbers of German
troops all but eliminated the probability of an invasion of the United
Kingdom or substantia. raids across the Atlantic. However, white
the threat of immediate invasion was removed, the German Navy
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still remained strong and posed a significant threat to the- United
Kingdom's merchant marine, particularly to the North Atlantic
convoys, which constituted the United Kingdom's lifeline.
By the early summer of 1941 most of the German
battleships and cruisers had either been sunk or were blockaded in
European ports. However, larger numbers of submarines were
quickly becoming operational with a corresponding increase in the
number and tonnage of vessels sunk. Unfortunately, the increase in
U-boat activity more than compensated for the reduced threat posed
by surface vessels. The war in the Atlantic was not going well for
the Allies. Three ships were being sunk for every new merchant
vessel launched and eight submarines were being added to the
German navy for each one sunk (Schull,1952:67).
Throughout 1941 the German submarine force continued to
grow in strength and experience. As more U-boats became
operational, patrols were moved farther west into the Atlantic. By
early June 1941 German submarines had reached the waters around
Newfoundland and the Strait of Belle Isle (Hadley, 1986:23-24).
This escalating level of enemy activity in the Western Atlantic
forced Canada and the United States to continue strengthening their
Atlantic defenses with particular emphasis on their forces based in
Newfoundland.
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The westward extension of submarine warfare inlo the mid
and Western Atlantic also necessitated a change in naval strategy.
It now was clearly necessary to provide anti-submarine escorts for
as much of the convoy route as possible. To tt~e chagrin of the "big
ship· men, capital ships were no longer a viable escort option. In
fact they were now almost as vulnerable as the merchant vessels
they had been escorting. The enforced reorganization of the escort
forces reql,Jired the immediate development of additional bases
closer to the mid-Atlantic sealanes than those currently :Jeing used
in the United Kingdom and Canada. Only with new bases closer to the
mid·Atlantic and the escorts o~erating in relays between the bases
would it be possible for the short range anti-submarine vessels to
operate across the Atlantic (Scholl, 1961:68). For this reason, and
mainly because of their location, Iceland and Newfoundland were
chosen as the forward bases for the reorganized anti-submarine
warfare escort forces.
The escorts to be stationed in Newfoundland were
designated as the Newfoundland Escort Force (NEF). Their principal
role was to meet the convoys at the West Ocean Meeting Point
(WOMP) approximately 350 miles east of St. John's (Map 5). Here
they would assume responsibility for United Kingdom bound convoys
from the Western Local Escort Force (WLEF). This latter force was
tasked with escorting the convoys from its base in Halifax to the
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West Ocean Me'?ling Point. The Newfoundland Escort Force was to
lS:scort the convoy from the WOMP across the Atlantic to the Mid
Ocean Meeting Point (MOMP) approximately 700 miles south of
Iceland and 350 miles west of Northern Ireland. Here the
Newfoundland Escort Force would transfer the convoy to the Eastern
Local Escort Force, and then steam north to Iceland for refueling and
resupply. The NEF would then meet the nex1 westbound convoy at the
Mid Ocean Meeting Point, escort it 10 the Western Ocean Meeting
Point and relurn to its base in St. John's for refuelling and resupply
to be ready to start the cycle all over again (Schull, 1952:136b&c).
The self-impasee German restrictions on warfare in the
Western Atlantic ended abruptly on December S, 1941 wit;". the
declaralion of war on Germany by the United States. The U-boats
were now free to conduct unrestricted wartare throughout the
Atlantic and in the coastal waters of North America. For the first
time the war moved to the very shores and bays of Newfoundi::\nd.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASES
Bases discussed in thi::; chapter have been classified using
nationality and then location as the primary criteria. On any given
base, or at any given location several countries and services may be
represented. In these cases nationality remains the primary
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classifier. This means that some locations will be discussed in
more than one of the following sections (Map 6). Because the forces
of' the United Kingdom were closely tied to the Canadian forces and
did not maintain separate bases, they have been grouped with the
Canadian Bases. By using this methodology and discussing service-
specific developments a detailed reconstruction of the bases by
location is possible. To convey the spatial and temporal dimensions
of the construction project and to illustrate the speed with which
the bases were "built from scratch" considerable detail on the
components and time of construction has been provided.
CANADIAN BASES
Canada assumed responsibility for Newfoundland's defense
as a result of the Bilateral Defense Conference in St. John's on
August 20, 1940. Canada's only previous military involvement in
Newfoundland had been the protection of the air bases at Botwood
and Gander and the supply of coastal defense guns for Bell Island.
The new defensive commitment, coming as it did almost one year
after the outbreak of war, had only been undertaken when the
growing strength of Germany necessitated the strengthening of
Canada's Atlantic coast defenses, to which the security of
Newfoundland and Labrador were integral.
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Under the agreement Canada incorporated Newfoundland into
her Atlantic defense structure and the "~ewfoundland militia was
placed under Canadian command. The immediate outcome of the
agreement was that Canada agreed It:' commit a battalion of infantry
to St. John's and to provide coastal artillery. harbour defenses a,~d a
tighter base near 51. John's for the general defense of the city (NLPA
GN 38 54-2-1, 5-4-1-1).
Shortly after the agreement was signed Canada prepared to
senrl an additional 1230 men 10 Newfoundland for garrison duty. 51.
John's was to receive 602 men along with 10 inch and 4.7 inch
coastal defense guns, anti-aircraft guns. and light infantry ....eapans.
while Gander was to receive 136 men to bolster the existing
defenses (Bridle, 1974:633;630). In April 1941 an American
intelligence report records the Canadian military strength in
Newfoundland at two battalions of infantry (2000 men), one flight of
bomber reconnaissance aircraft (5) and 356 men of the
Newfoundland Militia (USAAF Gander Field Daily Diary, 1941).
$t John's and EnYirons
The harbour of $t. John's is small but superbly sheltered and
of vital importance for naval escort operations in the North Atlantic.
Not surprisingly then, St. John's and its environs played host to the
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greatest concentration of military forces in both numbers and
services of any region of Newfoundland during the Second World War
(Map 7). Troops from three nations and six services were stationed
in the immediate area. No less than four major military complexes
and a host of Jesser stations, sites or emplacements were located
within a 10 mile radius of the harbour.
NQwfoundland Militia
The Newfoundland Militia which was formed in 1939 was a
volun:eer force assigned as a light infantry unit for the general
defense 01 the country. It was taken over by Canada under the
Canada-Newfoundland defense agreement. The force was used to
guard government buildings, the Dockyard. water supply, oil storage.
radio station and cable relay stations and other strategic assets in
51. John's, Bell Island and the Carbonear~Bay Roberts areas (Bridle,
1974:640:637). In June 1940 the Newfoundland Auxiliary Militia Act
was passed which created a volunteer non-paid force, later known as
the Home Guard, to be recruited in Corner Brook, Deer Lake and Grand
Falls for th", defense of the paper mills and power supplies and
general home defense (NLPA GN 38/S·1).
By the end of 1943 the Newfoundland Regiment which the
militia had been renamed in March had a strength of 26 officers and
543 men. Since the beginning of the war the Regiment had ex;>anded
87
MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE
NORTH EAST AVALON
MAP?
88
its role from thaI or a aircraft artillery, searchlights and coasla!
artillery at Bell Island and Cape Spear in place of Canadian Artlllery
personnel who had been redeployed to Europe.
Canadian ArmY
The Canadian Army provided the firs;! fceign military force
to arrive in St. John's for permanent assignment. The first troops
arrived in September 1940 shortly after Canada assumed the defense
of the cou.,try and by December there were approximately 775
(Bridle. 1974:146:138-139). Construction on the main base al
Lester's Field on LeMarchanl Road in the cenler of the city was
started in September shortly before the arrival of the first troops
(Private Communication: Frank Day) (Plate 1). The primary
advant'ages of this large open field were that it was centrally
located, adjacent to municipal selViCf:S ~r!d provided Ihe necessary
• open space on which 10 develop a base. The completed complex ran
from LeMarchant Road north to Blackmarsh Road and along the shores
of Mundy Pnnd (AP NF16-252). In addition to the barracks,
warehouses and support buildings the base included a small hospital,
laundry. theatre and recreation center. From ihis central base
troops were dispatched to guard the various strategic sites
LEGEND PLATE 1
1 Canadia:t A.."1TIy Base
2 Elacklll.arsh Road
3 LeMarchant Road
4 . Mundy Pond
PLA'I'E: 1 LESTERS FI.ELD, ST. JOHN'S, CANADIAN ARM~, 1948
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throughout the area and to man the coaslal artillery, searchlight.
and anti-aircraft artillery positions.
When Canadian troops arrived in St. John's in the fall of
1940 the only harbour defense was the anti-submarine net which had
been installed in late IS39 (Bridle, 1974:130:129). While this would
prevent a submarine entering or firing a torpedo into the harbour, it
obviously provided no protection against a bombardment by a
submarine or surface vessel. To provide a minimum defense against
naval bombardment until suitable coastal batteries could be
obtained, two obsolete 75 mm French field guns of First World War
vintage were installed on Signal Hill (Bridle, 1974:171;159).
Although hardly suited for the purpose these guns served as the sole
large caliber gun defense of the city until early February 1941 when
United States Army artillery arrived to defend the port.
Although there were no coastal defense guns immediately
available for the permanent defense of $1. John's, the Canadian Army
in the fall of 1940 started construction on three coastal defense gun
positions to be ready when guns become available. Sites were
selected on both sides of the harbour entrance at the Outer Battery
and Fort Amherst to house 4.7 inch guns to act as an examination
battery, along with a counter bombardment battery of 10 inch guns
at Cape Spear four miles to the south east of the harbour entrance.
The 4.7 and 10 inch guns were much heavier than the old 75 mm and
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designed to fire the armour piercing shell necessary to defeat a
heavily armored naval adversary. All three batteries were housed in
concrete bunkers designed 10 provide both a stable platfonn for the
guns and protection against enemy fire, up to a direct hit from a
large caliber shell. Bunkers were provided for p~rsonnel,
ammunition storage and close defense machine guns. It was not
practical to excavate Fort Amherst and the Outer Battery so the
bunkers were constructed abcve ground on the exposed bedrock,
almost at sea level, at the bottom of the cliffs. These batteries
defended the area immediately adjacent to the harbour entrance that
was under t~e depression limit of the guns on Signal Hill. Fort
Amherst had wood frame barracks, messes, administration and
storage building constructed in a cluster adjacent to the lighthouse
to the south 01 the gun emplacements. Because of the cliffs at the
Outer Battery the barracks and mess were constructed away from
the gun positions in the community of the Outer Battery. The 4.7
inch g:..;ns were installed and operational by June 15, 1941 (Bridle,
1974:154;143-144).
To defend the approach to 51. John's a counter bombardment
batter,' was installed at Cape Spear. These guns were of greater
range and projectile size and weight than the 4.7 inch guns at the
harbour entrance. The battery was designed to engage an enemy as
far seaward as possible to reduce the accuracy of his shells on the
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city and to provide time for shore, air and naval defenses 10 react.
Construction began in the spring of 1941. and the 10 inch guns were
operational by November (Bridle, 1974:636:634). Here the ground
conditions were marginally better than at the harbour mouth sites
for excavation and this permitted a large portion of the bunker
complex to be underground. As at the harbour mouth, concrete
hunkers were constructed for the main guns, infantry support guns,
ammunition storage. gun crew and infantry ready rooms. Once
constructed, these facilities were backfilled with earth to provide
additional protection and camouflage. To the south of the gun
position the Sl:pport installations of wood frame bUildings were
constructed. This small installation which consisted of ba.iracks,
messes, storage buildings, power plant and administration building
supported the gun positions as well as the navy port signal unit.
Royal Canadian Naw
As noted earlier, Newfoundlar,'i ports had not played any
appreciable role in the eSCO!"'ling of convoys across the Atlantic
prior to the spring of 1941. Naval activity in Newfoundland had been
limited to occasional refueling stops at 51. John's. The navy's
original plans for Newfoundland had been to establish small bases at
5t. John's and Botwood for the use of local coastal patrol vessels
which would also perform examination services for the ports
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(Tucker, 1952:186-187). However a shortage of vessels caused by
commitments elsewhere in the Atlantic Theater of operations had
prevented the stationing of an~' vassels in Newfoundland. But by May
1941, changing strategic considerations in the North Atlantic
resulted in the re-evaluation of the navy's role in Newfoundland.
Once the United kingdom made the strategic decision to
provide enhanced an~i~submarjne escort in the mid and western
Atlantic from a base to be established in St. John's, Canada promptly
offered to construct the base, to provide as many vessels as
possible and undertake command of the force. "The idea of
concentrating its forces on a well·defined and vital objective also
immediately related to the defense of the Dominion (Canada) held a
strong appeal for the small Canadian. Navy· (Tucker, 1952:189). The
United Kingdom accer1i.d the offer and it was agreed that title for
the base would be vested with the United Kingdom, the government
of which would finance the construction. For her part Canada would
build the base and pay for its administration and operation (Tucker,
1952:190). Initial plans called for the aSSignment of 63 warships to
the base: 30 destroyers, 24 corvettes and 9 sloops. It was
anticipated that an average of 16 vessels would be in port at any
given time (NLPA 8-4-2-3).
Once the decision was made to establish the basA the first
priority was to provide the infrastructure necessary to support the
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escort force. This was accomplished in a matter of days after the
arrival of the first seven escorts on ~.~3Y 27, 1941 (NLPA, S-4-2~4).
To ensure the force was immediately operational while awaiting the
construction of shore facilities and storage. several support ships
were dispatched to 51. John's to provide interim services.
On May 29 a naval tanker arrived followed on June 3 by another naval
tanker and the stores ship RFA City of Pieppe (Tucker, 1952:193).
The first escort mission carried out by the newly established
Newfoundland Escort Force took place on June 3. On June 14 a depot
and repair ship, HMS f..QI1h arrived from Halifax to assist with ship
maintenance and repair (Tucker, 1952:193).
While the navy was commencing operations utilizing the
existing civilian port facilities supplemented by the support vessels
moored in the harbour. shore facility design and site selection were
underway. By August design had reached the stage whsre the
construction contract had been awarded to the EGM Cape and Co. of
Montreal. Construction started immediately (Plate 2).
Because of Epatial limitations in the city and at the
waterfront, it was not possible to consolidate all the base
components in one location. As a result they were spread throughout
the city on sites chosen according to the availability of land and
utility services. A lack of available office space in the city forced
the Newfoundland Force Headquarters to seek accommodations in the
Newfoundland Hotel in Cavendish Square. Permanent quarters would
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come later in the Naval Headquarters complex constructed at Fort
William to the rear of the Hotel. HMCS~. the main wharf and
docking space, was constructed in Steers Cove on the north east side
of the harbour. The commercial premises occupying the site were
requisitioned and removed to make way for the 3200 feet of
wharlage and the 50,000 square feet of floor space required by the
navy (NLPA $·4-2-3). To facilitate access 10 the docks extensive
dredging was necessary. The repair shops, stores ;'\nd tactical
training center built in 1943/44 were localed on the southside of
the harbour near the dry-dock. The main naval barracks and
personnel stcres were located at HMCS 8.Y.a!.2n in BL:ckmasters Field,
which is now occupied by a Newfoundland and Labrador Housing
Corporation project (Plate 3). The r;nly tangible relic of the
numerous occupants is the former drill hall which is now used as a
municipal recreation center. The 250 bed hospital on Forest Road
adjacent 10 the General H02pital, a wireless station in the Goulds
• and a port signals s!alion e:.t Fort Amherst were given Hie highest
construction priority (Tucker, 1952: 193). Construction progressed
steadily and by January 1942 the wireless station was completed
and operational. February saw the completion of the port signals
station and the movement of the signals unit from Cabot Tower on
Signal Hill where it had been temporarily stationed since May 1941:
LEGEND PLATE 3
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The hospital was completed and occupied in March (Plate 4). By the
end of the summer the wharves, naval headquarters and barracks at
HMCS~ in Buckmasters Field had been completed.
Fuel storage was an immediate problem because the
existing storage capacity was $:T1all and designed only to serve the
prewar civilian demand. As a short·term stopgap measure three
tankers were stationed in the harbour for storage and refuelling. A
permanent solution was provided by the construction of a new tank
farm on the Southside Hills adjacent to the civilian storage tanks.
The first of the new naval storage tanks was brought into service in
September 1943.
In May within two months of the establishment of the naval
base. in May there were , 50 officers and 750 men stationed on
shore. {Tucker,1952:196}. In addition there were Ihe crews 01 the
40 escort and support vessels that were now stationed in the port
(Tucker, 1952:193). By November 1942, !he total shore-based
• complement had risen to 2000.
To provide sailors a respite from the rigors of life aboard
cramped vessels in the North Atlantic, a recreation camp was
established in July 1942 at the Goulds seven miles south of 51.
John's near the naval transmitter station (Private Communication:
Frank Day). This facility operated during the summer months until
the end of the summer of 1945.
LEGEND PLATE 4
1 RCN Hospi tal No. 1
2 US Army Docks
:3 General Hospital
4 Signal Hill Road
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Ammunition storage facilities were located on the south
side near the harbour entrance, the current site of the Fisheries
Products Fish Plant. Port signal stations for communications with
shipping in the vicinity of the harbour entrance were located at
Signal Hill, Fort Amherst and Cape Spear. To enhance the protection
of the harbour afforded by the submarine net, three anti-torpedo
baffles were installed in the fall of 1941. These were steel nets
suspended from buoys in much the same way as a gill net used for
fishing. The net and baffles were replaced in December 1942 by a
submersible anti-torpedo gate, that was raised and lowered by a
steam winch on the south side of the harbour (Murphy and Kenney,
1989:16-17). The ;;Jate allowed easier access to the harbour while
providing protection from torpedoes during the time that ships were
traversing the Narrows. Finally to complement the coastal guns and
the anti-submarine gate, a controlled mine f~ald was laid near the
harbour entrance in June, 1942 (Tucker, 1952:196).
BCAF No 1 Group Headquarters
As more and more resources were dedicated to combat
submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic, the RCP,F in Newfoundland
underwent an expansion in size and responsibility that necessitated
the establishment of a command separate from air force operations
in Eastern Canada. The new command established to control all RCAF
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units and air operations in the country, especially those in support
of the Canadian Navy, was designated as No. 1 Group and was directly
responsible 10 Eastern Air Command Headquarters in Halifax
(Douglas, 1986:387). On July 10, 1941 the Group headquarters was
established in 51. John's at the Newfoundland Hotel adjacent to the
newly established Naval Command with which it would work closely
in anti·submarine warfare. While No 1 Group was organizing its
bases and establishing its communications networi<, tactical control
of its aircraft continued to be exercised by Eastern Air Command.
However on January 20, 1942, control was passed to No 1 Group and
thereafter only general directives were issued by Eastern Air
Command (Douglas, 1986:390).
As had occurred with the other deployments to Gander and
Botwood, the Group was sent to St. John's before office space or
accommodations were available at military installations. In the
interim No 1 Group set up headquarters at the Newfoundland Hotel
pending construction of their military headquarters, while personnel
were billeted in rented accommodations throughout the east and
central city. By the end of September, command strength was four
officers and 23 men (RCAF No.1 Group Daily Diary, 1941). This
increased steadily and by the end of the year totalled 54, comprised
of 9 officers, 38 men and 7 civilians (RCAF NO.1 Group Daily Diary,
1941).
102
The accommodations, administration and store base for
Number 1 Group was constructed on Kennas HIli along the road to
Torbay Airport (Plate 5). This base, separate from Torbay Air Base,
catered to the needs of Number 1 Group. Construction started in the
summer of 1941 and the base was completed and occupied over the
winter of 1941·1942 as buildings were completed ( RCAF Number 1
Group Diary, 1941-1942).
RCAF Base Torbay
During the Canada - Newfoundland defense discussions of
August 1940, the matler of an airport near SI. John's was raised.
Subsequently, the Permanent Joint Board of Defense in its first
report dated October 4, 1940 recommended that Canada "If
physically possible, provide a lighter aerodrome near St. John's"
(Dzcuban, 1959:367). Initially the airport was conceived as a
fighter and communications support base. Fighters assigned to the
base ~ouJd serve to protect S1. John's and the iron mines at Bell
Island along with the approaches to the north east Avalon.
Communications and transport aircraft would use the airport to
support military and government operations in the city. Before the
construction of the airport air access to the city was limited to
flying boats using Bay Bulls Big Pond or Quidi Vidi Lake.
LEGEND PLATE 5
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PLATE 5 RCA.F NO.1 GROUP KENN1\.S HILL, ST. JOHN'S, 1948
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On November 1940, a Canadian survey party visited the
north east Avalon and selected a site between Torbey and St. John's
for the new airport (Bridle. 1974:459;461). This site was selected
over an altemate site near Cochrane Pond south west of the city
because it was closer to St. John's and much of the area was already
cleared for agriculture, thus permitting a more rapid and complete
aS~";2ssment of the topography. On April 17, 1941 Newfoundland
acceded to the Canadian request for permission to construct the
airport at Torbay. agreeing thai Crown lands would be placed al the
disposal of the Government of Canada free of charge either as an
outright grant or a lease for a period commensurate with the capital
invt::5iment (Bridle, 1974:460:462).
A $1.9 million (Can.) contract was signed with McNamara
Construction on April 28. 1941, with work commencing immediately
(Bridle. 1974, 461:462-463). Once construction had begun the
changing priorities in the North Atlantic resulted in lengthening of
• the runways and construction of addilional hangars and support
facilities to support the operation 01 maritime patrol bombers.
Work progressed rapidly through the summer and by October the
runways were operational (RCAF Torbay Daily Diary, 1941). By
December 20th outside construction was halted for the winter but
the base had been sl":;iciently completed to allow 11 BA to continue
operations through the winter (Plate 6).
LEGEND PLATE 6
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Although the airport was originally conceived as a fighter
base the changing priorities of the North Atlantic resulted in the
first aircraft stationed at the airport being the Hudson maritime
patrol bombers of 1t SR Squadron. They arrived in mid-November
and immediately began to take part in convoy protection operations
(Kostenuk and Griffin, 1977:33).
Because of the constantly changing winds that blew across
the North East Avalon, the airport plan incorporated two 5000 feet
by 150 feet wide and two 5000 feet by 200 feet wide runways which
allowed aircraft to take off and land in eight directions {AP 132C 1,
210). Four heated hangars designed to accummodai.e aiiciaf' up to
and including 8-24, 8-17 and C-54 fO:.JH~llgine aircraft were
constructed on the ramp next to the taxi strip.
The base which was located to the east of the airfield,
adjacent to the hangars, was a self contained unit with all the
utilities and services to operate independently of the nearby civilian
infrastructure. It consisted of thirteen H-block barracks, nine
administration buildings, two large warehouses for dry, cold and
refrigerated storage and miscellaneous smaller buildings, along
with a recreation center-drill hall with a swimming pool (Plate 6).
Ammunition storage was away from the inhabited areas to the west
and north of the runways. The tot~1 area occupied by the base was
881 acres, with the buildings occupying 125 acres and the airport
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756 acres (AP A13260, 210). By November 1943 Canada had spent
Approximately S11.2 million (Can.) on the runways and adjoining
t"':5e (Bridle, 479:480-483). Throughout 1942 one squadron of patrol
bombers operated in support of convoy operations, -.vith 145
Squadron replacing 11 SR Squadron in May. Later in May fifteen
Hurricane fighters of 127 Squadron arrived to provide air defense
for the area (RCAF Torbay Daily Diary, 1942).
RCAF Base Gander
In July 1940, the ACAF initiated a $1.3 million (Can.)
expansion and upgrading of the civilian airport to facilitate its use
by military forces (Bridle, 1974:395;404). The project entailed the
construction of de!ense positions, accommodations, hangars,
maintenance and repair facilities, ammunition storage and handling
facilities and the upgrading of the utilitias necessary to support the
large numbers of men and aircraft that would operate from the
airport (Map 8).
Shortly after the upgrading project began the function of
Gander within the North Atlantic Theatre of Operations was
reassessed by Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.
The second recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board of
Defense's first meeting of August 26·27, 1940 was that the defense
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of Newfoundland should be given higher priority. One of the
specified items was....selecting and preparing, as soon as practical,
bases permitting the operation of United States aircraft when and if
circumstances require, in the following numbers: A minimum of four
Squadrons of patrol planes (48 planes) along wtth a minimum of one
composite group of rand planes (73 planes)" (Dzcuban, 1959:367).
Newfoundland was recngnized by the Permanent Joint Board of
Defense to be within Canada's jurisdiction, and it was therefore
Canada's responsi~ility to undertake the construction necessary at
Gander to accommoda,~ the American Air Force. The Permanent
Joint Board of Defense recommendation. and in particular the number
of aircraft specified, reflected the American plan to have prepared
facilities available in the e....ent it was necessary to rush
reinforcements to Newfoundland to defend against a Gennan attack
on North America.
Concurrently with the Pennanent Joint Soard of Defense
meetings, the RCAF was revising its own defense plans for
Newfoundland and the number of aircraft to be stationed at Gander
was upgraded from a detachment of five airc:rart to two squadrons
totalling 24 aircraft. Meanwhile in the United Kingdom the Ministry
of Aviation was making plans to utilize Gander as the North
American point of departure for aircraft being flown from American
factories to the United Kingdom (Watt, 1960:14). RAF Ferry
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Comrr:dnd, which was created to carry out the transfer of aircraft is
discussed later in this chapter. These three decisions. one by the
Permanent Joint Board of Defense. one by the RCAF and one by the
United Kingdom, combined to make the 009iooal expansion plans of
the RCAF obsolete before they were completed. Within three
months, decisions were taken first to transform Gander from an
under utilized airport designed for use by a minimum number of
trans-Atlantic aircraft, to the base for five patrol bombers and then
to expand it into a major facility designed to provide the daily
support for upwards of 200 resident aircraft in addition to large
numbers of transient aircraft.
The upgrading plans were now completely fe-drafted to
address the new commitments. The initial estimate of $1.3 million
(Can.) projected in August 1940 rose dramatically to a total
expenditure of $20,281,955 (Can.) which was to be spent by
September 1945 (MacKenzie,1986:81). Additional capital projects
and operating expenses by the United States and the United Kingdom
increased this figure significantly.
Gander developed into four separate bases clustered around
the main runways. These runways measured 4500 feet long by 600
feet wide; 6150 feet by 400 feet wide and 4700 feet long by 1200
feet wide (Map 8). The latter was the original runway designed for
early trans Atlantic aircralt landing in poor visibility with a
"'
primitive instrument landing system (AP A12772, 2-6-37). Each base
was operationally independent of each other except for the common
use of the runways and utilities. The RCAF and Canadian Army bases
were buill adjacent to each other on the north side 01 the runways
(Plate 7). The army occupied the site directly to the north of the
rail line and railway stations while the a;~ force occupied the lands
immediately adjacent to the original airport facilities and further
west past the end of the north south runway. In the V between the
east-west and the north-south runway. the USAAF base was
constructed. To the east of the runways was the AAF Ferry Command
(RAFFC) base. Along the western perimeters of thl'! nmth-south
runway and the southern perimeter of the east·west runways, ten
aircraft hangars were constructtld. On the RCAF side of the east-
west runway, three more hangars were constructed and at the RAFFC
base a dOllble size hangar (224 feet x 160 feet) and a regular hangar
were constructed for a total of 15 including the original hangar
(AP A'2772, 36).
By January 1941 work was well underway. Because 01 the
wartime emergency the project did not close lor inclement weather
and construction continued through the winter. By March 31. 1941
barracks for 31 officers and 200 men as well as the RAFFC double
hangar had been completec.
LEGEND PLATE 7
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By September the project was approximately sixty percent
complete with the remainder in various stages of construction. Five
hangars had been completed, three had their steel frame erecled and
an additional four had their concrete foundations completed. Sixteen
barracks were completed and occupied by 1,576 men. An additional
five barracks for 728 men were completed but not yet occupied,
while seven barracks capable of accommodating 1,651 were under
construction. Six messes to accommodate 1,310 at a sitting were
completed and two more messes with a total capacity for 1,440
were under construction. The hospital, heating plant, bakery,
laundry, and ammunition storage bunkers were completed along with
29 general purpose bUildings for uses such as administration,
warehousing, utilities, etc. A further 29 buildings were in various
stages of construction with all foundation work completed (all data
in this paragraph from Bridle, 1974:444;447-448).
Progress on the utilities was well advanced. The pump
house for the water supply was under construction and a ten inch
water line had been completed to Gander Lake. The sewer treatment
plant and disposal field were under construction 10 the north of the
Canadian side of the airfield. Railway spur lines 10 the power plant,
coal storage yard and the gasoline and oil storage farms were
nearing completion. The RCAF's aviation gasoline storage farm of
100,000 gallons was completed and operational while a 500,000
gallon tank farm for the USAAF was well advanced in construction
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(Bridle, 1974:445;450). The United States constructed fuel storage
capacity five limes the size of the RCAF for two reasons. First,
they required the reserves in the event that large numbers of
aircraft were to use the airport to defend against an attack on North
America. A second consideration was to ensure an uninterrupted
supply of fuel in the event that for any reason tankers could not
resupply the airport. As the war progressed and fuel continued to be
available to Gander in uninterrupted shipments the tank farms of the
USAAF and the RCAF were used by all airport tenants on an as needed
basis (Private Communication: Wm. Chafe).
The RCAF continued operations throughout the construction
phase, taking over buildings and facilities as they were completed.
The five aircraft detachment of 10 SA continued to fly operations
over the Atlantic throughout the fall and the winter of 1941. In
early April the remaining ten aircraft of 10 SR flew in from
Dartmouth to take up a permanent posting at Gander, increasing the
number of aircraft permanently stationed at Gander to 15 (RCAF
10BR Squadron Diary, 1942). The Squadron continued to operate in
the anti~submarine role over the North Atlantic until November 10,
1942 when they moved back to Dartmouth because the aging and
often unserviceable Digbys had becorr.e ~oo unreliable for winter
operations over the North Atlantic. In just over two and a half years
of constant operations over the North Atlantic the Digbys had been
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wom out. Number 5 SR Squadron operating amphibious Cansos
replaced 10 SR at Gander (RCAF SBR Squadron Diary. 1942). They
flew anti-submarine operations from Gander in support of the
convoys until May 1943 when the unit moved to Torbay to make room
for the return of 10 SR, now newly equipped with four engine very
long range 8-24 Liberator patrol bombers. (RCAF 1DBA Squadron
Diary, 1942). In August 1942, 127 Squadron comprising 15
Hurricane fighters deployed from Dartmouth to Gander to provide
local air defense for Gander, Botwood and the surrounding area
(Kostenuk and Griffin, 1977:60).
The Canadian Army garrison provided ground defense and
security for the facilities and aircraft. When they first arrived in
1940 the Black Watch temporarily moved into construction barracks
that dated from the airport's construction (Private Communication:
Jack James). In August work started on the army base north of the
railway. Barracks, messes, bakery, laundry, drill hall, parade ground
along with associated warehouses, storage and support buildings
were constructed.
A major duty of the garrison was the anti-aircraft defense
of the airport. To accomplish this, long range 57 mm heavy anti-
aircraft artillery and short range 20 mm light anti-aircraft
artillery were set up around the airfield. The heavy anti-air/;raft
artillery, which was designed to defend against high altitude
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attackers, was set up three miles to the west and east of the airport
to provide a greater range and radius of fire. The light 20 mm anti-
aircraft artillery was set up around the perimeter of the airfield and
throughout the base. These quick firing weapons were designed as a
point defense or close in weapon and were intended for defense
against low to medium revel attack. To provide a greater radius of
fire many of these guns were elevated on wooden platforms above
the surrounding buildings (Private Communication: Wm. Chafe).
Royal Air Force Ferry Command
As noted earlier in this chapter, flying or ferrying aircraft
to the United Kingdom from North America was e measure decided
upon by the United Kingdom's Ministry of Aircraft Production to help
alleviate the shortage of aircraft in the United Kingdom, particularly
maritime reconnaissance patrol bombers (Map 9). Until the fall of
1940, aircraft built in California on the west coast of the United
States took approximately four months to reach the United Kingdom
(Powell, 1982:19). They were flown to the eastern United States,
disassembled, crated and transported by ship to the United Kingdom,
where they were uncrated, reassembled and flight tested. This
process was time-consuming, labour intensive and very demanding
of maritime cargo space. To compound the problem the high rate of
shipping losses in the Nr.rth Atlantic resul~ed in an average loss rate
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01 between 10 and 20 percent (Hughes and Costello, 1977). The only
feasible alternative was to fly the aircraft across the Atlantic
although this was not without its risks.
In July 1940 the Ministry of Aircraft Production approached
officials of the Canadian Pacific Railway and proposed the formation
of an organization to ferry American manufactured bombers across
the North Atlantic (Watt, 1960:20). There is no clear evidence of
what the reasons were for the choice of the Canadian Pacific
Railway, but it may have been because of the longstanding friendship
between Lord Beaverbrook, the United Kingdom's Minister of Aircraft
Production, and Canadian Pacific's president Sir Edward Beatty
(Douglas, 1986:643). However, notwithstanding these personal
friendships, Canadian Pacific was an important player in the
transportation industry, with the management infrastructure to set
up and operate the new organization quickly. On August 16 an
agreement between the parties was signed and the Canadian Pacific
Railway immediately began the recruitment of the personnel to
operate the Atlantic Ferry Organization (Watt, 1960:20). Gander,
because of its location, was selected as the North American staging
base for the long over·water flight to the United Kingdom.
In early October Squadron Leader G. J. Powell, a former
Imperial Airways pilot with considerable trans-Atlantic flying boat
experience, arrived at Gander to establish the base of operations
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(Powell, 1982:25). Because of the Jack of ladtities and the
generally crowded conditions al the airfield, it was necessary to
arrange with the Newfoundland Railway to station a number of
sleeper cars and a dining car on the rail siding for temporary
accommodations (Watt, 1960:33). Construction was started
immediately on a 30 room transient barracks (Powell.1982:26.). By
the end of October Ferry Command was ready lor operations. The
first flight of seven twin engine Hudson bombers departed Gander on
tne night of the tenth of November and arrived safely in the United
Kingdom after a flight of approximately eleven hours (Air Ministry,
1945:5).
Throughout the 1:-:1 and winter operations continued while
the Ferry Command be.,s8 was under construction as part of the
general building program managed by Canada. The base was located
on the east side of the runway south of the main east-west runway
immediately adjacent to the hangars and flight line. It consisted of
&. double and a single hangar, four barrack!':. mess facilities and
warehouses (AP A12772, 36-37) (Map S).
Ferrying operations continued under the auspices of the CPR
until May 1941 when the Ministry of Aircraft Production, to
consolidate the operations within the Ministry, assumed direct
cc.ltrol (Douglas, 1986:644). This arrangement was to be short
lived, for on July 20th the RAF absorbed Ferry Command. Operations
in the North Atlantic steadily increased from 26 aircraft dispatched
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to the United Kingdom during the last two months of 1940 to 722 in
1941. During 1942 this figure increased to 1163 aircraft
successfully ferried across the Atlantic using Gander and Goose Bay
as the departure bases (Statistics from Air Ministry, 1945:36;
Powell,1982:19).
RCAF Base Botwood
The RCAF first arrived a1 Botwood in late June 1940. At
this time the civilian base was operational in support of American
and United Kingdom trans-Atlantic flying boat operations. The
mission of the RCAF was to support the civilian flying boat services
10 ensure their continued operations and to expand the facilities to
support operational military flying by RCAF flying boats. In August
it was decided that the facilities at Botwood required expansion and
upgrading to allow the base to accommodate greater numbers of
personnel and operational aircraft as well as the anticipated
increase in transient flying boat traffic as a result of wartime
operations. This expansion was similar to that undertaken at Gander
to enhance military operations, the only major difference being that
Botwood was a seasonal base due to winter weather conditions over
the North Atlantic and the presence of ice in the harbour. It
operated only during the summer flying season from May to mid-
121
November, then was closed for the winter (Plale 8).
Work commenced on the upgrading of Botwood in the spring
of 1941. The existing 40 It. ramp and parking area was e>..panded and
the two seaplane hangars had their concrete foundations poured. By
November when the base closed for the season, rle construction
project was 70 percent completed (Bridle,1974:446:451-452).
Construction started on the hospital, barracks, messes, repair shops,
warehouses, laundry and utilities along with a water supply Irom
Peters River. A breakwater was constructed between tile base and
Killock Island, on which ammunition storage caves were established
(AP A12240, 109-110).
The lirst operational military aircraft arrived at Botwood
on July 7th, 1941 when a detachment of Catalina twin engine patrol
bombers of the ACAF's 116 Squadron arrived from Dartmoulh for
anti-submarine patrols over the shipping lanes of the North Atlantic
(Kostenuk and Griffin,1977:49). When the flying season closed in
early December, the ACAF strength consisted of 27 olficers and 383
men under the command of a Wing Commander (ACAF Botwood, Daily
Diary 1941). From December until May the station conducted routine
maintenance with a significantly reduced complement of personnel
while awaiting the reopening of the spring flying season.
May 19th marked the arrival of the first civilian lIying
boats of the season and May 31st marked the return of the
detachment 01 116 BR Squadron Cansos from Dartmouth
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(RCAF Botwood Daily Diary, 1942). Strength of the base grew
steadily over the flying season and peaked at 46 officers, 456 men
and 86 civilians at the end of the 1942 flying season when the base
ceased operational flying and was placed :,1 maintenance lor the
winter (RCAF Botwood Daily Diary, 1942).
To secure the port of Botwood and the sea plane base, it
was necessary to control the Bay of Exploits to prevent the approach
of submarines or surface raiders. In the fall of 1940 the army
started construction of a battery of 4.7 inch coastal defense guns at
Point of Bay on the west side of the Bay of Exploits and a 10 inch
counter bombardment battery at Wisem?~ns Head on the east side of
the bay. The guns as well as the alert and ammunition storage rooms
were mounted in concrete bunkers. The entire complex was
backfilled and covered with earth for camouflage and added
protection from gunfire. Temporary wooden frame barracks, messes,
storage and generator buildings served to support the gun batteries,
......hich were manned and supportfld by the garrison at Botwood. The
4.7 inch guns were installed and operational by Ihe opening of the
shipping season in the summer of 1941 while the 10 inch battery
was operational by December 15, 1941 (Bridle, 1974: 636;634;
152:142).
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RCAF Base Goose Bay
To complement the existing ferrying of aircraft 10 Europe
via Gander, the Permanent Joint Board of Defense agreed that an
airport in Labrador or Northern Quebec would be necessary to serve
as a link between existing airfields in the North Eastern United
States, Eastern Canada and Gander with the new airfields under
construction in Greenland (BW·l at Narsarssusk and BW-B
Sondrestrom) by the United States (Dzcuban, 1959:353·354) (Map 9).
Combined with the United Kingdom's bases in Iceland and Scotland
these would provide a northern route to Europe for shorter range
aircraft, eliminating the need for a perilous non-stop flight from
Newfoundland.
A secondary consideration in the development of the base
was the general strategic defense of North America and the need for
a northern base for aircraft operating in the Battle of the Atlantic
(Bridle, 1974:484;485). In July 1941, the United States and Canada
both dispatched survey crews to Labrador to undertake a
reconnaissance of possible sites for the proposed airport. Although
working independently of each other both parties met at Goose Bay,
agreed on the same site and independently recommended it to their
respective Governments (McGrath,19S7:18). On July 29, 1941 the
Permanent Joint Board of Defense met in Washington and the board's
17th recommendation was that Canada would construct the base.
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A caveat to the recommendation stated that the United States was
prepared to proceed alone if Canada was either unprepared or unable
to commence the project immediately (Ozcuban. 1959:183). This
explains the American sUivey party even though the construction of
the base was preViously agreed to be a Canadian responsibility. The
Li, ,iled States was prepared to mOlle unilaterally to build the
airlield. On August 29, 1941 Newfoundland agreed to Canada's
requests for permission to construct the base and a contract was
immediately awarded to MacNamara Construction Co. 01 Toronto with
construction to start as soon as possible (Bridle. 1974:352;862).
A convoy carrying construction personnel, equipment and
supplies along with fifty RCAF personnel landed at Terrington Basin
on September 19. By November, three 7.000 foot unpaved runways
had been bulldozed from virgin black spruce forest (RCAF Goose Bay
Daily Diary, 1941). The fact that the airport site was located on a
flat well drained raised sand terrace facilitated swift construction.
To expose the sand it was only necessary to remove the trees and
humus soil. Gravel was then spread level and rolled to form the
foundation for Ihe runways. For the first winter, belore concrete
was laid for the runways, Ihe gravel froze and snow was then
compacted on the top 10 form a surtace similar tl) concrete. The
airport itself was operational by 3 December when the first aircraft
landed (RCAF Goose Bay Daily Diary, 1941). When completed the
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landing facilities consisted of three 200 feet wide runways
measuring 6070, 6080 and 5850 feet long (Plate 9). Because 01
Goose Bay's isolated location far removed from any modern urban
infrastructure, almost everything, including the majority of the
labourers had 10 be brought in by sea. Later after the runways
became operational supply by air became possible. To support tile
military operations, a fully self-contained base consisting 01
barracks, messes, administration, laundry, bakery, power plant,
water works, sewage system, whari and heating plant was built
(Map 10). Because the shipping season only lasted five months, from
June to late October, large storage warehouses and POL tank farms
were necessary to permit the base to operate continuously from
November to May when ice along the coast of Labrador and in Lake
Melvill3 suspended shipping.
Military facilities to support the air operations consisted
of hangars, meteorological services, air radio station, navigation
beacon, Instrument Landing System and communication network.
Construction continued throughout 1942 with a significant revision
upward in the facilities necessary for both the military and civilian
construction personnel. This was necessitated by the entrance of
the United States into the war and the dramatic increase in aircraft
crossing the Atlantic.
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On April 5, 1il~2 the first aircraft for overseas delivery
departed for the United Kingdom (RCAF Goose Bay Daily Diary, 1942).
By the end of April the RCAF strength consisted of seven officers
and 68 men. The RAFFC unit had one officer and nine men while the
USAAF contingent stood at three officers and nina men (RCAF Goose
Bay Daily Diary, April 1942). In June with the openii1g of the
shipping season the New Brunswick Rangers infantry regiment
arrived for airport defense (RCAF Goose Bay Daity Diary, 1942). The
strength of the Base increased dramatically and by the end of June
stood at 1,700 military personnel of all services and 700 civilian
personnel (RCAF Goose Bay Daily Diary 1942).
AMERICAN BASES
On September 16, 1940 the Greensiade mission consisting
of Army, Air Force and Naval personnel arrived in Newfoundland
aboard the USS~ to select three sites for military bases as
specified by the Leased Bases Agreement (NLPA GN38 S4-2-1; file
8). After holding discussions with th~ Governor and his advisers and
obtaining his consent, survey flights were undertaken of potential
base sites throughout Newfoundlarld. This was followed by a sea and
ground reconnaissance to confirm the aerial observations. The Army
selected a site on the north ~hore of Quidi Vidi Lake on the northeast
boundary of SI. John's for a base to house an infantry garrison for
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the protection of the city and to serve as the headquarters for the
American Army in Newfoundland. 81. John's was chosen as the site
for the headquarters because it was the seat of Government and the
Canadian Army had recently established its headquarters here. The
Navy selected the Argentia peninsula on the northeast side of
Placentia Bay for a combined naval and air base. The Army A!r Force
selected a 5ile near Stephenville at the eastern end of Bay St.
George for an emergency landing field. In addition to the Quidi Vidi
site the Army also established a base at Marquise adjacent to the
Naval Base at Argentia and stationed truops at Stephenville to
protect the air base. On November 11th an agreement between the
United States and the United Kingdom authorized the start of
construction before the formal signing of the leased bases
agreement (Dzcuban. 1959:167).
Shortly after the initial surveys had been completed
preparations began to dispatch troops to Newfoundland. Because 01
the urgency of 1he perceived threat by Germany, Newfoundland was
the destination for the first American troops dispatched to new
bases in ti-Ie United Kingdom's possessions in the Atlantic, arriving
in January 1941. The troops had originally been scheduled to arrive
in mid·November but sailing was delayed until January when a
suitable ship could be prepared for transportation and quarters
(Bykofsky and Larson. 1957:9). Troops were not sent to any of the
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other new Atlantic bass locations until April (Conn, 1960:98). The
decision to dispatch combat troops to Newfoundland in the middle of
winter, before base or support facilities were available is an
indication of the importance the American military placed on
defending the island. The troops had to be billeted on their transport
ship.
The United States had two major military objectives in
establishing bases in Newfoundland. The first and most important
was to secure the island to allow il to serve as a defensive outpost
of the United States. The Si,,>cond was 10 develop the necessary
military infrastructure to support units deployed in or transiting
through the North Atlantic. To achieve these objectives entailed
considerable expense and the allocation of scarCE: personnel and
equipment.
In 1941 the initial cost of constructing the army bases at
St. John's, Stephenville, and Marquise was estimated to be $28
million (US) (Dzcuban, 1959,168). By 1943 after completion the
final cost had risen to $60.3 million (US), more than double the
initial estimate (Dzcuban, 1959:168). Increases in personnel
numbers were similar. The initial army garrison in January 1941
was 977 men. This almost doubled by May to 1660 and further
increased 10 2211 in August. By the end of November there were
132
2383 personnel assigned 10 Newfoundland (Watson. 1950:480, all
personnel figures).
The original leased Bases Ay~eemEnl signed in March 1941
provided for a tctal of 4487.43 acres in six locations (Acts of the
Honourable Ccmmission of Government, 1941). As construction
progressed and the military commenced operations it was realized
that considerably more land would be required for the bases. In
early 1941 the United States requested an additional 2142 acres of
land to fulfil these operational requirements. These lands were
leased to the United States pursuant to the July 1942 Supplementary
Bases Agreement (PO,CIS of the Honourable Commission of Government
1942). While this was a substantial acreage, almost half the size of
the original appropriation, it did not include the large bases being
constructed on lands subleased from the Canadians at Gander and
Goose Bay or small communications, navigation and radar sites that
were obtained from Newfoundland under the terms of the duration of
the war plus six months.
$1 lobo's and Environs
Less than a month aller the Greenslade mission, the U5S
~ arrived in 5t. John's on October 13 with a detachment of
the Army's Corps of Engineers to conduct the preliminary surveys
and design for the bases (Watson, 1950;480). They rented office
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space in the Reid Building on Duckworth Street and throughout the
fall of 1940 and the winter of 1941 surveyed the sites around SI.
John's and coordinated other engineering parties at Stephenville and
Argentia. In addition to the 198.36 acre main site at Quidi Vidi
Lake, 2.5 acres for a supply dock on the north east side of the
harbour, 27.57 acres on the White Hills for radio communication
towers and a site on Signal Hill for the establishment of a coastal
artillery battery were also selected for inclusion in the Leased
Bases Agreement (ACts of the Honourable Commission of Government
1941).
Shortly aNer the Engineers arrived, the United States, in
response to the deteriorating strategic situation in Europe, decided
that it would be necessary to establish a garrison in Newfoundland
immediately. It was clear that the deployment could not wait for
the establishment of the necessary infrastructure to house and
support the personnel. The engineering personnel in 51. John's
expanded their mandate to include pre-planning for the arrival of
Army personnel in the new year.
In response to this perceived threat construction of
temporary barracks and administrative buildings at Fort Pepperrerr
started in October, followed on the last day of December with the
commencement of construction on the permanent buildings (Dzcuban,
1959:167). Initial plans called for the base to accommodate 3500
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personnel and this was the basis for the fjrst year's construction
program. With the active participation of the United States in the
war this was upgraded to 5500 in early 1942 (Ozcuban. 1959:168).
On January 29th the UST Edmund 8 Alexander arrived in St.
John's with 58 officers and 919 enlisted men assigned to garrison
duty (Dzcuban, 1959:98). The contingent consisted of infantry.
coastal and anti·aircraft artillery. and support and headquarters
personnel along with their equipment and weapons. Because there
were no accommodations available in the city, and winter weather
made living under canvas difficult, the Edmund 8. Alexander
remained docked on the south side of the harbour until July as an
accommodations ship (Private Communication: Frank Day).
Although the defence of St. John's was recognized as
Canada's responsibility by the Pennanent Joint Board of Defense and
Canada had resources committed to defend the port, there were no
coastal defense guns available in Canada for assignment to S1.
John's. To complicate the matter further, Canada did not produce
this type of artillery and was dependent on the United States and the
United Kingdom for her supply. Unwilling 10 leave the port
undefended, the United States dispatched a battery of four 6 inch
coast defense guns with the first contingent of troops. In early
February, shortly after their arrival in the city, these batteries
were installed on Signal Hill (Bridle, 1974:282;289). In addition to
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the coastal guns, mobile anti-aircraft artillery batteries were set
up at temporary sites neaf the United States military facilities. In
light of the delays experienced by Canada in obtaining suitable
coastal defense guns for the city, the United States as an interim
measure dispatched four mobile 155 mm artillery pieces along with
3 inch anti-aircraft artillery batteries for the interim defense of
the city (Bridle, 1974:152;142). The United States further
reinforced its coastal artillery battery on Signal Hill in September
by adding two 8 inch guns.
Throughout the winter and spring of 1941 personnel
continued to arrive in the city. The Edmund B Alexander could not
accommodate all personnel, so in late March with the improved
weather, a temporary tent encampment was established at Camp
Alexander, located in a 15 acre field near Carpasian Road and Pine
Bud Avenue in the north east section of the city (Private
Communication: Frank Day). This provided temporary
accommodations while Fort Pepperrell was under construction. By
May new arrivals had increased the garrison in St. John's to 1666
(Dzcuban. 1959:98).
Construction of the barracks and support buildings on Signal
Hill had commenced in February shortly after the arrival of the
troops and artillery piec"!s. By May the Signal Hill barracks were
ccmpleted and occupied. M Fort Pepperrell construction emphasis
was on the completion of personnel accommodations and support
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infrastructure such as messes, hospital, and electrical, water and
sewer services. Work progressed steadily throughout the summer
and in November the base was thirty-five percent completed with all
barracks scheduled to be finished by the first of December (Bridle.
1974:306;316). At this time the first personnel began to move from
Camp Alexander and by mid-December the latter was vacant. Shortly
thereafter it was disassembled and the property returned to its
owners. Army headquarters, which had previously been located in a
rented house on Rennies Mill Road, moved to Fort Pepperrell in
February thereby consolidating all personnel on the base.
Construction continu_ad throughout 1942 on the revised building plan
and was finally completed !n the middle of March 1943 (Dzcuban,
1959:168) (Plate 10).
By the time the United States military arrived in SI. John's,
cargo handling at the port was already near capacity given that most
of the docking facilities were finger piers unsuited for large cargo
vessels. Without the addition of new cargo handling facilities the
port would have been unable to handle the volume of cargo necessary
to build, maintain and operate the planned American bases. To
address this potential supply bottleneck and to continue American
policy of having complete cc; itrol over as much of the supply
infrastructure as possible, a dock and warehcuse was constructed 011
PLATE 10 FonT ;>~pr!!:RR.I::LL ca. 1943
photograph Credit:
Public Archives of
Canada
Ottawa, Ontario
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tile leased harbour front site at the Inner Battery ( Bykofsky and
Larson, 19S7:11){Plate 4). The facility consisted of a wharf, cranes,
warehouse for dry cargo and pipelines for the transfer of bulk POL.
Construction started in late 1941 and the facility was operational
by mid-1942 although all final work was not completed until March
1943 (Dzcuban, 1959).
With the presence of large numbers of combat troops there
came a corresponding need for the safe and secure storage of large
quantities of ammunition away from inhabited areas in case of an
explosion. Twenty five acres of land was leased from Newfoundland
on Portugal Cove Road, west of the Tarbay Airport for that purpose
;DE&L Files USA Lands). The site was selected because it was in an
uninhabited area adjacent to the main transportation routes and
airport which made the ammunition readily available for routine or
emergency allocation. Additional ammunition storage silos were
constructed in the White Hills which formed part of Fort Pepperrell.
U S Naval Base Amentia
The Naval Lase was built on the 948 acre Argenlia
Peninsula, under the leased bases agreement (Acts of the Honourable
Commission of Government 1941). The initial estimate was that it
would cost $9.5 million dollars (US) but by the end of the war $53.2
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million (US) had been spent on the Base (United States Navy,
1979:14).
On January 9, 1941, the 5.S. Richard Peck, a converted river
ferry. arrived with engineers and construction wor1<ers for the
project (Dzcuban, 1959:168). Because of a lack of suitable housing,
the ship remained moored at dockside and served as an
accommodations ship until sufficient temporary barracks had been
finished. Many of the Newfoundlanders employed on the project lived
aboard schooners and fishing boats moored in the harbour while
awaiting construction of shore accommoda.::ons (AP NF 4·90).
The first priority of the construction crews was to erect
barracks and mess halls to house and feed the growing workforce.
Once this had been completed work progressed rapidly on the base.
Before building the runways, it was necessary to remove a layer of
peat which averaged twelve feet in thickness but extended up to
twenty feet in places (United States Navy, 1979:5). It is e::.,imated
that 8.5 nillion cubic feet of peat was removed and dumped in the
ocean (AP NF 4·90; United States Navy, 1979:5). Once the peat was
removed, the underlying layer of glacial gravel served as the bed for
the three concrete runways which were 5,000 feet long by 150 feet
wide (AP NF 490). By September, one runway was available for
emergency use (Bridle, 1974:305;315) (Map 11).
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Concurrent with the runway construction, the remainder of
the Naval and Air Base was under construction. Wharf and docking
facililies, workshops, machine shops. communication facilities,
messes, barracks. recreation facilities, utilities, petroleum oil and
lubricant storage along with warehouses were built 10 support the
naval vessels which ranged from corvettes to battleships and
aircrah carriers (Plate 11). In September a 7,000 Ion floating
drydock was added to service escort vessels (Bridie, 1974:309:317).
On the aviation side, aircraft hangars, workshops, POL storage and
warehouses were buill 10 support land planes using the runways and
flying boats that operated from the nearby harbour.
By February 1941, 600 Newfoundland workmen were
employed on the site in addition to American contractors and naval
personnel~ February 1941). On May 15, 1941, the USS
~ a seaplane tender, arrived to support a squadron of
Catalina twin engine patrol bombers that were based at Argentia for
maritime reconnaissance (Navy Department, 1979:6). These aircraft,
the first to be based at Argentla, took part In the search for the
~ shortly after their arrival. The USS~ remained
at Argentia for seaplane support until the ramp and shore hangars,
~lJops and maintenance facilities were operational. Construction
continued throughout 1941 and 1942 with 85 percent of the base
completed and the runways operational by April 1942 (Bridle,
PLATE 11 ARGENTIA NAV.~!. cASE ca .194 J
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1974:307;316) Throughout the construction phase aviation and
naval operations continued with buildings and facilities taken over
from the contractors as they were completed. All major
construction was completed by March 1943 (Dzcuban, 1959: 168)
(Plate 12).
Because of the base's location on the shore of the Atlantic
Ocean in a relatively exposed position, it was necessary to protect
the harbour and anchorage from submarine attack. To achieve this
anti-torpedo nets were placed across Placentia Sound. .~o defend
against aircraft and surface vessels the army tro.:lps stationed at
Ihe adjoinlnr Ft. McAndrew fT,anned caasla; defense gun!'.
searchlights and anli-aircraft artillery.
U S Army Base Fan McAndrew
To protect the naval and air base tile military constructed a
base at Marquise adjacent to the Argentia peninsul2. (Map 11). The
initial plans called for a garrison of 2000 men. In early 1942 this
figure was revised upward to 7,500 (Dzcuban. 1959:168). In May
1941. construction of the base known as Fort McAndrew began and
shortly thereafter army troops and their equipment arrived from St.
John's (Plate 13). These infantry. anti-aircraft and coastal artiliery
units were assigned to delend the area during construction. To carry
oul this mission mobilF~ 155 mm artillery and supporting anti-
1::
PLATE 13 FORT MCANDREW ca.194J
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aircraft artillery guns were deployed around the Argentia peninsula
and on the height of land to the east of Marquise to provide coverage
of the seaward approaches to the bases. Farther oul in the bay al
Isaac Head and Fox Island anti-aircraft artillery and searchlights
were established to defend the northern approaches to the base and
anchorage.
Infant!)' defense positions were constructed on the
perimeter of both bases and unmanned prepared positions were
constructed overlooking any potential coastal landing sile in the
immediate vicinity. For security patrols were conducted throughout
the area and along the roads and mil line leading 10 the base (Fort
McAndrew Daily Diary, 1941).
USAAF Base Harmon
After the site was selected in Oc\otJer 1940, the firsl
military engineers arrived in January 1941 to begin preliminary
survey and engineering work (USAAF Harmon Field Daily Diary,
1941), At Stephenville 8S7 acres were acquired lor the staging
field (Acts 01 the Honourable Commission of Governmer.t, 1941) The
initial plan called for a 250 man base with three 5000 foot long by
150 feet wide concrete runways. Harmon was originally intended as
a temporary staging facility with navigation beacons, and
communications to be used by short ranae aircralt flying from the
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United Stales via Sydney to Gander. A secondary requirement was
the capability of supporting twelve fighter aircraft. Because of the
temporary nature of the facility the initial contract specified
temporary wooden frame buildings (USAAF Harmon Field Daily Diary,
1941 ).
Construction on the base began on March j C, 1941 (Ozcuban.
19%':167). Military units consisting 01 a coastal artillery unit wah
mobile 155 mm artillery and Signal Corps personnel arrived shortly
thereafter to set up coastal defenses and establish communications.
An infantry company for base d'-Jense was transferred from $1.
John's where they had arrived with the UST Edr:lund B Alexander.
Because no accommodations existed in the ana, a temporary tent
encampment known as Camp Morris was set up near the community
of Stephenville (USAAF Harmon Field Daily Diary, 194t). Before
construction on the runways and base support buildings began it was
necessary 10 build 21 miles of road to the DOSCO wharf a: Aguathuna
on the Port aux Port Peninsula and to the railway siding at
Stephenville Crossing (NLPA J&D, file 14a; S4-2~3,1), These roads
were essential for the movement of equipment. supplies, men and
material to the construction site. These projects were quickly
completed and construction progressed steadily through the spring
and summer with emphasis on temporary barracks to accommodate
militalY units and constr Jction personnel. By the fall of 1941 the
1~S
three 150 foot wide by 6000 feet long runwny~ although not
completed were operational (AP At2156. 122-123) (plate 14).
Early in 1942 the original concept of a temporary lC'lIlding
field was revised and the base was upgraded to accommodate 2.800
personnel instead of the original 250 (Ozcuban. 1959:168). The
upgrade was a result or the general increase in m~litary facili!"0S
with the United States' entry into the war as well as the nee,j lor
additional airports in Newfound:and tn handie the growing trC',ns
Atlantic air traffic from the Uilited States in support of American
military activity in the United Kingdom. Tile status of the facility
was changed from temporary to permanent and thus resulted in a
corresponding revision in the type and number 01 buildings
constructed. To ;;Ileviate the supply proLJlems for fucls a pipeline
was constructed into $1. Georges Bay for direct offloading 01
tankers. This reduced the dependency on thc already overworked
rdilway. Wor~( continued through 1942 with linnl construction
completed in March 1943 (DLcuban, 1959:168) (Map 12).
For defense against :laval attack the base was protected by
a battery of two mobile t 55mm coastal defense guns which were
installed on the edge of the base overlooking the bay. From Ihis $ile
the guns with a range of 17,400 yards could effectively cover the
seaward approach to the base awl in the event 01 an overland al!:'l.ck
be moved to bring the enemy under lire.
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USAAF Base Gander
Th"" first American personnel to be stationed outside of the
Leased Bases are<>.s were a contingent of weather and
communications personnel who arrived in Gander iTom St. John's on
March 9, 1941 (USAAF Gander Field Daily Diary, 1941). To bolster
the reconnaissance and strike capabilities of the Newfoundland
garrison the Uniled States moved six obsolescent B-18 Bolo
maritime patroi bombers to Gander. These six aircraft of the 21st
reconnaissance Squadron conducted flights over the North Atlantic
in the expectation and hope that they could provide an early warning
of any potential aita.ck by Germany.
Operationally the first American land based trans-ocean
flight occurred on July 2, 1941 when a USAAF transport on a flight
from Washington to Prestwick Scotland passed through Gander
(USAAF Gander Field Daily Diary, 1941). These flights, for VIPs and
priority cargo, would continue through Gander and Goose Bay until
the end of the war. The movement of tactical aircraft did not start
until after the United States enterea the war in December 1941 and
decided to set up an air force in nle United Kingdom. The first flight
of tactical aircraft occurred on A'Jgust 15, 1942 when a squadron of
B-17s passed through Gander on their way to the United Kingdom
(USAAF Gander Field Daily Diary, 1942). Long range heavy bombers
had no difficulty flying the ocean from Gander to the United Kingdom
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and after the entry of the United Slales into the war, the support (>i
transient combat aircraft became the primary mission of the
American base at Gander (USAAF Gander Daily Diary. 1942). These
units were tenants of the RCAF and shared their facilities. This
arrangement did noi prove satisfactory as friction developed
between the services as both had their own standards and
procedures. When the United States determined that a permanent
presence would be required in Gander, permission was received from
Canada to construct its own base on the south side of the runways
(Map 8; Plate 7).
USAAF Base Goose Bay
The ffr;:;, American personnel to be stationed in Goose Bay
were from the Ferry Division and arrived in April 1942 to prepare
for the first movement code naml~d Bolero, of B-17 bombers and p-
38 fighter aircraft of the 8th Airlorce to England to form the basis
for the Amr:rlcall air war against Germany (USAAF Goose Bay Daily
Diary, 1942). To support the flights the United States established
its own communications and navigation facilities as well as
maintenance units to service the aircraft. These personnel were
initially billeted with the RCAF in already crowded facilities, which
resulted in a certain amount of friction between the services and a
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desire by !:-:e- United Stales to build and maintaip ils own base.
With the United Stales now a lull combfllant in lI1e war sllpponing a
heavy bomber Air Force in the United Kingccm. It was clear that
there would now be considerable and constant air traffic between
North America and the United Kingdom. A permanent presence in
Goose Bay was now going 10 be needed. The U.S. requested and
received permission from Canada to construct its own base designed
to house 1000 permanent and 1200 temporary p~rsonnel. on tile west
side of the runways (Craven and Cate, 1964:346), Initial
construction was carried out using personnel who were on sHe
finishing the CanadiCin base. Construction pfo~~essed rapidly and the
base was ready lor occupancy in November (USAAr Goose Bay Daily
Diary 1942). As wilh the Car.adian base it was a self· contained unit
with all the facilitie~ of a small town including heating plant. 150
bed hospital, library, recreation hall including pool, movie thealer
and retail store (Platp 15). Three heated hangars were c')nstrucled
, on the flight line for all weather maintenance operalions (Map 10).
~y June there were seven officers and 45 enlisted men at
Goose. June saw 62 aircraft depart lor the United Kingdom, JUly
saw 208 and August. 80. In September the number was up to 163
with 133 in October ler a tetal 01 662 in 1942 (USAF Goose Bay
Daity Diary 1942; Milner, 1947). Because of winter wealher
LEGE!';" PLATE 15
1 RCAF Base
2 USAF Base
3 Ai~cra=t Parking
4 AlT.muni':ion Storage
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conditions the United States ~Llrtailed trans-Atlantic lIying
operations for the year in November.
SUMMARY
By June 1942 all the bases had been established and were
operational. although construction would continue until the end of
the war. In two years Newfoundland had acquired 14 military bases
which included four airports !J.nd two naval bases. These lacilities
would form the basis of ,he military landscape for the remainder of
the war and continue as a integral component 01 the military and
civilian landscape into the 1990's.
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CHAPTER IV
CONSOLIDATION AND DIFFUSION:
JANUARY 1941·DECEMBER 1943.
STAAlEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
For lhe Allies, 1942 was a pivitol year in World War II.
II was the y::a. ::1 which they halted the expansion and conquests of
the A)(is powers. In the Pacific the Uniled Siaies in June stopped
the Japanese advance into the Central Pacific at Midway Island and
in the Southwest &1 Guadacci.nal in the Solomon Islands. In North
Africa the German thrust towards Egypt was defeated at the
NC"!ember Battle of EI Alamein. In the Soviet Union the German
Army's advance was stopped at Stalingrad on the Volga River. With
lhes~ defeats, except for localized successes, the Axis Powers were
never to regain the strategic offensive. T'1e strategic initiative in
these theaters now rested with the Allies.
By 1942 the threat of invasion of Newfoundland and North
America had passed. The bulk of the German Army was tied up in
bailie with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe fI.~ld Germany's capital
ships were either sunk or blockaded in the ports of Europe. The main
threat 10 North America was now reduced to either bombardment by
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cruisers or raids by small submarine borne parties. Given the
increased size and readiness of the Allied forces such raids. while
having the potential to inflict considerable damage and casualties.
would be of little military consequence. Their main value would be
in reducing civi!ian morale and creating demands for stationing a
larger proportion of the military forces destined for Europe at home
to protect against future attacks.
In the North Atlantic the Battle of the Atlantic continued 3S
a war of attrition The year 1942 was particularly bad for the
Allies wi~h losses of merchant shipping and war ships mounting.
Submarine warfare reached the very shores of Newfoundland. On
January 25 the Greek vessel Mount Kithem was torpedoed and sunlo:
IWO miles oH 51. John's (Hadley. 1986:73). ::1 Mar<,h two torpedoes
aimed into St. John's harbour missed their tar::ct and detonated on
either side of the harbour entrance at Fort Amherst and the Ouler
Battery (Dzcuban, 1959:175). On September 5, lWO ore carriers ....ere
torpedoed and sunk in Wabana Harbour (Hadley, 1986:116). On
October 14 the passenger lerry 55 Caribou was torpedoed and sunk
40 miles from Port aux Basques with the loss of 137 lives (How.
1988). On November 2 Wabana anchorage was again attacked with
two more are carriers sunk and th'3 loading pier damaged by a
torpedo that missed its intended target (Hadley, 1986:152). In the
shipping lanes submarines continued to threaten the ability of the
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Allied pOWe'"d to supply the United Kingdom and to build up military
strength in the United Kingdom. In fact Alli9d control of the
Atlantic was very much in doubt with shipping losses uncomfortably
close to exceeding new construction (Morison, 1964; Tucker, 1952:
Schull. 1961).
It is accepted among historians Churchill, Schull and
Morison thaI the war in the Atlantic reached its peak during the
first four months of 1943. Shipping losses climbed steadily and
reached 627,000 lennes in March. While this was not the highest
monthly toll of the war, 75 percent of the losses were from convoys
which were under the best protection the Allies Gould provide and
the tOJ"nage sunk was greater than the entire shipbuilding effort of
the Allies (Schull, 1961:1'i'1»). These factors caused considerable
consternation by the Allied Powers.
In April Allied tactics, new weapons and electronic
technology and the sheer weight of numbers combined to gain the
upper hand in the battle of attrition and the toll of submarines began
to rise rapidly. In May submarine losses for the first time exceeded
new submarines coming into service (Schull,1961:176). By the end
of May German submarine losses were so high that the U-boat forces
in the Atlantic were tempvrarily withdrawn back to Germany and
occupied France to refit and regroup (Schull, 1961:176). For the
remainder of the war, althollgh the Battle of the Atlantic continued
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until the very end of hostilities, losses 10 submarine attack dropped
significantly and Allied control of the sea lanes, while challenged.
was never again in jeopardy. Nevenheless German naval activity
continued in Newfoundland waters for some time thereafter.
renewing concerns about Newfoundland's defense.
In October 1943 the Germans established an automatic
weather station at Martin Bay near the northern tip of Labrador.
This station which only transmitted for a short period of time was
not discovered until July 1981 (Douglas, 1982) (Map 14). The
Canadian and American records are silent on this station which
would support the conclusion that the Allies were unaware of the
station through accidental discovery or the interception of its
signals. While this station had little military significance it
illustrates the great difficulty in patrolling the thousands of miles
of coastline of Newfoundland and Labrador.
On October 11 a mine field was laid by U-Boat off the
entrance to $1. John's harbour. While the navy accounted for 34 of a
possible 64 mines, two of the undetected mines sank ore carriers
from Bell Island while the remainder were never found (Hadley,
1986:190-191). These events, in addition to the torpedoing and
sinking of ships within sight of land off the Southern Shore, Cape
Race, Cape Spear, and the Strait 01 Belle Isle and a multitude of U-
Boat sightings both real and imagined brought home ~ht:: war to
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Newfoundlanders for a longer period than for any other North
Amenc<:,'1s (Hadley, 1986; NLPA J&D GN 38 files).
For the military forces in Newfoundland, although strong
defense forces were still important, the emphasis of military
strategy moved from defending North America to supporting the air
bridge between North America and Europe and naval and air units in
the Battle of the Atlantic.
BUILDING THE STATIONS
The establishment of six large bases by Canada and the
United Slales was not the only military presence in Newfoundland.
These bases could nol function in isolation; therefore, a
considerable number of smaller stations along with the necessary
supporting infrastructure was necessary throughout the country.
The large s~atial dimensions of air and naval operations throughout
the North Atiantic, combined with the need to protect the bases,
necessitated a large network of smaller stations and communication
corridors to integrate the defense of Newfoundland with the rest of
North America as well as North Atlantic naval and air operations.
Lines of communication were essential not only between
the various bases and stations but also between the various armed
services and the Command Headquarters in Canadi'l and the United
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States. In addition to ground based telephone and telex lines. very
high frequency and short wave radio transmitters and receivers
were necessary for ground 10 ground. air to ground and ground 10 sea
communications.
The inference thaI one can draw is that the movement of
supplies, personnel and equipment both to defend the country ~nd
support the bases necessitated the construction of new roads and
the upgrading and m3intenance of others. The railroad which was
the ..::ountry's primary mode of land transportation fulfilled the same
role lor the military of both Canada and the United Slates. The
military quickly became a permanent presence on the roads and rails.
To monitor and collect meteorological data for forecasters on the
bases, weather stations were set up in didant points throughout the
country.
To provide for the local defense of the bases. prepared
coastal and anti-aircraft artillery and infantry positions were
established. These positions were up to 15 miles outward from the
bases and ranged from permanent coastal artillery sites to
unmanned prepared infantry and artillery sites for occupancy in an
emergency.
The construction of these secondary stations began in
parallel with the construction of the bases because the bases and
their attached military units could not operate in isolation without
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local defetlse installations and communications. For example, the
RCAF Air Base at Gander could not effectively operate without the
network of stations providing navigation beacons, meteorological
reports, communications with aircraft. other bas(,$ and headquarters
in Newfoundland and Canada and rail and sea supply tines.
The military landscape in Newfoundland evolved as an
interconnected network of bases, stations and communication
corridors designed to support operations at the Newfoundland or
micro level as well as the macro level within the North Atlantic
(Map 13). Most stations and bases, had a dual role even though they
had originally been intended for a single purpose. Once a facility
was constructed it often took on a secondary use. For example the
radar s;tes were also used to maintain air navigation beacons and
report meteorological observations. Other sites had only a singular
use. The coastal artillery position at Cape Spear was designed for
the local defense of S1. John's; conversely the Loran Station at Cape
Bonavista was designed primarily for the benefit of the North
Atlantic with a secondary use for navigation in local waters.
1AA:r;;s;;~-- "'63
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CANADIAN STATIONS
Bell Island Battery
Bell Island was the site 01 the first Canadian station
outside of the main base areas at Gander and Botwood. In fact the
planning and sile preparation for the establishment of the coastal
defense battery began before Canada assumed the defense of Gander
aod Botwood, but because of delays in obtaining the required guns it
was late in the summer of 1940 before the battery was operational.
This was a priority project because of the strategic value of iron
ore to the war effort of the British Empire. At ihe request of
Newfoundland. Canada supplied 4.7 inch coastal defense guns for the
defense of the Bell Island Iron Ore Mines. Canada was prompt in
responding to this request because the'3e mines were the sole iron
ore supplier for the Sydney steel mill which accounted for 33
percent of Canadian steel production. In the spring of 1940 military
engineers arrived at Bell Island to prepare gun platforms on the
cliffs overlooking the loading pier and anchorage. By late 1940 the
guns were operational and initially manned by the Canadian Army
while the Newfoundland Militia was being trained in their operation
(Bridle. 1974:152:142).
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Bay Bulls Marine Railway and DQckyard
By the end of 1941 St. John's harbour and its shore
facilities were being utilized to the maximum extent possible. The
ever increasing number of merchant ships requiring repairs as a
result of enemy action, storm damage, or wear from constant use
under wartime condliions was limiting the space and time available
at the dry dock for naval vessels. To allow the dock yard to
concentrate on servicing merchant vessels the navy decided to
construct a 3000 ton marine r,'\ilway to service the escorts. Escort
vessels were srnf';ier than merchant vessels and it was possible 10
remove them from the water by means of a marine railway. thus
reducing the level of demand for the dry dock. However, the limited
size of St. John's harbour and the lack of available land made it
impossible to locate the new facility there So the fishing village of
Bay Bulls which had a fine deep water port, and was located 17 road
miles south of St. John's was selected as the site of the new repair
facility (Map 7). In July t942 construction started on tt~e S 2.14
million (Can.) marine railway, supporting shore f~cilities and
anchorage, althc'Jgh formal permission for the project was not
granted by Newfoundland until August (Bridle, 1974:606;606).
166
The station wllich was built adjacent 10 the marine haulout
consisted of workshops, administration offices, barracks, sick bay
and water supply (AP A13268, 95-96).
Defensively the base was unrl~r the partial protection of the
Cape Spear battery. Local batteries were not considered necessary
because the threal of bombardment by a naval raider was now
considered unlikely. The major threat v:as now considered to be
from submarines. As the harbour was exposed to the open sea, anti-
torpedo baffles were installed to protect the base and anchorage.
BotwOQd Naval Stat jon
In Canada's initial naval plans for Newfoundland it was
intended to have a small base and a def~nded anchorage with anti-
submarine vessels. With the Cil811ge in naval strategy in 1941 and
thE> creation of the Newfoundland Escort Force ther·' plans were
dropped, The development of 81. John's as a major base and the
availability of Argentia resulted in 'ne ,:;caling down of the ~ase
planned for Botwood. Only an administration building, wharf and
examination service were put in place. The station served
throughout the war in support of the adjoining air base and the port
of Botwood.
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lliI,rbour GracI:! Naval Station
A smail naval station and communications site with
direction finding equipment was set up at Harbour Grace in the
summer of 1941. It was uS':!d in conjunction with training exercises
for the vessels of the Newfoundland Escort Forces based in St.
John's. The training "target' submarine was based here. Ttie
wireless slation was built on the site of the Harbour Grace ai, strip
which had played prominently in pioneer trans- Allantic flights in
the late 1920's and early 1930's.
~sl)Qrte Fuel Terminal
Lewisporte, like Botwood, served as a port of entry for fuel
supplies for Gander Airport. In addition to the ocean terminal for
offloading fuel there was a fuel storage tank farm. To protect these
facilities, Canada dispatched an infantry unit of 13 officers and 255
other ranks to the town in the spring of 1941. This force consisting
of coastal artillery, infantry and administration support personnel
was ';jarrisoned in temporary wood frame buildings erected for this
purpose (Bridle, 1974:639: 636). Defensive positions were
constructed for infantry weapons near the whart and fuel storage
facilities.
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8i90le' Batte,'l
The seaward approach to Goose Bay is through Lake Melville.
To protect it. the Canadian Army erected a coastal artilleIY battery
:'1 Rigalet on the narrow isthmus between the Atlantic Ocean and the
lake. This battery commanded the narrows and served to guard the
sea approach to the air base at Goose Bay during the shipping season.
The ice in the lake could be up to eight feet thick. and this precluded
any surface or submnrine operations, protecting Goose Bay more
effectively than the coastal artillery battery. As a result the
majority of the battp.ry j>ersonnel were withdrawn after free:l8 up in
November, r~luming only in May. A small detachment of infantry and
artillery personnel remained to provide security and maintain the
guns.
Construction of the battery started in May of 1942 as soon
as ships could reach Rigolet and it was manned and operaHonal by
June 1942 (Bridle, 1974:379;390). This station, which had to be
supplied from Goose Bay. consisted of 200 infantry and artillery
personnel. For unknown reasons. Canada had not soufJnt permission
from nor even advised Newfoundland that a station was 10 be
constructed h~re (Bridle, 1974:380;391). The existence of the
station came to Newfoundland's allenlion only through a routine
report filed by a member of the New10undland Rangers. While no
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explanation can be found for Can~ ';a's not having sought
Newfoundland's permission to build the station it may be surmised
10 have been given because Rigale! was part of Ihe outer defenses 01
Goose Bay. Permission 10 build the station was therefore contained
in the general approval 10 build Goose Bay. However Ihe incident
was typical of the way in which the "foreign powers· dealt with
.Jewfoundland.
ReAP BeflJe!!jog and Meteorological Staljoos
To provide data for meteorological forecasting and luel
caches lor sea planes conducting reconnaissance along Ihe coast of
Labrador and the Northern Peninsula 01 Newfoundland, Canada, with
Newfoundland's permission, in the spring of 1941 developed a
network of small lour man stations at Roddickton, Cartwright,
Hopedale and Hebron (Map 14). Each station consisted of a single
building that served as living quarters and for operations. Aviation
fuel was stored outside on the edge of the harbour in 45 gallon
drums for ease of handling and transportation. Weather observations
were recorded and radioed to the Gander meteorological office along
with any reports received from the local Aircraft Detection Corps
observers. The stations were sel up al the beginning of the shipping
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season in tht:l spring of 1941 and closed in the lall al the end 01 the
shipping season (Bridle. 1974: 663:655).
Communications
The RCAF was the first of the -;-,ilitary lorces to establish
its own telephone and telex system. To provide for secure reliable
ground communications, in the fall of 1941 a land line linking
Botwood, Gander and 51. John's was installed. This line used the
existing telegraph poles that paralleled the railway (NLPA 5-4·;::-2).
For radio communications the RCAF established Iransmitiers and
receivers at each base for ground to air communications. Although
these systems wer') primarily designed for ground-lo-air use they
also provided a secondary ground-to-ground communications
network, especially for reTr.,Jte stations that had no tele;:.hone or
telex lines (Map 15).
By 1942 operational requirements required a reliable and
secure telephone and telex link between U"le naval and alf
headquarters in 51. John's and their respective headquaners in
Halifax. To facilitate this project Canada obtained circuits on the
American Long Lines that crossed the country from S1. John's to
Stephenvll1e. From Stephenville Crossing :he U"ited Stales agreed
to extend the line to Table Moun:ain near ?ort aux BasGues, .... here a
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Frequency Modulation (FM) transmitter-receiver station was built
(MacKinnon. 1947:219). For the connection to Canada instead of
laying a cable across the Cabot Strait FM radio was used. Because
FM radio waves travel in a straight line, an unobstructed optical or
line of sight path between the stalions transmitting and receiving
the signal was necessary. To achieve this, the southwestern
terminus was established on Table Mountain near ,31. Andrews. This
site was ~he highest point of ;and on the southwest coast of
Newfoundland and offered the necessary elevation to provide an
optical transmission pali~ to Cape Breton unaffected by the
curvature of the earth. At this station the signal was converted into
a FM radio signal and transmitted to a receiver-transmitter station
in Cape Breton where it was relayed through tne North American
communication network. For communications from Canada, the FM
signal was transmitted from Cape Breton, received at Tahle
Mountain, converted into a telephone or teletype signal and
retransmitted 10 lis destination via !h<:i long lines.
Air Navigation Beacons
Air navigation beacons were an important component of the
infrastructure necessary to allow operational flights in most types
of weather (Map 13). Without these beacons aircraft in
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Newfoundland would have been grounded much of the time because
the inclement weather did not lend itself to Direct Navigation.
Direct Navigation was the most rudimentary form of navigation that
required constant contact with the ground, water, aT celestial
bodies to determine location. When in contact with the ground,
physical features were used to determine location; when over waler,
the course was charted and estimated using drift sighting from
flares fired into the air or flare pots dropped into the water to
determine drift of the aircraft away from the proposed flight path
(Private Communication: Wm. Parrott Sr.). The third aid 10
navigation was celestial. This reqUired clear weather to obtain
fixes Irom the sun or stars to determine the aircraft's position.
When at sea on convoy patrol, this supplemented direct navigation
and was an added benefit whenever available. Unfortunately, given
the typical weather conditions prevalent in the North Atlantic and
the inherent need of marine patrol bombers to fly low at most times,
celestial navigation was a lUxury. Direct navigation was :J1herently
prone to errors espe.::ially in the inclement weather often
encountered off Newfoundland which often obscured any
observations both terrestrial and celestial thereby placing an
exorbitant amount of work on the aircraft crew, the navigator in
particular.
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When the RCAF first arrived in Newfoundland in 1940. the
only navigational beacons available were those at Gander and
Botwood thaI were installed for trans-Atlantic flights. Initial RCAF
operations were conducted by a combination of direct navigation and
bearings of fixes obtained from the existing deacons at Botwood and
Gander along with the commercial AM radio slations at St. John's
whenever possible. This made for erratic navigation and large
numbers of non flying days because of t~le weather. To address these
problems the RCAF established additional haacons at each new base
and many of the stations it opened throughout the country. After the
RCAF assumed control c: 8orwood and Gander in 1940 the beacons
were upgraded for military use. In late 1941 beacons were installed
at Torbay and Goose Bay. and then at Cape Bauld. Port aux Basques.
Spotted Islands and Brig Harbour in 1943 (RCAF Radar Station Daily
Diaries, 1942-1945). To ensure coverage in the event of failure and
to provide aircraft with as many bearings as possible the coverage
of the beacons was intentionally overlapped. Beacons were also
established at 51. Andrews near Port aux Basques and at Buchans in
central Newfoundland. Buchans was also the site of an emergency
landing field. These facilities were designed for Trans Canada
Airlines flights between Sydney and Harmon and on to Gander and
Torbay, but their mIlitary use was obvious.
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The establishment of beacons eliminated much of the risk
associated with navigai-ion in Newfoundland and over the North
Atlantic. By tuning into several beacons an aircraft could determine
its exact position, under ideal conditions, in a matter of seconds.
For the aircraft, because the system was passive, thai is the
aircraft only received a signal and did not emit one, there was no
concern that its position would be compromised to any submarines
in the area. As with other early electronics, this sy.stem was
plagued by numerous problems that prevented the aircraft gaining a
bearing on a given beacon. Common problems that made reception
difficult were weather, sun spots, electronic failures and weak
transmitters. Both Canada and the United States established
beacons for the use of their aircraft, but the frequency could be
received by aircraft of both nations.
The navigation beacons served a dual role in navigation.
The first was to permit an aircraft to return to base if the signal
emanated from an air base. The second, if the beacon was in a
location other than an airport. was to provide a navigational
checkpoint. By obtaining a bearing or fix on two or more beacons an
aircraft's navigator could determine the aircraft's position by
pioHing the bearings to find the location where they crossed. While
fixes from two stations was generally considered acceptable, plots
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from three stations was the preferred solution to ensure accuracy
{Private Communication: Wrn. Parrott Sr.).
In addition to the beacons each base and many of the
stations had a direction finding antenna as part of their radio
eC>:Jment This allowed the operator to tune the antenna to the
direction of a transmitting aircrafl or Ship. While direction could be
determined from a bearing taken by a single station, the range could
not. To determine the range and thus location a second bearing from
another ground station was necessary. This permitted the
broadcasting position to be determined by plotting the bearings.
This was particularly useful in assisting lost aircraft, but it was
also used extensively in monitoring German submarine
communications in the Atlantic. Bearings on submarines picked up
by Newfoundland direction finding stations were pas'5ed on to the
navy and combined with bearings obtained from stations throughout
the North Atlantic littoral and ships at sea to locnte submarines.
This allowed the navy and air force to dedicate re<:(,urces to
specified locations by hu· .,·ng known submarines instead of
patrolling thousands of miles of ocean and to detour convoys away
from known concentrations of submarines.
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ACAF Radar Stations
To provide early warning in the event of an air attack and to
serve as a controller for vectoring fighter aircraft, in 1942 the
RCAF started construction on a network of radar stations along the
coast of Labrador and Newfoundland to link with another chain of
radar stali0ns in Nova Scotia which together provided coverage of
the Atlantic approaches to Canada (Map 13). Plans for the system
began in 1942 but it was not until early 1943 that radar equipment
was instalied and operational at all stations (RCAF Radar Stations
Daily Diaries i 942·43).
There were two types of radar used in Newfoundland; The
first was Ground Control Intercept. This radar was used for
controlling fighter aircraft to vector them to the target and as a
landing aid to assist aircraft to land in poor visibility. A third
limited us~ was for early warning. These radars were installed at
Gander, Torbay and Gocs~ Bay. The second was the Early V/arning
Radar. This radar was or longer range than the ground control
intercept radar and was designE:~j to monitor the air approaches to
Newfoundland, provide early warning of an air attack or to a lesser
degree naval attack. To ensure the optimum range and coverage the
units were installed on prominent headlands along the coast. The
northern most station was at Brig Harbour at the mouth of Lake
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Melville on the Labrador Coast which monitored the approach 10
Goose Bay, A second Labrador station was established on the
southern Labrador coast at Spotted Islands. \n Newfoundland
stations were sel up at Cape Bauld on the tip of th~ Northern
Peninsula, Flatrock near St. John's and at Port aux E:asques 0:1 the
south west coast. These stations combined with the USAAF radars
on Fogo Island on the northeast coast, Cape Spear east of 51. John's.
St, Brides at the entrance to Placentia Bay and Allan's Island on the
south end of the Burin Peninsula provided a 100 mile early warning
zone from Hopedale on the Labrador coast through the northeast and
southern appmaches to Newfoundland.
H,e early warning or search radar used by the Canada had a
depe'ndable range of 100 miles (RCAF Radar Stations Daily Diaries.
1942-":945). The word dependable is used to describe the range that
could be r€!!ed on when the unit was operational. There were many
factors or combination of factors that could reduce, extend the
range or conversely knock the radar out altogether. While the radar
was designed with an effective range of 150 miles many factors or
combination of factors combined to reduce the range or prevent the
radar from functioning for rang periods of time (RCAF Radar Stations
Daily Diaries, 1942-45). Factors such as wind, atmospheric
conditions, sun spots, antenna ice, power supply, technical problems
with the tubes, circuits and magnetron in conjunction with the skill
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of the operator and maintenance personrlel all affected range and
clarity of signar.
The single most important factor in determining the
effectiveness of the radar was location. It is not surprising that
Port aux Basques obtained the greatest ranges because it was
located on the highest elevation overlooking the sea which provided
for a greater range before the signal was affected by the curvature
of the earth. Conversely, the radars at Gander and Goose Bay
reported the shortest ranges because they were limited by the
topography' of the surrounding countryside with its many hills. This
caused shadows or blind spots which limited the maximum ranges
under optimum conditions to under one hundred miles. The station at
AIIans Island reported that the offshore islands of SI. Pierre and
Miquelon left a blind spot or shadow on the scope (RCAF Station
AIIans Island Daily Diary, 1944~45). While the units had a reliable
range of 100 miles, operational ranges of up to 150 miles were
obtained by all coastal sites during optimum operating conditions.
In addition to their primary function of early warning, the
radar stations served to monitor Allied air traffic. Besides plotting
the return signal reflected by the large! the radars were able to
track allied aircraft equipped with Identification Friend or Foe
transporters. These devices transmitted a signal that the radar
antenna picked up and displayed on the radar screen. Because this
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signal was transmitted by the target it was stronger than the signal
returning to the station after reflecting from the airplane and
therefore could be tracked at greater distances. Transponder
equipped aircraft were plotted routinely at 150 miles and frequently
up to 240 miles (RCAF NO.14 Radar Unit Flatrock Daily Diary, 1944-
45). The equipping of aircraft with transponders increased the
monitoring of their movements and effectively identified them as
Allied.
Each radar unit consisted of basically the same equipment
and facilities. The center of the station was the rotating mast lor
the radar antenna that was mounted on a steel or wooden tower.
Because the Bri(j' Harbour, Spotted Island and Cape Bauld sites were
in isolated locations, it was necessary that these sites have
additional storage to be self-sufficient in fuel. food and spare parts
for extended periods of time. Barracks, storehouses, power house,
transmitter-receiver building and support infrastructure for
approximately 40 personnel were provided. Each station, in addition
to the radar, housed an air navigation beacon along with
meteorological instruments for weather observations. A short wave
wireless radio was standard for ground to ground and ground to air
communicatons. After the close of the shipping season, air drops,
flying boats or ski equipped aircraft were the only means of supply
to the three remote sites. The $Iations at Flatrock and Port aux
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Basques were connected to the other Canadian bases by road anc the
railway respectively.
Cape Bauld was the first station to be manned, with the 50
RCAF personnel arriving on October 28, 1942, The station operated
until October 1944 when it was closed because of the elimination of
the threat of air attack and ils poor location for use as an air traffic
control radar. Ranges up to 145 miles were recorded although the
mean reliable range was 100 miles (RCAF Station Cape Bauld Daily
Diary, 1942-44).
The remaining radar stations were manned during the fall of
1943. On the labrador coast Brig Harbour was manned in November
and became operational on December 9, 1943. Forty-four personnel
were assigned to the unit which operated until September 1945.
Ranges of up to 143 miles were obtained under optimum conditions
(RCAF Station Brig Harbour Daily Diary, 1943-45).
The Spotted Island stations was an anomaly among the radar
stations. The 23 man detachment arrived in October 1943 and set up
the navigation beacon and radio. The radar itself never became
operational. Once the Br1g Harbour and Cape Bauld stations were in
operation, it was decided that the Spotted Island station would not
be necessary and the station closed in August 1944 (RCAF Station
Spotted Island Daily Diary, 1943-44).
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The ground control approach radar detachment at the Gander
air base became operational In March 1943 with a strength which
varied from 40 to 50 personnel. Maximum ranges of upwards of 90
miles at high altitude were obtained which was considered excellent
for an inland station, although the norm was 50 miles. The unit
functioned in the ground control approach role for the remainder of
the war and continued to serve the civilian airport after the war
until replaced by more modern equipment.
The Radar Unit at Goose Bay was manned by 37 personnel
and became operational in September 1943. Ranges of up to 135
miles were recorded to the east over Lake Melville. Ranges in other
directions were significantly less because of the mountainous
topography. The slat ion remained operational until it '"as closed in
September 1945 (RCAF Station Goose Bay Daily Diary, 1943-45).
There were two radar units based at Flat Rock, north east 01
Torbay Airport. Flatrock was selected over the airport because its
location on a headland overlooking the ocean provided maximum
coverage to the east over the open ~ ~a away from the hilly terrain
near the airport. Number 17 Radar Unit was the ground control
approach radar for the airport. It consisted of between 40 and 60
personnel who were stationed al RCAF Base Torbay and daily bussed
to the station for their shii ;". The second unit at Flatrock was
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Number 14 Radar Unit which was an ear1y warning radar ano 'ormed
part 01 the early warning system. Both units became operational in
September 1943 and In January 1944 were combined at the Number
14 unit station in Flatrock for e;Jse of administration. The combined
unit continued to operate uoW October 1945 when closed as part of
the post war downsizing program. Maximum ranges for the early
warning radar were 145 miles (RCAF Station Ftalrock Daily Diaries,
1943-45).
The 40 personnel of number 32 Radar Unit arrived at Port
aux Basques in April 19~3 with the radar and navigational beacon
becoming operational in September. Ranges of up to 220 miles were
recorded but the norm was approximately 100 miles. The station
operated through the remainder of the war until closed in September
1945 (RCAF Station Pon aux Basques Daily Diary, 1943-45). A radar
station, especially designed to monitor surface vessels was
established at nearby Cape Ray in June 1943. This unit which was
designed to detect submarines operating on the surface operated
until the end of the war iDouglas, 1986:377).
185
AMERICAN STATIONS
51 lohn's and Environs
To protect f-=ort Pepperrell and other installations in tt1e
vicinity of 81. John's, prepared defense positions were established
throughout the area by both the United States and CC'oada. with the
authority of the Newfoundland Government for the period 01 the war
and six months. For air and coastal defense search lights were set
up at Outer Cove, Blackhead Road, Freshwater Bay Ridge, Cape Spear
Road, Maddox Cove, Long Pond Road, Thorburn Road. Upper Banery
Road, Torbay Road and White Hills. The lights and generators used al
these site3 were mobile therefore these sites although designated
for this purpose, were no~ the only locations where this equipment
was set up. Depending on the perceived threat, training exercises,
etc., the equipment was deployed throughout the northeast Avalon as
required (USAAF Fort Pepperrell Daily Diary. 1942-1945; Private
Communication: Frank Day).
To defend against a seaborne landing, beach defenses were
prepared at Flatrock, Torbay, Middle Cove, Outer Cove and Logy Bay.
While these sites were manned by observers in 1941 as the danger
of invasion declined permanent manning with sentries was
discontinued although the positions were maintained in the event of
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need. For the defense of St. John's and environs the United Slates
assigned two 8 inch and two mobile 155 mm coastal defense guns,
four 90 mm anti·aircraft and eight 40 mm anti-aircraft guns
(USAAF Fort Pepperrell Dally Diary, 1944). Gun positions for the
placement of the mobile 155 mm coastal artillery wefe constructed
on high points overlooking the ocean around the northeast Avalon.
These positions were designed to cover any possible invasion landing
area and to cover areas, particularly to the north of 51. John's and
Conception Bay that were not protected by the permanent guns at
Signal Hill, Fort Amherst and Cape Spear. These positions were at
Red Cliff, Topsail Head, Robin Hood Bay, Blackhead, Tomay Poi0\.
Middle Cove, Torbay Point. Middle Cove, Torbay, Flatrock,
Chamberlains and Kellegrews (USAAF Fort Pepperrell Daily Diary,
1944). These positions permitted the fixed and mobile artillery to
engage any sea borne raiders approaching the North Avalon and
dete~d all likely landing sites.
Amentia and Environs
At Argentia, eight 6 inch guns, two 3 inch, twelve 90 mm
and sixteen 40 mm anti-aircraft guns were assigned to protect the
Base and immediate area. Ranges from the coastal defense guns
were from 10,900 yards for the three inch guns to 27,500 yards for
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the six Inch guns (USAAF Fort Pepperrell Daily Diary. 1944). Coastal
guns were located near Ship Harbour, on the Argentia Peninsula and
at Freshwater Head. A mobile site and fire control were located at
Black Point south of Point VerGe. Anti aircraft guns were located in
support of the coastal artillery sites and throughout the army and
naval base.
USAAF Radar Scaljops
To provide an Early Warning System. the United States
decided to establish a five station Early Warning Radar Network to
provide an early warning network for the northeast and southeast
coast which was the direction of the most likely attack on
Newfoundland. In 1942, a survey was carried out and sites were
selected al Fogo Island, Elliston Ridge, Cape Spear, 51. Brides and
Allan's Island. Construction on the stations started in the summer
of 1942 and finished early in the winter of 1943, when the stations
were operational and reporting to the Filter Center and Plotting
Room at Fort Pepperrell.
All stations were constructed on headlands overlooking the
ocean and were similar in design and layout. The stations were
manned by between 35 and 50 personnel. Centered around the radar,
the stations contained barracks, mess hall, stores, generator and
lEa
transmitter buildings. The stations operated until the fall of 1944
when the United States, deciding the threat of invasion was
eliminated, removed its radar technicians for redeployment to more
active theaters of operations and turned over operation of the
stations to the ACAF. This did not result in any lessening of
American early warning capability because the reports of the
stations were reported to a joint United States-Canada plotting
Communications
One of the major difficulties facing military operations
throughout Newfoundland in the early war years was
communications. The telegraph service, and in more remote
communities short wave radios which were the mainstay of the
civilian communications network, were limited in their capacity and
not designed for or capable of handling high volumes of military
traffic. Telephone service was limited fo the Avalon peninsula, the
Grand Falls-Botwood area and the Bowaters operating area in and
around Corner Brook in Western Newfoundland. Paradoxically,
although local communications were limited. international
communications with the United States and the United Kingdom were
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readily available through the Irans-Atlantic cable relay stations at
S1. John's. Bay Roberts and Hearts Content.
It was clearly necessary that the existing communications
facilities be improved and a new high capacity communication
network created in order to link the various military bases and
stations in Newfoundland and Labrador together with bases and
command headquarters in Canada and the United Slates. Telephone
and teletype lines were necessary while a high frequency tactical
radio network was required to link ships at sea and aircrafl in flight
with their bases. In addition to the ground and air voice
communication, beacons for naval and air navigation were also
necessary.
As the RCAF had done a year earlier the United States
realized that because of the limitations of the country's
communications system it would be necessary to install ils own
telephone and teletype lines. The new network, known locally as the
"long lines", was designed to interconnect the American military
bases and faciiities with the Canadian bases at Gander, Botwood and
St. John's. The initial survey for the project was carried out in April
1942 (Owen, 1943:206). For convenience, the route followed the
railway which was the only transportation corridor thaI crossed the
island. Construction started in June with the plAcement of the poles
and cable installation commenc:ng in August. 8y late fall, cable was
190
being j'1stalled at rates of up to ten miles per day. At peak
construction there were sixteen work camps with approximately
100 men per camp. Work continued through the winter of 1942/43
with the project being completed and operational by the end of March
at a total cost of $3.5 million (Can.) (Bridle, 1974:697;685; Owen,
1943, 206).
The long lines ~.ystem consisted of a series of manned
receiver/tnnsmitter stations approximately every 50 miles along
the route (Map 15). Interspaced between these stations were
unmanned booster stations every seven miles. Each station had a
permanent complement of between seven and ten personnel who
were responsible for operations and line maintenance. The stations
were located at Harmon which was the western terminus,
Stephe::wille Crossing, Corner Brook, Howley, MiI1ertown Junction,
Grand Falls, Gander, Shoal Harbour, Whitboume and at the eastern
terminus at Fort Pepperrell. To c~nnect the planned radar station at
Elliston Ridge an open wire line was installed along the rail corridor
between Shoal Harbour and Bonavista (Dzcuban, 1959:180; NLPA J&D
Bex 84, lile 25).
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The existing road network was not sufficient to serve the
military needs. Where roads were required considerable new
construction and/or extensive upgrading was necessary to allow
extensive all weather military use. Both Canada and the United
States participated in a road maintenance program for all the roads
on which the used extensively. There were two major American road
bUilding projects, one to connect Harmon to the rail hne and another
to connect 51. John's to Argenlia. In the Stephenville area, the road
from Stephenville to Aquaforte was upgraded while a new road was
built and later maintained by American personnel, from Stephenville
to the rail siding at Stephenville Crossing. On the Avalon the 54
miles of highway from Holyrood to Argentia via Salmonier and
Colinet was rebuilt and upgraded for all season heavy truck traffic.
Construction began in the summer of 1941 and was completed the
following summer (Bridle, 1974:714:696). Upon completion the road
was maintained by the United States army and permanent
maintenance camps were sel up in Colinel and at Deer Park on the
Salmonier Line for summer maintenance and winter snow clearing
(NLPA J&D Box 34, file 32). These improvements reduced the travel
time from $1. John's to Argentia from six t'l eight hours down to two
(Dzcuban, 1959:179).
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By mid 1941 the military construction proQ'am was in full
swing and military operations were consuming more and more
supplies. The Newfoundland Railway was operating to full capacity.
Unfortunately the condition of the railway made it impossible to
meet the increased demands the military projected would be
required in the coming years. Because of the major role the railway
played in the country alternate means of land transportation did not
exist. The railway was the most critical means of distributing
supplies to the bases, once they had arrived by sea. Supplies to
Stephenville and Gander were the most critical problem because
unlike the bases at St. John's and Argentia which had port facilities,
they were dependent on the railway for aviation fuel and supplies.
To address this potential supply bottleneck, the United
States arranged with Newfoundland to upgrade the railway (NLPA
54-2-3.1. files 5, 14a). The upgrading was accomplished through
four initiatives: 1) a low interest loan of $1.2 million (US) was
provided for general upgrading. The most important part of this was
the addition of new long sidings in an effort to permit more trains
to travel simultaneously. The loan was also used to purchase five
locomotives and 150 cars of various types. 2) The Americans as a
project of their own upgraded the Argentia branch line with new
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heavy gauge ralls to permit the line to accommodate heavier traffic
than the existing line permitted. 3) the United States Army provided
five locomotives and 100 flat and tank cars. 4) To connect Harmon
Air Force Base with the main line a branch line to Stephenville was
constructed in 194.'2 (Bridle. 1974: 717;698-999).
These improvements increased the railway's capacity \0 a
level that met the needs of the militart for the remainder of the
war. The initial congestion of 1940 and 1941 caused by the large
influx of supplies and material for base construction began to ease
in early 1942 as much of the material had already been delivered
(Bykofsky and Larson, 1957:10). Henceforth until the end of the war,
congestion never again reached the proportions of the early war
years, with most of the military freight destined for the operations
and maintenance of the bases and other assigned units.
Air Navigation Beacons
In the spring of 1941 with consiruction of air bases
underway throughout Newfoundland, the USAAF decided to extend the
air navigation beacon system that existed in the United States to
Newfoundland, Greenland and Iceland and eventually across the North
Atlantic to the United Kingdom. The system would enhance the
operation of American aircraft (and any allied aircraft with the
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necessary receiver) throughout the Northwest Atlantic.
The first contingent of USAAF communications personnel
arrived at Gander from SI. John's and within days were operational
with a mobile beacon and voice communications center (Shores,
1947:33). Later in the year this temporary unit was replaced with a
permanent station. Beacons were soon established at Harmon in
January 1942 and at 81. John's and Argenlia. The four station
network was linked from Harmon to the American network at
Presque Isle in Northeastern Maine. In the spring of 1942 Goose Bay
joined the Newfoundland network (USAAF Goose Bay Daily Diary,
1942).
In addition to serving as navigational beacons the AACS
units provided weather and voice communications with aircraft.
Reliable range of the signal was between 300 arId 400 miles
depending on the limitations previously discussed earlier in this
chapter on the HCAF navigation beacons (Shores, 1947:52).
Once the network in Newfoundland and Labrador was
established it was determined that additional beacons were
necessary on the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador for trans
Atlantic aircraft departing Gander and Goose Bay respectively.
These stations were established at WesleyVille and Cape Harrison
(USAAF Goose Bay and Gander Daily Diaries, 1941-1945).
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The Wesleyville beacon provided a bearing for the aircraft
departing North America and the first beacon to guide aircraft
approaching Newfoundland from the Allanlic. Wesleyville was
chosen because it was the last p,:,.il1t of land on the great cirde route
between Gander and the United Kingdom. The site, which was
selected in late 1942, was on the highest point of land, five miles
from the community of Wesleyville. Construction on the station
started in early 1943 and it was opera\ional by April. The
installation was a self-contained unit that housed the small
operations staff, generators, transmitter and wireless receiver.
A road was constructed between the installation and Wesleyville
where a wharf was construcled for maritime resupply.
Cape Harrison served the same purpose for aircraft
departing Goose Bay for trans Atlantic flight and for those
approaching Goose Bay from the ocean as Wesleyville did for those
flying from or into Gander from the ocean. The station and
equipment were similar to Wesleyville. The station was constructed
in the summer of 1943 and operated until the end of the war.
To further enhance the network and provide duplication of
existing beacons, in 1943 additional beacons were set up at the five
radar bases at Fogo Island, Elliston, Cape Spear. $1. Brides and Allan
Island.
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MeteQrologi;,;al Stations
"For the first six months of 1942 the North Atlantic was
the scene of hurried and at limes almost frantic preparation for an
air movement that would permit the weight of American air power
to be thrown against the Germans at the earliest possible moment"
(Craven and Cate, 1964:342) The main bases in Newfoundland,
Labrador, Greenland and Iceland were operational but required
considerable improvements to handle the large east bound air traffic
that was projected. To support these bases and the high volume of
air trafflc. accurate and reliable weather forecasting was necessary
10 ensure optimum utilization of the available good flying weather
and to reduce aircraft losses. Aside from the weather units at the
major bases a far flung system of remote stations was necessary to
supply data in the uninhabited areas to allow more ~'ccurate
forecasting. In addition to the weather stations set up in Greenland,
Baffin Island, and Northern Quebec, stations were established in
1942 at Hebron and Cape Harrison on the North Coast of Labrador. In
1943 additional stations were established at Indian House Lake
north of Goose Bay Just on the Quebec side of the border and at
Mecatina Lake in Quebec south of the Labrador border (Private
Communication: Col. Mereweather, 1989). All stations reported to
and were supplied by Goose Bay (Private Communication: Col.
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Mereweather; Dzcuban, 1959:190). Site selection for all weather
stations was based on their representativeness of the surrounding
weather, relationship to airports and airways along with a location
which permitted servicing by flying boat in summer and ski equipped
aircraf: in winter. This required a large nearby body of water.
To complement the ground obs~rvations the USAAF
maintained specially instrumented aircr::lft at Gander and Goose Bay
to traverse throughout the region to collect additional data and 10
observe wea:;-'I~l' patterns. These flights provided a check of inland
forecast data and additional data from over the Atlantic where
weather reports from passing vessels were random at best.
Information from the American and Canadian weather
networks in Newfoundland and labrador, Quebec and the Maritime
Provinces was combined and used by both countries to develop
forecasting maps 01 the North Atlantic theater. These forecasts
were shared by all services but were critical for the air operation
especially trans-Atlantic and maritime patrol
Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN)
LORAN is the acronym for Long Range Aid to Navigation. It
is a system of stations broadcasting radio signals lor long distance
navigation. To replace the traditional methods of navigation using
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celestial bearings, soundings and dead reckoning, LORAN was
developed to allow vessels to know their exact location at all times.
The system, with a range of approximately 1000 miles, depended on
operational conditions, as described earlier in the chapter for
Canadian radar, and worked on the same principle as the air
navigation beacons (Shores. 1947:256). A network of transmitter
stations was set up along the coast of North America, Greenland,
Iceland and the United Kingdom, with each station broadcasting a
unique signal. By tuning a receiver mounted in a ship and later on
aircrafl to two or more stations and plotting the bearing on a chart,
the vessel could determine its location through triangulation. To
ensure complete and accurate coverage of the Western Atlantic
stations in Newfoundland and Labrador were necessary.
A joint American-Canadian survey team surveyed the
counlry in August 1942 and selected Cape Bonavista and Battle
Harbour for transmitter sites (NLPA J & 0 Box 34, file 28).
Construction commenced immediately and the stations manned by
the United States Navy were operational by late fall. In July 1943
3n additional station was constructed at Twillingate (NLPA J & 0
Box 390 F48). In July 1944 a fourth station at Mouse Island, Port
aux Basques, was added to the network (NLPA S4-1-7,file 16). All
stations were similar in construction and design. The main feature
was HIe transmitter building and lhe adjoining steel tower to house
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thE' broadcast antenna. Accommodations and support buildings were
designed to accommodaie up to 15 personnel :J.lthough the nonnal
operating complement was betw~an five and len personnel. All
stations were serviced by sea and air with the exception 01
Banavisla and Port aux Basques which had the benefit 01 being
located adjacent to other military .;;lations and the railway. The
LORAN network operated for the remainder 01 the war anr' although
lhe original stations are no longer in use, remains today one of the
primary means of navigation for ships in the North Atlanlic.
The range of each beacon was determined by the size 01 Ihe
power supply that was available to the transmiUer. The larger the
power supply lhe more powerful the signal that courd be broadcast
and the greater the range.
SLMMAAY
By the end of 1943 the st'iltions, supporting infrastructure
and communications corridors had been Astablished. This network
supported the operations of the bases and the general air and naval
operations in the Nurth Atlantic. Because of their interdependence
with the bases these facilities were constructed at the same time
as the bases, although because their very existence was usually
based on technical limitations thaI were subject to change, their
construction was usually of temporary wooden buildings.
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CHAPTER V
CONTRACTION, REDUCTION AND REDEPLOYMENT:
SEPTEMBE·" ';943 - SEPTEMBER 1946.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
From mid 1943 10 the end of the war in 1945, Japan and
Germany continued on the strategic defensive. In the Pacific the
Island hopping campaign which had begun in 1942 was slowly
recapturing Japanese he~d territory and 'Nould end in September
1945 with the unconditional surrender of Japan. In the other major
theatre, the Allies had defeated the German forces 'n North Africa
and Sicily in 1942 and were advancing in Italy. The strateg;,;.
initiative on the Eastern Franl was held by the Soviet Union, which
through constant attack was slowly forcing Germany to retreat
westward. The heavy bomber forces of the United Kinguom, Canada
and the United States continued around-the-clock bombing offensive
against German industry and cities, while land, sea and air forces
were assembling for the invasion of continental Europe. The Allied
invasion of Normandy on June 6. 1944 forced Germany to tight a land
war on two fronts which from the very beginning of the war had been
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one of the German General Staff's greatest fears. The unconditional
surrender of Germany on May 8,1945, only eleven months later was
the almost inevitable consequence.
The Allied move to the strategic offensive coupled with the
growing Allied power in Europe and the reduction in German military
power had an obvious effect on the strategic and tactical allocations
of forces in the North West Atlantic. The main strategic role of
Newfoundland became less that of serving as a defensive outpost on
the perimeter of North America and more that of serving as a
suppc 1: base for trans Atlantic air traffic, and !;,,lr ships anoj aircraft
ei!gaged in the Battle of the Atlantic. In summarizing the strategic
change. Conne et ai, (1964: 552) stale "After the summer of 1943
the chief problem was one of contraction, of reduction and
redeployment. The enemy. not the Americas, was on the defensive
and the American outposts in the Atlantic shifted roles accordingly:
The strength of the defense forces peaked at approxima~ ..~ly
27,000 during the summer of 1943 and declined steadily until VE-
Dayan May 8, 1945 (Macleod, 1986:2&8). After this date there was
a rapid winding down of operations coupled with the redeployment of
operational units from Newfoundland to new locations in Canada. the
United States and the United Kingdom.
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With the conclusion of the war Newfoundland's strategic
importance was refocused. Operational naval and air units based in
the country were no longer necessary. However the large size of the
occupying forces in Germany and the hardening of relations between
the Western Allies and the Soviet Union combined with the newly
established air connections between the continents to provide the
requirement for the continued maintenance of air bases in
Newfoundland and Labrador to support the e~":lady flow of transient
aircraft. Therefore, while the naval and army bases and stations
were either closed or significantly reduced, the air b::tses remained
fully operational.
THE FUNCTIONAL LANDSCAPE; SEPTEMBER 1943 - MAY 1945
By the end of 1943 the development of the military
landscape was essentially completed. The construction program
which had created a new cultural landscape beginning in mid 1940
was now over. All the major bases and s~ations along with the
communications and transportation infrastructure had been
constructed and were in full use. The operational units and
equipment were all in place that were necessary to defend both the
country and the North West Atlantic along with support air
movements between North American and the United kingdom. These
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facilities were functioning at or capable of handling the maximum
level of military traffic or operations that the war planners
projected would be necessary. With this requirement achieved. and
given the Allies shift to the strategic ollensive, no further
construction of bases 0; defensive positions was necessary.
Although no new bases were established alter 1941. tllere
was a continuous program 01 maintenance. upgrading and small scale
construction at all bases in response to operational requirements
In many instances new construction was undertaken simply 10
replace temporary facilities that had been hastily established a\ tile
onsel of the base building boom in 1940 and 1941. The only
substantial examples of new construction were al the Canadian
naval base in S1. John's which underv.'ent a large expansion during
the period from the spring of 1943 until the summer of 1944, and a
LORAN station constructed at Mouse Island near Port aux Basques in
1944 (Tucker, 1952:201; Bridle, 1974). The expansion of the base
was in response to the continuing need lor more and more North
Atlantic convoy escorts, white the LORAN slalion was intended to
fill a gap in the existing coverage (Plate 16 & 17).
While there W<;lS a gelleral downsizing of tolal force
strength by bolh Canada and the United States, all !he bases and
stations remained pan of the functional landscape although some no
longer supported operations or were closed, unmanned and placed in
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'care and maintenance." The latter term was used by 1he military to
describe a base or station that was no longer needed as an
operational facility but which was 10 be preserved so as 10 be
available in case of some future need. The site may have been
maintained by a minimum complement of personnel as occurred at
the RCAF base at Botwood or closed completely and the personnel
withdrawn as occurred at the coastal defense battery at Rigale!.
With the allies on the offensive and the threat of even a
major raid eliminated, it was no longer necessary to maintain large
numbers of defensive tfOOPS in Newfoundland. This facl coupled
with the high demands for personnel in more active theaters of
operations led both Canada and the United States to begin rerlucing
the size of the garrison in the summer of 1943 (Dzcuban, 1r·59;
Stacey, 1948; Douglas, 1986). The first withdrawals occurred
among the infantry, anti-aircraft and coastal artillery troops The
defe'1sive capability was not, however, reduced to zero. The coastal
defense guns at Bell Island, Cape Spear, Outer Battery, Fort Amherst.
Argentia and Harmon were maintained until the end of tl\l~ war
although at a reduced readiness level. Other coastal batteries at
Rigolet, Point of Bay, Wisemans Head and Lewisporte were closed at
the end of the shipping season in 1943 although the siles were kept
in care and maintainence until the end of the war to permit rapid
reactivation if that were to become necessary.
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For the Navy the war in the North Atlantic continued
unabated until the unconditional su,render of Germany on May 8,
1945 (Hadley. 1986:295). The constant submarine threat produced
an ever-increasing demand lor escorts. Canadian naval strength in
51. John's and American streng!:1 at Argentia actually increased until
the end of the war as a~Jilional ships were assigned for anti-
submarine warfare. ','<Jhile there were small increases in the number
of shore based r.ersonnel at these bases, the greatest increases were
in ships' crewf,. These increases however, made only minimal
demands on '.he shore bases facilities. While assigned to
Newfoundlar.d bases crews spent the major portion of their time at
sea and v. hen in port were billeted aboard ship.
The number of escorts stationed at S1. John's steadily
increased throughout the war from 60 in June 1943 to a final tot?i
of 89 in May 1945 (Tucker, 1952:203). To accommodate this el'er
increasing number of ships the base at Sf. John's underwent a second
y~ar long building ;:'Irogram beginning in the summer of 1943 (Tucker,
1952:200-201). The ex~sling facilities were p. ....p:?~d~d and uPcraded
and a second 250 bed hospital was built adjacent to the existing
civilian hospital on Topsail Road. The final addition was a new
barracks complex on the South Side Hills overlooking the repair
shop, stores and tactical training center at the south end of the
harbour (Tucker. 1952:203a).
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The airfields at Gander. Goo£e Bay and Torbay and the
seaplane base at Botwood were operated by S1. John's based No. 1
Group (RCAF No.1 Group Daily Diary, 194"1-1945). Gander and Torbay
were used until the end cl the war by maritime patrol bombers.
Because of the acouisition 01 more efficient land based aircraft and
the switch from thf~ Catalina llying boat to the amphibious Canso
aircraft a seaplane ?ase at Botwood was no longer necessary.
Because the Gansos could use the runways at Gander the RCAF was
able to consolidate ,)perations at one year round facility. Neither
the costs ~:wed ilOf the effectiveness gained were insignificant The
civilian flying boat operations continued for the seasons of 1944 and
1945. As a result Botwood ceased to be used by operational
squadrons after lhe close of the 1943 flying season. The base was
placed in care and maintenance until the end of the war (RCAF
Botwood Daily Diary, 1943).
Both Gander and Goose Bay had a large USAAF base and a
smaller RAFFC contingent in addition to the Canadian air force <ind
army bases. The main operations at boih airtields were trans
Atlantic ferrying and transport operations although both continued
to support Canadian maritime patrol bombers engaged in the Battle
of the: Atlantic. Ferry operation:;; continued until the end of 1I-,e war
with the movement eastward of medium and heavy bombers from
North America. The transport operations on the other hand were
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predominantly by four·engine long range transpo'1S and converted
bombers flying VIPs and priority cargos on round trip Atlantic
crossings. The majority of these flights were by USAAF aircraft
although some operations were carried out by the ACAF and RAFFC.
The United States Navy operated twin engine long range
maritime patrol bombers from Argentia to the end of lhe war. On
the naval side there was an increase in the numbers of anti
submarine escorts and escort carriers until the end of the war in
much the same manner as the build up in Canadian Navy escorts at
$1. John's.
THE POST WAR MILITARY LANDSCAPE, JUNE 1945 - SEPTEMBER 1946
With the surrender of Germany in May 1945 military
operations in Newfoundland immediately began to wind down. The
last RCAF squadron returned to Canada by mid August. The
Newfoundland Escort For- was disbanded and the escorts returned
to Canada and the United Kingdom by the middle of July. The
Canadian and American infantry, coastal defense artillery and anti-
aircraft artillery were withdrawn and the sites abandoned. The
American bases at Pepperrell. Argentia, Fort MacAndrew and Harmon
remained although at reduced strength. Th~ same waSirue for the
American bases subleased from Canada at Goose Bay and Gander.
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Number 1 Group was disbanded and the base at Kennas Hill
closed. However, Canada maintained its air bases at Gander. Torbay
and Goose Bay to continue operational functions al the airports. The
radar stations at Brig Harbour, Fogo Island, Elliston Ridge, Cape
Spear, St. Brides, Allan's Island and Port aux Basques all closed
within lour months of the end of the war. The electronic equipment
and portable material was removed by the military and the buildings
were soon removed from the sites and integrated in to the local
communities as bUilding materials. Within a few years the only
remaining vestiges of the radar stations were concrete platforms,
foundations and debris (1949 air photos).
The Canadian Army abandoned Botwood, Lewisporte and
Gander in June 1945 and by September only administrative personnel
remained at St. John's. The coastal defense positions at Signal Hill,
Outer Battery, Fort Arr:herst, Cape Spear along with the previously
vacated sites at Rigolet, Lewisporte, Wisemans Point and Point of
Bay were abandoned and the tands returned to the Newfoundland
Government. Within a few years the temporary wooden buildings had
been removed for building materials although concrete bunkers
remain to this day as relic features.
The end of the war eliminated the need for Canadian naval
bases in Newfoundland. The scattered installations that made up the
base at S1. John's along with the other stations which had been built
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solely for anti-submarine escort operations were no longer
necessary. Within weeks all escort vessels had been withdrawn
from SI. John's and the shore base reduced to a minium complement
to oversee the closure and disposal of facilities. In June 1946 the
Canadian Naval base facilities in St. John's along with the stations
at Bay Bulls, Botwood and Harbour Grace which had closed in
September 1945, were turned over to Newfoundland (Tucker,
1952:498).
At SI John's the only facility maintained by the Canadian
Government for military purposes was the former naval base at
Buckmasters Field which was maintained as a joint services
headquarters for the administrative staff of all three services in St.
John's. The two hospitals were transferred to Newfoundland and
integrated into the country's health system. Many of the other
buildings were sold for commercial premises. The temporary
buildings were gradually torn down for their building materials or to
make way for new construction. The South Side Hills barracks
complex was removed in the late 1940's and the maintainence shops
were taken over for civilian Ship repair. The wireless station at the
Goulds remaine- I tor a 'lumber of years but was eventually replaced
by another more modern site south of Windsor Lake. The recreation
camp at Fourth Pond in the Goulds was sold for <;ivilian use. The
airport at Torbay was transferred to the Canadian Department of
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Transport in 1945 and thereafter remained in operation as a civilian
airport. Not all military activity ceased howevej: the USAF at
Pepperrell used a portion of ~he former Canadian base for transport
operation associated with the American military bases in the North
West Atlantic. However after Newfoundland joined Canada the ACAF
facility on the east side was reactivated
After the initial surge of returning combat aircraft from
Europe in the summer and early fall of 1945 the United States.
Canada and the United Kingdom reduced their contingents at Gander
and in March 1946 they pulled out altogether and all facilities at
Gander and Botwood were sold to Newfoundland for one million
dollars (Bridle, 1974:1418). Botwood continued to be used as a base
for trans Atlantic flying boats until the end of the 1946 flying
season when flying boals were replaced on the Atlantic routes. They
were supplanted by the large number of sur~lus land planes with
trans Atlantic range.
At the end of the war Gander finally assumed the role that
had !Jeen envisioned in 1933 when the airport had first been planned;
that 01 a refuelling and technical stop for trans-Allantic aircraft.
To accommodate the changing role of Gander many of the barracks
and administrative buildings abandoned by the military were
modifi~d into apartments tor the civilian staff who operated the
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airport and other buildings were converted for commercial and civic
p~Hposes and served as the town until the present town site was
constructed in 1952.
After the war Goose Bay remained a military airlieJd with
separate Canadian and American bases maintained on opposite sides
of the runways The major function of the airfieid was a
continuation of the wartime role of supporting trans-Atlantic flight.
Most of the far flung communications and radar stations
were closed during either the l<'l.st year of the war or in the first
ye2r of peace. All the RGAr: radar and American stations were
closed and the temporary buildings dismantled. By 1949 only scrap
melal and concrete foundations remained as the salvageable building
materials were incorporated into the local economy (1949 Air
Photos). The long lines communications network was maintained and
the relay stations automated. The FM transmitter! receiver station
at Table Mountain was transferred to the civ: n
telecommunications company which operated the site as part of the
country's telephone network. It subsequently served for many years
as the main telephone link to the mainland until it was finally
superceded by microwave technology. The airstrip at Buchans was
abandoned by Canada but continued to be used by c:vilian aircraft
particularly those operated by the Buchans Mir,ing COrT!pany. It is
still in use today by light sport aircraft.
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The United Stales closed the communications site at
Wesleyville and automated the navigation beacon. The beacon has
been upgraded over the years and today a civilian navigation beacon
lor trans Atlantic flight is operational near the original site. The
slalion at Cape Harrison on the Labrador coast remained operational
into the 1960's as a cOl':"ponent _,I the United Slates trans ocean
navigation network as did the LORAN stations at TlVillingate, Bailie
Harbour, Port aux Basques and Cape Bonavisla.
As would have been expected, most of the operational units
departed at the end of the war. But the trans Atlantic air age was
now firmly established and the American defense commitments in
Europe required the continued maintenance of operational bases in
Newfoundland to cement the air links to Europe. This became
especially important as relations between the Soviet Union and the
Western Democracies led by the United States continued to
d!::teriorate. American leadership of NATO and the Cold War with the
Soviet Union would be the stimulation for a military expansion in
the 1950's that saw extensive construction on the bases and the
establishment of another generation of far llung radar and
communication stations throughout the province.
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l.'iAPTERVI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In 1939 there was no military presence in Newfoundland and
Ihe cultural landscape contained virtually no military artifacts
except for the fortifications at 51. John's and Placentia, all of which
dated from the 18th and early 19th centuries. Throughout history
the military had played an important role in developing the
landscape of Newfoundland. The country had played host to a
permanent garrison in St. John's for nearly 200 years and during the
17th and 18th centuries had been the scene 01 numerous battles
between the British Empire and Franr:e as they struggled for control
of Ihe New World. However, because 01 the changing geopolitics of
Ihe North Atlantic world, Newfoundland had not hosted an Imperial
Garrison since 1370 (Stacey.1936). The almost complete lack of a
military presence on the landscape was to change in 1940 when
Canada, the United States and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom
decided, for reasons having to do with their own national security
and strategic interests, to develop a series of military bases and
stations throughout the country. In fact the United States had
unilaterally drafted plans to occupy and protect the country to deny
its use to Germany ana to facilitate the defense of the Western
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Hemisphere (Watson, 1950:477). Th~se were decisions and events
over which Newfoundland had little control but which resulted in a
major transformation of the landscape as the military initiated a
construction boom unprecedented in Newfoundland history.
Other researchers addressing lhe economic and cultural
landscape of the Province since 1939 have refe~red 10 the great
impact of the military on shapinn lhe province (Steward, 1974;
Brown, 1985: Neary. 1986). The changes throughout Newfoundland
were widespread and rapid. For example in 1939 there were
approximately 50,000 people receiving government assistance and
no defense related emplo,/ment (Mackenzie, 1986: 30). When delense
construction p€~ked in the fall of 1942 a tolal of 19.752 men were
employed on defense·related projects alone (NLPA PU G8J5).
Between 1941 and 1945 there was also a significant improvement in
the state of government finances. For the first time since the
Commission of Government came to power in 1934 revenue exceeded
expenditures. This allowed Ne\'noundland to provide war loans to
the United Kingdom, pay olf its accumulated debt and actually build
up a budgetary surplus. Total revenues from t940 to 1945 were
$133.5 million while expenditures amounted to only $116.6 million
This compares with the preceding be year totals of $53.9 million
in revenue and $64 million in expenditures, for a deficit of $10.1
million. Between 1940 and 1945 the United States spent $113.5
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million (US) on military bases stations and infastructure while
Canada spent $65.1 million (Can.). This total military expenditure of
$178.6 million was $62 million grea: ; than the total expenditures
of the Newfoundland Government during the same period (Dzeuban,
1959:168; United States Navy, 1979:14: Bridle, 1974:14~7). These
military expenditures played a great part in a three fold increase in
annual government revenues, which rose from $11.2 million In 1939
to $33.3 million in 1945. These increases allowed expenditures to
rise from $15.3 million in 1939 to $26.3 million in 1945 (Neary.
1986:363).
The immediate effects of the post-1940 military
occupation of Newfoundland and LC'.brador on the cultural landscape
were dramatic and in many cases long-lasting. Today there are many
relics remaining in the landscape. Relics can be 01 two types, those
features or forms which have survived but have lost IhiO!ir funciion
and those which have survived by acquiring a new function. Today
some former militalY features have survived only as relics Others
have survived as functional relics either because they have taken on
a new function or continue their original function in the civilian
economy. Former military features on today's landscape range from
the abandoned concrete coastal gun emplacements at the Outer
Battery, For1 Amherst and Cape Spear near St. John's to the airports
at Torbay, Stephenville, Goose Bay and Argentia. Of the original
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bases and stations none are presently used solely for military
purposes and only Goose Bay and Argentia have maintained a
continuous military presence (Table 1), Most of the substantial
assets have been irJtegraled into the social capital of the province
and have played an important role in the development ('1 the provinca
over the las1 53 years. The impacts on the landscape go far beyond
the simple physical changes brought about solely by the military.
The physical. social, economic and cultural landscit;leS also
underwent tremendou~ change as a direct and indirect result of the
eco.,omic boom createcl by defense construction and maintainence
employment.
The military landscape in Newfoundland and Labrador
evolved from the necessity and desperation borne of wartime needs.
Geography and geopolitics were the primary reasons the military
forces of three nations came 10 Newfoundland. In the three years
from July 1940 to July 1943 they completel1 a massive building
program of bases, stations and supporting communication and
transportation infrastructure. Military personnel poured in from
Canada, the United States, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom,
often before the necessary infastructure was in place.
Of all the military developments it was the bases that had
the greatest ~mpact on the landscape. The stations were smaller,
usually intended for a single function and constructed of wooden
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frame buildings that were designed for temporary use. The life
expectancy of a station was often limited by technology (Table 2).
The bases were constructed with a large number of permanent
buildings that have endured over time, and this permitted the bases
to be transformed for ether uses once the military withdrew. This
;5 particularly true of the American bases .....hich were built to a
very high standard.
The facilities transferred from the military when the war
ended. enabled Newfoundland to make tremendous gains in social
capitaL The infrastructure that was added, at little cos: to the
country, hastened development and improved the quality of the lives
of its citizens. Two complete hospitals in SI. John's and one each in
Botwood, Gander and Lewisporte were incorporated into the health
care system. Welt dev~loped and fUlly operational airports at
Torbay, Harmon, Goose Bay, Argentia and a greatly enhanced airport
at Gander eventually made their way into the civilian aviation
network. With the exception of Argentia, which was
decommissioned in 1973, they form the nucleus of the province's
aviation landscape.
With the exc~ption of Goose Bay, all of the Canadian and
American bases were constructed within the existing cultural
landscape. Fort Pepperrell, Harmon, Argentia, Fort MacAndrew and
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Torbay airport \'''ere all constructed on lands that, for the most part,
wer<:l cleared and in agricultural use. Private property was
expropriated and the inhabitants moved to nearby communities.
Among the base sites only that oj Fort Pepperrell had an earlier 20th
century military association. It had served as the training groufld
for the Newfoundland Regiment before it went overseas in the First
World War. Among the stations, only the battery at Fort Amherst
had been used during Wand War One. The site of the American dock
at the Inner Battery had previously been used for commercial
shipping and since the withdrawal of the military in 1960 has once
again returned to this commercial role.
At the time it was taken over by the military, Argentia was
a deep·wat€~ ~ort with a rail line connection to the main line of the
Newfoundland Railway. The Navy's use was only a continuation of
the function eSlablished years earlier by the railroad and steamship
services and the existen.:e of well developed facilities was one of
the major factors underlying ihe Navy's choice of the site for a base.
Gan-ler and Botwood were air bases established in 1935 by
the British Air Ministry predominantly for civilian I~ans Atlantic
flight. From the time that they were taken over by the m:lilary in
1940 and until they were relinquished back to civilian control in
1946 their function, although expanded considerably, continued to be
the same. Although Botwood was ov~rtaken by technology and closed
224
at the end of the 1946 flying season Gander continues as the only
international airport in Newfoundland serving both domestic and
international trans Atlantic traffic.
At Botwood the ramp and breakwater to Killock Island along
with a small building which serves as a museum remain today. The
ramp serves as pan of the street network for the town and the
breakwater as a shelter for £.mall boats. The naval hospital
continues to function as a municipal facility but the former naval
pier is a derelict feature on the water1ront landscape.
Gander took on new prominence in 1946 as it became the
main civilian airport in the Western Atlantic for trans-Atlantic
propeller aircraft. For the next 15 years it was the most impo:'ani
airport on the western side of the Atlantic for refueliing and
maintainence of aircraft on trans Atlantic !Iights. The importance
of the airport declined in the late 195[J's with the introduction of
hng range jet aircraft. Today the airport is Newfoundland's only
international airport with its main runways substantially
lengthened to a~commodate the heavier jets with their higher
landing speeds.
At Gander few of the original wartime buildings survive
today. Only the AAFFC hangars on the east side of the field, the
Canadian Army drill hall and the former American power p~A.nt on the
west side of the runways remain. Hangar 13, originally built lor
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RCAF patrol bombers, was used by Transport Canada as a
maintajnence garage until it was torn down in 1986. Since the early
19S0's, Gander has hosted a Canadian military base on the west side
of the runways. The main administration building is the former
USAAF hospital.
Goose Bay is the only base wilhoJI a previous human
landscape, having been carved out of a virgin lichen forest in 1941-
42. The military landscape has endured to the present day. The
functi.::.n of the landscape has remained fundamentally unaltered
although its form has cha'iged over the years in response to the
continual upgrading which has been necessitated by changes in the
framework of military requirements.
Not surprisingly the largest concentration of miiitary
artifacts are to be found within 51. John's and environ". The whari
and maintainence shops of the Bay Bulls marine railway remain
today and have been used since 1945 to support fishing and coastal
trade vessels. At Buckmasters Field only the recreation center
remains and still serves the same function. The old naval store
buildings at the west end of the harbour continued tG stand until the
late 1970's when they were demolished to permit a road widening
project. The Southside barracks complex was removed shortly after
the end of the War. The former naval fuel storage tanks on the
Southside Hills were sold to Imperial Oil in 1946 which has
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maintained them in their original function. The naval hospitals
remained in U$e as medical facilities until the 1960's when the
Topsail Road Hospital was converted to a college. II was finally
torn down in the early 1980's. The facilities on the army base at
Lester's Field had mostly been demolished by the end of li,~ 1940's.
The only buildings which survive today are those on BI~c!'f'larsh Road
which are currently in use by Purity Factories as part of their
bakery. The concrete cOi;lstal defense gun emplacements at the Ouler
Battery, Fort Amherst, Argentia, Bell Island, Pair! of Bay and
Wisemans Head remain today as derelict relic features. The only
such facility that has escaped 1118 consequences of neglect is the
Cape Speal battery which has been preserved as one of the main
exhibits in the Cape Spear National Park.
The American bases at Pepperrell, Argentia, Fort McAndrew,
Harmor, and Goose Bay are readily discernible on the landscape as
separate entities differing from the surrounding landscape by virtue
of their arChitecture. size, and the layout of the buildings. Having
obtained 99 year leases on these sites the Americans constructed
high quality permanent buildings, which were carefully maintained
well into the 1960's. Gander was the only wartime American ba~-=
that was not expanded anG operated as a military facility in the
post-war years. The base facilities leased from Canada had been
hurriedly built mainly using wooden frame construction that was not
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designed 10 survive for long in the Newfoundland climate. Given the
existing airtields at Argentia, Harmon, Goose Bay and Torbay, the
first two under American military control, there was no need for a
firth base at Gander that would have to be shared with civilian
traffic.
In the 1950's the United States expanded it~ bases in
Ne~Aoundland in response 10 the geopolitics of the Cold War. All
bases were active in support of naval and particularly air operations
in the North Atlantic and underwent considerable expansion and
modifications to the original 1940's infrastructure. However by the
beginning of the 1960's advances in technology combined with
changing geopolitics negaled lhe need for an extensive American
military presence in Newfoundland. In 1961 Pepperrell Air Force
Base beca;ne the first of the bases to close. The land was returned
10 Canada, and Ihe buildings and assels were divided between the
Provincial and Federal Governments. The Canadian military moved
from their quarters at Buckmasters Field into some of the vacant
buildings at Fort Pepperrell which are still occupied by the Canadian
forces posted to Canadian F-orces Station St. John's. The hospital,
housing units, heavy equipment garages and laundry continue to
fulfill their original functions under new ownership. Other buildings
are used for Federal and Provincial Government offices and storage.
In 1966 Harmon Air Force Base 0.1 Stephenville became ltw
second of the bases to close. In this case too. the :lsse,s and
infastructure were transferred to Canada (Plale 18). Since t1wn the
Federal Department of Transport r'dS operated the <lirport. The
buildings which are not required for the function 01 the airport l1:we
been transferred to the provincial government and integrated into
the provincial infrastructure. Like PepperrelJ, although the base 11;1$
been closed for 27 years. the land3cape is rciatively uncllanged. Th~
only current vestiges of military use on tt~e former base is Ihe
inlre'.:juent stopover by mllitary aircraft and the annorj which
houses a company of the Royal Newlour.dland Regiment, Canadi~n
Army Reserve.
At Argentia the original naval base on the north side wa!'>
abandoned by the United States in 1973 and leased to Newfoundland,
although a reoceupation clause in the s'lblease allows the American~
to reactivate the site on 24 hours notice. The present Uniled Slales
Navy 8ase is localed on the site of the fanner Fort MacAndrew which
the Navy acquired from the USAF iI, the earlv 1950's. This baSe is
scheduled for closure in 1994 at which time ttle [and and Itw
infrastructure will be returned 10 the Governments 01 CanarJel and
Newfoundland and Labrador as has occurred with all the previous
base closings.
LEGEND ?LATF.. 18
1 St. George's Bay
2 Stepr,envi lIe
3 Aircraft Parking
4 Fuel Storage
0:; Housing
6 Stephenville Pond
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The USAF Base at Goose Bay was extensively rebuilt in the
1950's and 1960's along Witil the runways, but was closed in 1976
and returned to the Canadian Armed Forces with the expiry of the
lease (Plate 15). The !ctlter moved into the belter built and equipped
buildings of the former American base and closed their base on the
north side of the runway. The buildings and land were then
transferred to the federal and provincial governments. SUbsequently
some of the buildings were sold to private interests. Only the large
hangars, warehouses, stadium, curling club and recreation center
remain. Many of the smaller buildings have not survived because of
their age and wood frame construction. The Canadian Armed Forces
have continued to operate the former US,\F base as their base and
the facility has been used extensively since 1976 for low level
flight training by the air forces of J\!,",TO.
Because of their size and longevity the various bases have
had the greatest impact on th8 landscape, There are, however, other
facilities and infast; Icture that have also had a large impact on the
landscope but because of their very nature they are not readily
identifiable to the untrained eye as having originated in !he military
landscape, The roads, navigational beacons, LORAN, port facilities,
airports and communication systems were all integrated into the
country's social capital at little or no cost and all played an
important role in the post-war development of the country.
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II is clear that the military landscape established dur'nQ 36
months of intensive construction between 1940 to 1943 continues
to have a ::ignificant impact on the landscape of the province. The
military landscape has proved not 10 be ephemeral but has survived
hoth physically and functionally to the present. Today relics of the
1950's, 1960's and 1970's are scattered throughout Newfoundland
and Labrador as reminders of the province's military geography of
the twentieth century.
This thesis has set out to ~econstruct the mil italY
developments of the war years and show their impact on thp.
landscape. It is believed this will provide a basis for understanding
the impact of the military on the present landscape and serve as a
basis for other studies on the role of the military in Newfoundland.
LITERATURE CITED
M8MJSCRIPT SOURCES
Archjyal Collections
Newfoundland
Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador
Commission of Government
Department of Justice and Defense, GN 38/S4-2.
Department of Public Utilities, GN 38/S5·1.
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador
Department of Environment and Lands
Lands Branch General Files
Air Photo and Map Library
Canada
National Archives of Canada
Military and !ilternational Affairs Records
Royal Canadian Air Force
No.1 Group St. John's
RCAF Station Botwood
RCAF Station Gander
RCAF Station Goose Bay
RCAF Station Torbay
NO.5 (BR) Squadron
No. 10 (SR) Squadron
No. 125 Squadron
No. 126 Squadron
232
No. 129 Squadron
No. 130 Squadron
No. 14 Radio Detachment 51. John's
No. 17 Radio Detachment Torbay
No. 19 Radio Detachment Gander
No. 29 Radio Detachment Goose Bay
No. 30 Radio Detachment Cape Bauld
No. 32 Radio Detachment Port aux Basques
No. 36 Radio Detachment Spotted Islands
No. 37 Radio Detachment Brig Harbour
No. 40 Radio Detachment Allan Island
No. 41 Radio Detachment 81. Brides
No. 42 Radio Detachment Cape Spear
No. 43 Radio Detachment Elliston
No. 44 Radio Detachment Fogo Island
Transport Canada: Gander International Airport
Botwood DepartJre Logs 1936-1946
Gander Departure Logs 1939-1945
United Kingdom
Public Records Office, Kew Gardens
Air Ministry, Operational Records Book: RAF Transport Command;
Gander Daily Diary.
United States
Department of the Air Force
United Stales Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air
Force Base
Gander Air Force Base Dally Diary 1941·1945
Goose Bay Air Force Base Daily Diary 1945·1953
233
234
Fort Perperrell Air Force Base Daily Diary 1941-1952
Fort MacAndrew Air Force Base Daily Diary 1941-1945
Ernest Harmon Air Force Base Daily Diary 1941-1953
Department of the Navy
Naval Historical Research Center Archives, Washington Naval Yard
United States Naval Air Station Argeotia Daily Diary
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Newfoundland
Acts of the Honourable Commission of Government of Newfoundland.
Census of Newfoundland 1935.
Canada
Bridle, Paul, ed. Documents on Relations between Canada and
Newfoundland. Vol. 1 1939-"' 949, Government of Canada,
Ottawa, '974.
Minister of Supply and Services Canada Year Book 1978-1979,
Ottawa,1979.
United Kingdom
Air Ministry, Atlantic Bridge, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1945.
Air Ministry, Merchant Airmen The Air Ministry Accoynt of British
Civil Aviation 1939-1944, His Majesty's Stationer! Office,
1946.
235
Roskill, Captain S. W., The War at Sea 1939-1945 Vol II, Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1956.
United States
United 51;.:le$ Air Force, U. S. Operations in the North East 1940-
_t~,Directorate Historical and Reference Services,
Headquarters North East Air Command, 1950.
United Stales Navy, ~~Ii!y Cruise Book, Argentia,
1979.
BOOKS AND ARTICLES
Ashworth, G. J., War and the City, Routledge, London, 1991.
Baleman, Michael and Raymond Riley (eds.), The Geography of
~, Barnes and Noble Books, Totowa, New Jersey, 1987.
Beaty, David, The Water Jumo The StOry of Transatlantic Flight,
Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1976.
Bradshaw, Michael J., 'Geography a"d Peace Studies,' I.M
Operational Geographer, No, 6, 1985, pp 41-43.
Brown, Howard, The Impact of MOdernization on a Traditional
Regional System: The Case of Inner Placentia Bay
Newfoundland 1911-1966, Unpublished MA thesis, Memorial
University of Newfoundland, 1985.
Bykolsky, Joseph and Harold Larson, Unjted States Army in World
War II The Technical Services The Transportation Corps·
Operations Overseas, Department of the Anny., Washington
D.C., 1957.
236
Churchill, Winston S., Their Fines! HO'ff, Houghton Mifflin Company.
Bosto(l, 1949.
Cohen. S. B., Geography and Politics in a World Divided, Oxford
University Press, 1973.
Cole, Brigadier D. H., Imperial Military Geography, Silton Praed and
Co. Ltd.,London, 1950.
Conn, Stetson, et aI., United Slales Army in World War II' The
Western Hemisphere: Guarding the United Stales and Us
Q..yjQ~, Office of thE. Chief of Military History.
Department of the Army, WaShington, 1964.
Conn, Stetson, and Byron Fairchild, United States Army in World War
II' The Wester.r: 'dM:!isohere: The Framework of Hemisphere
~, CHiee of the Chief of Military History, Department
of the Army, Washington. 1960.
Craven, Frank W. and ~'ames L. Cate, The Army Air Force in World
~, Volume I, The University of Chicaqo Press, Chicago,
1964.
Douglas, I,',!, A. B., "The NaZI Weather Station in Labrador,"~
G.-~ 101, No, fj (December 19811 January 1982),
pp. 42·7.
Douglas, W. /\. B" The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official
History of the Roya! Canadian Air Force, University of
Toronto Press,Toronto, 1986.
Dzcuban, Col. Stanley W., United States Army in World War II.
MjlitaN Relations between the U.niled States and c.:~
~, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1959.
Faringdon, H., Confrontation' The Strategic Geography of NATO anc!
!he Warsaw pact, Routledge & Kegan Paul, New York, 1986.
237
Faringdon. H., Strategic Geography, Routledge, London, 1989.
Hadley, Michael L, U- Boats Agajnst Canada McGill-Queens
University Press, Kingston, 1985.
House, JOhl', ·War, Peace FInd Conflict Resolution: Towards an Indian
GGean Model", Institute of British Geographers,N. S. 9, 1984,
IJp·3-21
How, Douglas, Night of the Car~, Lancelot Press, Hantsport, Nova
Scotia,1988.
Hughes, Terry aod John Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic, Dial
Press, New York, 1977.
Jamieson, Don, No Place for Fools The Political Memories of Don
Jamiesoo Volume 1, Breakwater Books, $t. John"s, 1989.
Jordan, Terry G., aod Lester Rowntrl'!e, The H"rtl.ar! r",jQsaic A
Thematic Introduction 10 Cultural Geography, Harper and
Row Publishers, New York, 1986.
Kostenuk, S. and J. Griffin, ?G8E..,Squdrons and 8ircraft, Samuel
Stevens Hakkert and Company, Toronto. 1977.
Lamb, James, The Corvette Navy, The New American Library of
Canada, Scarborough 1979.
Langer, Wliliam L. and S. Everett Gleasofl. The Challenge to Isolation
1.9.a..Z.:.1..9..iQ., Harper and BrOthers Publishing, New York,
1952.
lotchin, Aoger W., (ed.), 1M Martial Metropolis' U. S. Cities in War
~, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1984.
MatloH. Maurice and Edwin M. Snell, The United States Armv in World
War II' The War Department· Strategic Planning for
Coalition WfH1are 1941-1942, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C., 1953.
238
MacKenzie, David. Inside the Atlantic Triang&......C.anada and the
Entrance of NewiQllndland into Confederation 1939-1949.
University of Toronlo Press. Toronto, 1986.
MacKinnon, "The RCAF in Newfoundland-, University of Toronto
~. Volume XV, 1946-46. pp 213·221.
MacLeod, Malcolm, Peace of the Continent. Hany Cufl Publications
Ltd., St. John's, 1986.
McGrath, Judy, ed. Qn tbe Goose The SIaN of Goose Bay. Them Days.
Volume 12 Number 4, June 1987.
McManners, Hugh, "The Geography of War", The Geographjcal
~, Volume L1X No. 11. November 1987. pp. 548-553.
McVicar, Don, Ferry Command, Airlife PUblishing. Shrewsbury. 1981.
Mieczkowski, Z., ·G~ography and Peace Studies·, Two Models.~
OperaUooal Geographer. No.8. 1985. pp. 63-65..
Milner, Samuel, "Establishing the Bolero Ferry Aout~". MW~
~ 11-12, 1947-1948, pp. 213·220.
Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of the United Slates Naval Operations
in World WJr II The Battle of the Atlantic September
1939-"Aay 1943, Volume I, Little Brown and Company, 1964.
Murphy, Tony and Paul Kenney, The War at Our Doorstep, Harry Cuff
Publications Limited, 1989.
Neary, Peter, Newfoyndland in the North Atlantic World 1929-1949,
McGill-Queens University Press, Kingston, 1988.
Nicholson, Colonel G.W.L., ,More Fichting Newfoundlanders' A History
of Newfoundland's Fighting Forces in the Second World War,
Government oi Newfoundland rInd Labrador, S1. John's, 1969.
239
O'Sullivan, Patrick, and Jesse W Miller, The Geography of Warfare,
St. Martins Press, New York, 1983
Openshaw, Stan and P. Steadman, "On the geography of a worst case
nuclear attack on the population of Britain", f..Q.!.i1k.a!
~~ 1, 1982, pp. 263·278.
Openshaw, Stan and Philip Green and Owen Greene, Doomsday,~
after Nuclear Attack, Basil Blackwell Publishers, Oxford,
1983.
Owen. H. G., "The Newfoundland Project", Canadian Geographic
~, 1943, p. 206.
Peltier, Louis C., and G. Elzil Pearcy, Military Geographv, D. Van
Nostrand Co. Ltd., New Jersey, 1966.
Pepper, David and Alan Jenkins, The Geography of peace and War.
Basil BlackweU LId., 1985.
Perkins, Dexter. " Bringing the Monroe Doctrine Up to Date," Foreign
Affairs, XX (January, 1942), 253-65.
Powell, G.,~, Airlife Publishing Ltd., England, 1982.
Schull, Joseph, The Ear Distan! Ships: An OffiCial Account of
Canadian Naval Operations in the Second World War, Queens
Printer, Ottawa, 1961.
Shores, Louis, Highwavs in the Sky' The stOry of the AACS, Barnes
and Noble Inc., New York, 1947.
Stacey. Col. C. P.. "The withdrawal of the Imperial Garrison from
Newfoundland, 1870", Canadian Hisbrical Reyiew, Vol. XVII,
June 1936.
Stacey, Col. C. P., The Canadian ArmY 1939-1945 An Official
Historical Summary, Kings Printer, Ottawa, 1948.
240
Stacey, Col. C. P., Arms Men and Governments The War Policies of
Canada 1939-1945 Queens Prio1.er. Ottawa. 1870.
Stewart. Ian M.. The Revolution of 1940 in Newfoundland,
Unpublished MA thesis. Me:ilorial University of
Newfoundland, 1974.
Taylor. W.A. JO~ln, and Kenneth Munson, editors, ~viatiQ!l;.
Air Transport before the Ser:ood World War, New English
Library, London, 1975.
Tucker, G. N. The Naval Service of Canada, Volume 1, Kings Printer,
Ottawa. 1952.
Watson, J, Wreford. "Relic Geography in an Urban Community'
Halifax, Nova Scotia-, in R. Miller & J. W. Watson (edS.)
Geographical Essavs in Memory 01 Alan G. QQalvi~, Thomas
Nelson and Sons Ltd., Toronto, 1959.
Watson, Mark Skinner, United Slates Army in World War II: The ~E
Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Early
Q.Q...e.!.a.1.., Historical Division, Department of the Army,
Washington, 1950.
Walt, Sholto. I'll take the High Road' A History of the Beginni~
the Atlantic Air F'rry in Wartime, Brunswick Press,
Fredericton, 1960.
West, Bruce, The Man who Flew Churchill, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.,
Toronto, 1970.
Wilcox, Francis, "The Monroe Doctrine and World War II", The
American Political Science Review, Vol. XXXVI, No.3, June
1942, pp 435·453.
Williams, Alan F., Father Baudoin'S War: D'iberville's Campaigns in
Acadia and Newfoundland 1696 16!J7, Memorial University
Newfoundland, 1987.
241
PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
William Chale; Mr. Chafe moved to Gander in 1936 as a youth. where
his father worked at the Airport both during construction and during
operations. Upon completion of his education he obtained
employment at the airport as an electric!:;.ns helper. Until his
retirement in the late 1970's he was employed at the airport in a
variety of pos'tions with government and the aviation industry and
resided in Gander until his death in 1989. Mr. Chafe provided
information to the author during numerous conversations during
1985, 1986 and 1987.
Frank Day; A life long resident of St. John's, Mr. Day worked for the
American military al Fort Pepperf~1l during the Second World War
and experienced the military buildup in the Northeast Avalon first
hand, Mr. Day provided information to the author during numerous
conversations during 1992 and 1993.
Jack James; Mr. James moved 10 Gander in 193610 work on 1he
construction of the airport. He worked a1 1he airport in various
capacities until retiring in 1984, the last 20 years as Airport
General Manager. Mr. James passed away in the early 1990's. He
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provided im'ormation to the author during ..;onversations in the
summer of 1982 and 1983.
Col. A. F. Merewether; Col. Merewether (USAAF Retired; was the
Commanding Officer, from late t 942 to 1946. of the USAAF's 8th
Weather Region which included Newfoundland and Labrador. Col.
Merewether provided information to the author in an exchange of
letters during 1988 and 1989.
William Parrott Sr.: During the Second World War Mr. Parrott served
as a Flight Lieutenant in the RCAF. He flew in the Newfoundland area
in 1943 before spending the last two years of the war in Coastal
Command Ilying anti-submarine missions in the vicinity of 'the
United Kingdom. He provided the author with information during
numerous conversations in 1992 and 1993.
Lester Shea; Mr. Shea was employed by the International Power and
Paper Company as a Woods Operations Manager in the Benton-Indian
Bay area in the mid+1930's. Mr. Shea, because of his local knowledge
of the area escorted the Air Ministry officials during their site
selection survey for Gander Airport. Mr. Shea passed away in the
mid-1980's. He provided the author with information during
numerous conversations in 1979 and 1980.




